

CONFIDENTIAL

NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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DESTROY AFTER BACKGROUNDER HAS
SERVED ITS PURPOSE OR WITHIN 60 DAYS

CONFIDENTIAL

Governmental Affairs

THE WASHINGTON POST

August 27, 1976

John Marks

Media in the Third World

A recent Washington Post editorial attacked Third World countries in UNESCO for trying to turn the news "into a national commodity which it is any government's right to exclusively control." The Post stated in no uncertain terms, "Government sponsorship of the gathering or distributing of news, inside a country or from outside, promotes propaganda and deforms the whole idea of a free press."

In essence, The Post was saying that the American First Amendment should be a planetary standard; that no government anywhere should take action abridging freedom of the press.

That is a commendable position, but it ignores a reality that no American—and especially, The Washington Post—can honestly ignore. The fact is that the U.S. government, through the CIA, has long been doing on a massive scale to other countries exactly what The Post accuses UNESCO of wanting to do: sponsoring the news in foreign places, with the avowed—if secret—purpose of promoting propaganda.

This American wrong in no way makes right foreign interference with the press, but it does explain to some extent why Third World countries are concerned about protecting their media against Western penetration.

Until the last few years, only a handful of government and press insiders knew how actively the CIA worked to manipulate the foreign press. Now after a series of exposes and congressional investigations, the scope, if not all the particulars, of the CIA's media operations is a matter of public record.

The House committee chaired by Otis Pike found that at least 29 per cent of the CIA's covert actions over the years "were for media and propaganda projects." This figure translates into secret CIA expenditures in the billions of dollars aimed at making other countries toe the covert American propaganda line.

The Senate's Church committee laid out in specific terms how as recently as 1973 the CIA ran a shrill media campaign in Chile as part of its efforts of "advocating and encouraging the overthrow of a democratically elected government."

The agency's press operations included:

- Pouring millions into El Mercurio, Chile's most well-known newspaper and most strident foe of the late President Salvador Allende. A CIA internal memorandum found that El Mercurio and other agency-supported media outlets played an important part in setting the stage for the coup against Allende.

- Orchestrating the issuance of a protest statement attacking Allende by the Inter-American Press Association, a prestigious grouping of U.S. and Latin American newspapers, including The Washington Post.

- Bringing to Chile scores of foreign

reporters, mostly controlled CIA "assets" to report the agency's line to the folks back home. This campaign was ostensibly not aimed at American public opinion, but an internal CIA memo quoted by the Church committee boasts that "replay of Chile theme materials" appeared in The New York Times and Washington Post.

The Post editorial stated that the paper was "not insensitive to the feeling in some Third World places that they are swamped by the Western media" and suggested "their proper response is to strengthen their own media, as many (with Western aid) have done."

This Post approach seems to be assuming that even with significantly fewer resources available, Third World media can bolster themselves to meet Western competition. Even if such a self-help solution were possible, it would still offer these countries no protection from the subversion of foreign intelligence agencies.

Mr. Marks is an associate of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington and co-editor of "The CIA File."

gence agencies. Notions of fair play, which ran through The Post editorial, simply do not apply when the spooks are trying to buy up a newspaper or suborn an editor, and the secret services of the Third World apparently are not nearly so clever in guarding against this sort of thing as the big powers' spy agencies are at doing it.

The Post complained about restrictions placed on Western correspondents. It made no mention that the CIA

keeps some of these correspondents secretly on its payroll. As long as the agency refuses to give up the use of journalists, all reporters—including the innocent majority—will be suspect. Even if Western reporters do not have the cultural biases that some in the Third World accuse them of having, the existence of reporter-spies still gives them the excuse to question the objectivity of the Western press.

The Post urged that the Third World accept and purchase the product of Western news services, such as The Post's. Yet, some of these same services have been used by the CIA to spread propaganda. An example was a London-based feature outlet called Forum World Features. Forum was an outright CIA front, and its board chairman from 1966 to 1973 was John Hay Whitney, publisher of the International Herald Tribune, of which The Post is part owner. There is no evidence that either The Post or the Herald Tribune was used by the CIA, beyond apparent unknowing "replay" of propaganda themes. Nevertheless, one might not have been terribly surprised if after Forum's CIA connection was revealed last year, Third World subscribers had drawn negative conclusions about all the news outlets with which Whitney was associated.

The United States is not the only country that covertly tries to manipulate foreign media. Our allies, including Britain, France and Israel, all do it. So do the Soviets in a major way.

But we are Americans, and we are supposed to be different. We proclaim to the world, as The Post editorial did, that foreigners would be better off if they accepted our idea of a free press.

It is totally inconsistent, in any case, to say that foreign governments should not interfere with the media and not to condemn our own government for doing just that to others. Just as we can't be the world's policemen, we also should not be its censor.

And in the meantime, until the CIA halts its media manipulation, we should at least be understanding of the desire of Third World countries to take action designed to maintain their freedom not to be subverted by our own government's propaganda operations.

on the leftists. In Buenos Aires in 1962, Smith learned that the focus of his work would be on Castro, not Argentina, what with a \$100-million hemisphere-wide budget authorized to "get" Fidel. He finally took early retirement in Mexico in 1973, disillusioned with work that had little to do with the CIA's professed *raison d'être*. This is a penetrating look at the Agency's everyday activities, consistently engrossing and eye-opening even though some readers may need a scorecard to keep track of the foreign political factions and the acronyms of the many "unilateral" CIA departments and projects.

[October 22]

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Monday, August 23, 1976

Ford ordered the CIA and other federal agencies to begin briefing his running mate, Sen. Robert Dole of Kansas. The President, vacationing at Vail, Colo., after his convention victory last week, was reported planning on as many as four televised debates with Carter during the campaign. The first may be Sept. 28.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Thursday, September 2, 1976

Arms report rewritten to suit Kissinger?

By Fred S. Hoffman

Associated Press writer

Washington

Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, retired military intelligence chief, says analysts rewrote an estimate of Soviet progress in missile warhead development after Henry A. Kissinger disagreed with their original conclusions.

"I was employed at the CIA when one fully coordinated National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Soviet strategic attack systems was returned for rewrite by Dr. Kissinger because he disagreed with certain conclusions," General Graham said. "It was rewritten."

General Graham said Dr. Kissinger, then head of the National Security Council (NSC), wanted the estimate to indicate faster Russian progress toward achieving multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). "The estimate was changed in his direction," General Graham said.

He recalled that the incident occurred in late 1969 or early 1970 when the Nixon

administration was working toward an agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting strategic nuclear weapons.

The general, who retired last January as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, suggested that Dr. Kissinger wanted a more ominous intelligence estimate to support arguments that such an agreement was imperative to curb Soviet missile gains.

An associate of Secretary of State Kissinger said General Graham's version of the incident was overdrawn and "not quite a fair representation" of what happened. "I don't believe that Kissinger sent the National Intelligence Estimate back to get a different conclusion," the Kissinger associate said.

"He probably told them to look at the NIE again and consider all possible interpretations of the evidence. There was a fair amount of debate in Washington at the time about the Russian S9 missile and whether they were MIRVing it. 'I would seriously doubt that Kissinger

would tell the technicians what to conclude. To my knowledge, he has never done that."

The CIA was given an opportunity to comment but did not do so.

General Graham mentioned the incident briefly and without detail in an article in *Strategic Review*, journal of the privately financed United States Strategic Institute. He elaborated in an interview.

As General Graham recalled it, the original conclusion reached by specialists from various government intelligence agencies was that the Russians had more likely tested a shotgun-style multiple warhead (MRV) than the more sophisticated MIRV, which could be aimed precisely at separate targets.

"The evidence was not clear at the time to say it was a MIRV," General Graham said. "I myself felt it was more likely an MRV development. But Kissinger didn't like the conclusion which the whole intelligence community came up with after lots of hours of wrangling. It arrived back at the Office

of National Estimates with a suggestion that he didn't like it. So they came up with another conclusion more to his liking. It went back to the NSC with heavier emphasis on MIRV."

General Graham, who was on the staff of the NIE office at the time, said, "We were pretty annoyed."

Asked why Dr. Kissinger might have sought a different conclusion, General Graham said he could only speculate, but that it is his belief that Dr. Kissinger wanted to underscore the urgency of getting an arms limitation agreement.

"At that time, the more horrendous the Soviet developments, the more necessary it would be to cut off their nuclear weapons growth with an arms limitation agreement," General Graham said.

The United States and Russia completed their first SALT agreement in 1972, but it placed no limits on MIRV warheads. In 1973, the Pentagon announced officially that the Russians had successfully tested MIRV-armed missiles.

NEW YORK TIMES

2 Sept. 1976

President Gets Bill to Open Agency Sessions to Public

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 — Some 50 Federal boards would be required to conduct most of their business in public under a "sunshine" bill that Congress has sent to President Ford. Mr. Ford has said that basically he agrees with the philosophy of such legislation.

The measure received final Congressional approval yesterday when both houses, which previously approved differing versions, passed a combined measure. The House vote was 384 to 0, while the Senate approved the measure by voice vote.

The bill, entitled Government in the Sunshine, also requires Federal boards to avoid off-the-record communications about cases put before them.

It covers about 50 boards and commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Power Commission.

Last February, President Ford said, "Basically I agree with the philosophy of the Sunshine

bill." However, he added: "There may be some meetings held by agencies or departments in the Federal Government where there would have to be confidentiality maintained."

The boards would be required to announce meetings at least a week in advance. They would be allowed to close their meetings only under specified circumstances, when certain types of information were under discussion.

These would include defense and foreign policy matters, internal personnel affairs, private commercial data, criminal and other law-enforcement matters and information that might invade an individual's privacy.

Transcripts or minutes of closed meetings would have to be kept. Courts could review decisions to close the sessions and, if they found cause, could order information released.

The bill would prohibit "ex parte" communications intended to influence decisions—that is, unofficial contacts outside the regular proceedings and

THE PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
9 August 1976

MEDIA

"IT IS OUR AIM to be contemporary, exciting, and to deliver solid entertainment—as well as the most up-to-date reports on mystery films, books and television," write the editors of the new magazine *Mystery Monthly*. In addition to mystery and suspense stories, each issue contains a review section, an interview, puzzles and quizzes, a cash contest, and a column by a former C.I.A. problems analyst covering new developments "in the real world of spies, detection and criminology."

The annual subscription rate is \$10 (\$12 foreign). A single copy costs \$1. *Mystery Monthly* is distributed nationally in Independent News Manuscripts. Review copies of books, and all other correspondence, should be sent to *Mystery Monthly*, 119 W. 57th St., New York, N.Y. 10019.


records between agency decision-makers and outsiders with an interest in the outcome.

Representative Bella S. Abzug, Democrat of Manhattan, head of a subcommittee that handled the bill, said the "sunshine" law would "assure that decisions affecting millions of Americans which have too often been made at informal sessions, will no longer be permitted to be made in meetings closed to the press and public."

NEW YORK
16 AUGUST 1976

A Harlot High and Low: Reconnoitering Through the Secret Government By Norman Mailer

THERE ARE NO ANSWERS. THERE ARE ONLY QUESTIONS.
—Jean Malaquais



A HARLOT HIGH AND LOW WAS the English title given to *Splendeurs et misères des courtisanes*, one of Balzac's best novels. The book was concerned as much with secret police as with the prostitutes who passed through its pages, but then whores and political agents made a fair association for Balzac. The harlot, after all, inhabited the world of *as if*. You paid your money and the harlot acted for a little while—when she was a good harlot—as if she loved you, and that was a more mysterious proposition than one would think, for it is always mysterious to play a role. It is equal in a sense to living under cover. At her best, the harlot was a different embodiment of a fantasy for each client, and at those moments of existence most intense for herself, the role she assumed became more real than the reality of her profession.

A harlot high and low. The pores of society breathe a new metaphor—the enigma of intelligence itself. For we do not know if the people who make our history are more intelligent than we think, or whether stupidity rules the process of thought at its highest level. Is America governed by accident more than we are ready to suppose, or by design? And if by design, is the design sinister? Are the actors playing roles more intricate than we expect? Trying to understand whether our real history is public or secret, exposed or—at the highest level—underground, is equal to exploring the opposite theaters of our cynicism and our paranoia.

For instance, we may be getting ready to decide that the CIA was the real producer of Watergate (that avant-garde show!), but where is the proof? We have come to a circular place. The CIA occupies that region in the modern mind where every truth is obliged to live in its denial; facts are wiped out by artifacts; proof enters the logic of counterproof and we are in the dream; matter breathes next to antimatter.

There are Americans whose careers are composed of fact. One does not begin to comprehend certain men without their collections of fact. It would probably be crucial to know if Harry S. Truman had been happy or angry on a given day since that would enter the event of the day. He lives on an elementary level of biography.


There are personalities, however, like Marilyn Monroe, for whom there are no emotional facts. It does not matter on any particular occasion if she was pleased or annoyed, timid or bold, even successful or unsuccessful. Her mood did not matter on a given day since she would as easily be feeling the opposite five minutes later. Moreover, she was an actress. She was able to simulate the opposite of what she felt. Since she was surrounded by people in show business who felt no need to be accurate if that interfered with a good story, one could not begin to discover the facts about such a woman, only the paradoxes. It may be that the difficulties in coming to know Marilyn Monroe offer a modest model for our penetration of Central Intelligence.

I

A Skew in Sociology

Questions of social class and snobbery have always been very important in the CIA. With its roots in the wartime Office of Strategic Services (the letters OSS were said, only half-jokingly, to stand for "Oh So Social"), the agency has long been known for its concentration of Eastern Establishment, Ivy League types. Allen Dulles, a former American diplomat and Wall Street lawyer with impeccable connections and credentials, set the tone for an agency full of Roosevelts, Bundys, Cleveland Amory's brother Robert, and other scions of America's leading families. There have been exceptions, to be sure, but most of the CIA's top leaders have been white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and graduates of the right Eastern schools. While changing times and ideas have diffused the influence of the Eastern elite throughout the government as a whole, the CIA remains perhaps the last bastion in official Washington of WASP power, or at least the slowest to adopt the principle of equal opportunity.

—Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks,
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence



WHAT A BABY! KNOWN affectionately as the Company, it was delivered to America by the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, and grew from 5,000 employees in 1950 to 15,000 by 1955. Because

The CIA is currently the owner of one of the biggest—if not the biggest—fleets of "commercial" airplanes in the world. Agency proprietaries include Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport, Inter-mountain Aviation, Southern Air Transport, and several other air charter companies around the world ... [but] CIA headquarters ... has never been able to compute exactly the number of planes flown by the airlines it owns, and personnel figures for the proprietaries are similarly imprecise. An agency holding company, the Pacific Corporation, including Air America and Air Asia, alone accounts for almost 20,000 people, more than the entire work force of the parent CIA. For years this vast activity was dominated and controlled by one contract agent, George Doole, who later was elevated to the rank of a career officer. Even then his operation was supervised, part time, by only a single senior officer who lamented that he did not know "what the hell was going on."

—The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence


the old OSS was not nearly large enough to make up its cadres, the CIA raided the FBI to obtain some of its first agents (thereby commencing an immense feud with J. Edgar Hoover) and also did its best to strip the army, the navy, the air force, the State Department, and virtually every other government bureau of good personnel. There was, after all, a vision. The potential functions of the CIA were calculated to become immense. They became immense. All intelligence was the purview. There was no reason, for instance, why the best long-term weather forecasts in America should not derive from CIA weather experts—knowledge of the weather helped crops; large crops were an instrument of foreign policy. No vein, therefore, of American business or culture was independent of Intelligence—not finance, media, economic production, labor-management relations, cinema, statistical theory, fringe groups, Olympic teams. There was no natural end to topics the CIA could legitimately interest itself in.

Since we live in an age of general systems, where all knowledge is assumed to live ultimately in the same field as other knowledge, so, from its inception, the CIA looked to draw its experts from every field: bankers, journalists, lobbyists, colonels, professors, commodores, soil-erosion specialists, diplomats; business consultants, students, lawyers, doctors, poison specialists, art experts, public-relations men, magazine editors, movie technicians. Out of every occupation in American life, men and women were drawn to make up the first cadres of the CIA, and they were often the best in their field.

Because the CIA, like other government bureaus, had a table of organization which limited the rank and salary of its employees, the Company had from the beginning an army of officers serving as privates. There was not room for the amount of ambition in its ranks. People moved out of the CIA almost as quickly as they went in and returned to universities, businesses, other government departments, and major foundations, or back to their previous occupations in American life. Of course, a banker who had been a CIA man and was now in finance again was hardly the same banker. Nor had he necessarily left the CIA. If it had been the most exciting experience of his life and/or the most patriotic, he had sentimental loyalties to the Company. He was out of the CIA but still an effective member of it. Sometimes he might even be on call for special jobs or be asked for privileged information on the movements of his financial community.

Like the breaking out of a virus from the host cell, the metastasis of a cancer colony, or the leavening of yeast in bread—depending on one's point of view—the CIA offered a suffusion into the joints and pores of American life so complete that no master list of its active and reserve members (not to speak of its devoted sympathizers) was ever available. One CIA man could never know for certain whether a CIA man who had left the CIA did not still belong to it, and if he did, there were often excellent

reasons no record should exist, particularly if he belonged to the Company as to a club, and took no salary. Some agents who left the CIA but were still in it, or of it, might have given reports every week of their life. Others may never have reported once. Like "moles"—it is the CIA word—they waited underground through the seasons working at their private career in order to be of eventual use. Some old agents might still be reliable, some might not—some might report only to one old friend in the agency. No one would be certain finally who belonged and who did not. In places like the State Department, one could begin to guess, but never know, whether the first allegiance of many a foreign-service officer was to the State desk or to the Company's cover. Since the leaders of the CIA came from a social, financial, and corporate elite, it could be said that the agency was the militant arm of the Establishment, an order of potential martyrs to Henry Luce's American Century.



NE CANNOT FOLLOW THE CIA'S USE of funds: Nobody is meant to know where all the Company's sources of money originate nor how they begin to end. At the core of many a CIA operation is the need for secrecy in the use of money. Some foreign official has to be bought, or expensive military equipment must be left as a gift in another country. If spies are to be paid, and foreign companies infiltrated, if Central American troops are to be trained for invasion forces, and drug traffics infiltrated for the information they will supply on Indo-Chinese troop movements, if a hundred semilegal or near-to-criminal patriotic activities need to be lubricated without congressional grit in the bearings, then money has to pass down to active operative levels in the middle regions of the Company without scrupulous bookkeeping. It was better for the director of the CIA not to know what his agents were up to, not if he had to testify on oath before congressional committees. What one did not know, one could not tell. It was therefore the essence of policy for no one to be in command of more information than he needed—a cellular society has to have waterproof compartments, enclaves. Money, therefore, did not always have to be accounted for; indeed, it often was put into an activity on no more than the word of the good character (and/or good family) of the agent who requisitioned it. No word needed to come back on what had been done with the bread, who was bought, who was killed, who made a profit.¹

Since inside information on foreign currencies, or the domestic commodities market and gold market, or advance warning of a devaluation in the dollar, was as available on occasion as money, it is unthinkable that some of the Wall Street men in the CIA did not make secret investments for the agency (that is, for their enclave in the agency) which soon brought back huge profits by virtue of the secret information which had first encouraged the investment. That kind of surplus could now be used for ultrasecret operations or for even more resplendent financial investments. It is novelesistically intoxicating to contemplate the pyramiding of wealth which must have gone on in some enclaves of the CIA. What a congeries of friendly and competitive financial empires may have begun to exist within the agency! For all we

¹The Pike committee in Congress had a withheld report (published in the Village Voice, February 16, 1976) which decided that the real intelligence budget is not \$5 billion, the estimate given to Congress, but is "closer to \$10 billion," the missing \$5 billion being buried in the appropriations of other departments. Ten billion dollars is roughly equal to the annual budget of New York City.

know, and we will not soon know, half-the Swiss banks are now controlled by agents, facets, wings, arms, committees, councils, operators, and officers of the CIA. Contemplating the mix of real names and false names, actual companies and fronts, declared and secret investment, legal and illegal accounting, fair and flawed computers, it is doubtful that we will ever be able to measure the wealth manipulated by the CIA. Add to this the inevitable intimacies and financial interrelations of such prime possibilities as Hughes, Vesco, and J. Paul Getty, plus the covert investments of the agency in any number of multinational corporations (with the Mafia and without)—lo, it is not so difficult to think that the economic history of the Arab nations may yet be seen to shine by the secret light of the Company's resources. One cannot, of course, know. It is just that it is easier to believe in such a scenario than to assume that all those 'proud, powerful Company patriots with their comprehensive information and financial skills never used CIA money to make money that did not have to be accounted for.

Besides, it would be interesting to guess the magnitude of the CIA's secret funds. Out of the real \$10-billion Intelligence budget would come the seed money for concealed investments; if the process has been going on for 25 years with continuous reinvestment, then these secret investments could total by now anywhere from \$25-billion to \$100 billion, not an impossible sum for the 25 years it has been burgeoning if we compare it to the income of the CIA's senior partner, the Mafia—but we anticipate.

I have worked on projects with many CIA men so unaware of the entire operation that they had no realization and awareness of the roles of other CIA men working on the same project. I would know of this because inevitably somewhere along the line both groups would come to the Department of Defense for support. I actually designed a special office in the Pentagon with but one door off the corridor. Inside, it had a single room with one secretary. However, off her office there was one more door that led to two more offices with a third doorway leading to yet another office, which was hidden by the door from the secretary's room. I had to do this because at times we had CIA groups with us who were not allowed to meet each other, and who most certainly would not have been there had they known that the others were there. (For the record, the office was 4D1000—it may have been changed by now; but it stayed that way for many years.)

—L. Fletcher Prouty, *The Secret Team*

It is inevitable that there should be a loss to CIA agents of a clear boundary to their identity. A man may work in the CIA for twenty years and never perform the role his title suggests he is performing. Two men may work side by side in the same office for ten years and never learn the other's real work, or to the contrary may know the work intimately but not have a clue on what it is designed to cover. A man's wife may only guess at his real activities. Old moles who have been working at a separate career for years might find themselves suddenly activated as agents and have to deal with CIA men who are present under a new cover themselves.

After years of such work, one may no longer be certain of one's own function, loyalty, or sanity—one can hardly be certain of the identity of one's friends, and one can never be sure the CIA has or has not made a new piece of history. It is impossible, for example, for anyone in the Company ever to be positive the agency had absolutely nothing to do with the assassinations of the sixties. In such a medium of existence, paranoia is equal to logic itself, and an infinite number of scenarios may dance on the head of a pin. There is always the unforgettable paradigm of the double agent Azev, who, in the years before the Russian Revolution, spied on the Bolsheviks for the czarist police, but in the course of his false Bolshevik duties murdered czarist police with such daring that Azev rose high in Bolshevik circles and became one of Lenin's most trusted men. Indeed, Lenin could not at first believe the captured files of the czarist police although

they gave unimpeachable evidence that Azev was a double agent. Where is the root of identity in that kind of man?

The human brain is divided: into a right lobe and a left lobe; a bold side and a cautious one; a moralist and a sinner; a radical and a conservative; a live lover and a dead one; a wit and an idiot; a hard worker and a sloth. We are all ourselves, and to some degree we are the opposite of ourselves. Consider the overlays of personality which accompany these shifts of identity when a cover story is added—there must be an actual need to function as double agents now that the psyche has been already once divided! Then contemplate the variety of political activities which take place within the Company: from the right-wingers of the John Birch Society to the social engineers who brood in private over *The New York Review of Books*; consider the ideological wars which go on between cold warriors and lovers of détente, between those who would presumably die for more government and those who wouldn't mind killing for less. If we take into account the functional need of the agency to have its enclaves cut off from responsibility or accountability, and in turn the natural propensity of these enclaves to become—in compensation for the dirtiness of the work—political, that is, to fight for political ends within the CIA and maneuver for power at the top, as well as engage in capers on their own to affect the internal history of the United States, how then can they not use every tool ranging from straight financial manipulation to Syndicate involvement to assassination? Yes, try to keep up (if you are the director) with the movements of agents in the CIA attempting to infiltrate rival enclaves. The mind reels. The scenarios do a dervish. To live with a role is to live as an actor—so soon as the role is more satisfying than the life, all clear boundaries of identity are lost. All the more reason, then, for the CIA man to try to find an identity within his false identity by way of some enclave that satisfies his political needs. It is a way of saying he looks for a secret political action which will seem authentic to him—an action that can cut through the confusion of enigmatic projects and multiple identities in order to give the country what it really needs, that is, what he believes America secretly desires.

It is against the background of this mammoth of shuffled identities, concealed fortunes, fever-hot enclaves, secret killers, paranoid visions, osmotic bureaucratic walls, pervasive unaccountability, double agents, infiltrated capers, and cross capers that we attempt to look at Watergate. If what has been proposed already is valid at all, then we can be certain no clear picture will come to us soon. It is better to recognize that we are blind and can only try, through the distorted reverberation of the echo, to improve our knowledge of the mood. Of course, that is the true perception of the blind.

II

A Hitch in Historiography

Huldeman ordered an exhaustive investigation into O'Brien's relationship with billionaire Howard Hughes. Caulfield reported back in a Jan. 25, 1971, memo that the investigation could bubblegum in Nixon's face.

*The Hughes organization's "tentacles touch many extremely sensitive areas of government," cautioned Caulfield, "each of which is fraught with potential for Jack Anderson type exposures."*²

—Jack Anderson, *the Washington Post*, June 6, 1974

The phantom billionaire repeatedly insisted upon total secrecy. He didn't want "the most microscopic chance of the slightest hint being accidentally dropped to anyone," stressed a typical memo. Another time, he declared that his informants "put their very lives in jeopardy with some of the disclosures they make to me, and if they thought this information went to any-


²The memo actually said "Maheu's tentacles. . ." We will meet Maheu before long.

body—no matter whom—they would not continue to inform me."

—Jack Anderson, May 23, 1974

Howard Hughes has not been interviewed or photographed by any pressman since 1958.

—Stephen Fay, et al., *Hoax*



BY THE END OF HIS LIFE, HUGHES satisfies some idea in us of the giant amoeba or master spider. If he first appeared on the screen of the American media as a wealthy and prodigiously eccentric young man, reminiscent of Orson Welles at the beginning of *Citizen Kane*, he ended as one of the wealthiest recluses and most mysterious right-wingers of history (that is, assuming it was Hughes who just died and not one of his—more than one—legendary doubles). He is at once the principle of total invisibility in public life and a gargoyle out of *The Day of the Locust*. We think fondly of young Hughes, his racing planes, and his movies: *Scarface*, *The Front Page*, and *Hell's Angels*; his stars: George Raft, Jean Harlow, Bob Mitchum, Jane Russell; and then we read of the old gink who abhors bacteria as Dracula fears the cross.

Hughes kept his last wife, movie actress Jean Peters, on a yo-yo string. He would disappear for long stretches and send her endearing but false messages. . . .

In 1965, he promised to have Thanksgiving dinner with her. But because of his fear of germs, he told her to sit across the room from him. She walked out in a huff.

The following year, he persuaded her to join him in Boston where he promised they would settle down. But again, he kept her at across-the-room distance. She put up with it for three days.

—Jack Anderson, May 23, 1974

Since secrecy was his antiseptic, the media are often tempted to portray his ventures as absurd. The story of the \$550-million CIA contract for the Glomar Explorer came out in the press as a huge and peculiar sum for the CIA to pay Hughes to design a boat that could "retrieve military codes and nuclear warheads from a Soviet submarine sunk three miles deep in the Pacific . . . [especially] since the codes were outdated and the value of the other information was negligible."³


Of course, the Soviet submarine might only have been the cover. Maybe, it was wiser to assume the CIA had grown concerned with finding a new source of minerals to compete with Third World cartels. They could have "awarded Hughes the \$550 million to develop an advanced technology for underwater mining—thereby giving Hughes a head start toward a bonanza with more potential than oil. . . ."⁴

The Glomar bonanza could leave Hughes, by some counts already the wealthiest man in the world, an order of magnitude wealthier. But then for two decades Hughes must have been suffering something like the psychosis of a heavyweight champion. (Every heavyweight champion has to be a fraction insane since he cannot know if he is the greatest fighter alive or if some unseen maniac of the martial arts is getting ready to destroy him in an alley.) So Hughes had to wonder whether he was making history or was only a servant of the history the CIA might be

making through him. He could not know, and no one looking on from the outside could know, how much of the CIA was part of his operation or how much of his operation was directed by the CIA. Indeed, was there even a live man named Hughes at the center of it all, or was there a Special Committee?⁵ Suffice it that whatever entity was comprised by his name, Hughes had properties. Since we don't know what we are dealing with, let us designate it HUGHES.

HUGHES's corporations earned more than half a billion dollars a year from government contracts alone and 32 such contracts were with the CIA. That was the largest number held by any corporate entity with the Company. Time fortified such figures: "During the past ten years Hughes Aircraft, which relies almost exclusively on Government work, has won nearly \$6 billion in Government contracts. . . . There was also about 6 billion dollars more in secret contracts with the CIA over this period. . . . Asserts one former Pentagon official, 'Their interests are completely merged.'"⁶ So, HUGHES, whoever HUGHES was, might begin to look like the pope of Avignon to any director of the CIA. If an enclave needed funds for a special caper, who was better than HUGHES to fund it? HUGHES was Daddy Warbucks to the CIA. HUGHES owned half of Las Vegas. HUGHES, by way of various intermediaries, had absorbed it from Meyer Lansky. Since the CIA already had associations with Lansky, easily as old as their mutual attempts to assassinate Castro, the Company could now, by way of HUGHES and Las Vegas, enter into another majestic interface with the Mafia, that is, with half the labor unions of America, and nearly all of the entertainment industries, the construction industries, the highway, travel, and tourist industries, not to speak of the more celebrated nonlegal industries like prostitution, pornography, narcotics, and—the finest operation yet discovered for laundering huge sums of money and evading the IRS—gambling. (If the Mafia had detested the very mood and atmosphere of gambling casinos, it would still have been obliged to get into the business for the legerdemain it offered to heavy sums.) In turn, the high-potential money in the CIA would want to discharge into the great sea of Syndicate wealth. There the take—voices fill in awe—came to \$50 billion a year, and that was twice General Motors' if only half the size of the defense budget.

CIA officials asked Maheu to enlist Syndicate men for the Castro murderer . . . and authorized him to pay \$150,000 for the hit. Maheu told the Church committee he hesitated initially because he feared the project might interfere with his work, for Howard Hughes, who also had retained Maheu's services. But Maheu said he agreed to the assignment after informing Hughes of the murder plot—and, according to one source, gaining the billionaire's approval. For the project Maheu called on John Roselli, Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante.⁷



WE COULD SPEAK OF MAHEU. ⁵The body of the Hughes who died in April of this year had its fingerprints checked "against genuine Hughes prints on file with the FBI in Washington. It was," Time says cheerfully (April 19, 1976), "Hughes, all right." Of course that assumes no one in the mills of identification has ever been able to switch a set of prints.

⁶Time also says: "Not until 1971 did the IRS subject the Hughes holdings to an overall audit; the results of that audit have been kept secret."

⁷"Strange Bedfellows." In excerpt, out of respect for the source's punctuation, Hughes will appear in lowercase.

³Howard Kohn, "Strange Bedfellows—The Hughes-Nixon-Lansky Connection," Rolling Stone.

⁴"Strange Bedfellows."

an ex-FBI agent on special retainer to the CIA since 1954, as a man of variety and dimension, a veritable fixer, but such words do not elucidate the physics implicit in his personal forces. Rather, Maheu is known in Intelligence as a "pivotal" figure—the roads go through his tollbooth. We will learn for instance from the Pike committee that pornographic movies were sometimes made with CIA funds to blackmail people and "one of these was titled 'Happy Days' with Mr. Robert Maheu as casting director, make-up man, cameraman and director." The detail is cited not to offer us the opportunity to rise in moral height above Maheu so much as to loosen our imagination. He was also for a time the most visible HUGHES representative in public life. "You are me to the outside world," reads one memo to Maheu.⁸ "Go see Nixon as my special confidential emissary," says another in the spring of '68. "A Republican victory this year . . . could be realized under our sponsorship and supervision every inch of the way."⁹ HUGHES even had a \$600,000 French colonial mansion built for Maheu on the Desert Inn grounds.

The first time he entertained for lunch the casino managers . . . Maheu tapped his water glass for attention. Then, to the astonishment of his Las Vegas colleagues, Robert Maheu said grace.¹⁰

"O'Brien and Maheu are longtime friends from the Boston area. . . . During the Kennedy administration there apparently was continuous liaison between O'Brien and Maheu."

—Memo from John Dean to H. R. Haldeman,
January 26, 1971.¹¹

There was, of course, the delicate matter that Hughes wanted to hire me but didn't want to meet me face to face. Maheu raised the issue—he said that was simply Hughes's style of operation, that he, Maheu, had worked for the man for years, and was his chief executive officer, but had never met him.

—Larry O'Brien, *No Final Victories*

After Hubert Humphrey's defeat in 1968, Larry O'Brien was relatively at liberty. The new administration might be Republican, but O'Brien had not worked as postmaster general and chairman of the Democratic National Committee nor managed the presidential campaigns of Kennedy, Johnson, and Humphrey for too little. Nobody had more contacts in Washington than Larry O'Brien. From early in 1968 on, even as Maheu was being confidential emissary to Nixon, so was he also being instructed to hire O'Brien as HUGHES's Washington representative; but it was only in October, 1969, after a stretch for O'Brien on Wall Street, that the consulting firm O'Brien Associates was formed and given a HUGHES contract at \$15,000 a month. The arrangement, however, soon faced complications. By late 1970, HUGHES had decided to replace Maheu with Intertel.

Although this is not widely known, an increasing number of big corporations in recent years have either established private intelligence units or hired intelligence consultants from the CIA, the FBI, the DIA, the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, the Treasury, the Secret Service, or the Internal Revenue Service. The purpose is, basically, to protect a corporation's own secrets or acquire other corporations' secrets in the ever-competitive business world. A whole underworld of corporate intelligence has thus developed.

Several organizations in the United States openly offer corporate intelligence services. The most important is Intertel. . . .

—Tad Szulc, *Compulsive Spy*

It could be said that Intertel had better CIA connections than Maheu. In fact, they were socially superior.

⁸David Timlin, *Just About Everybody* vs. Howard Hughes.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹J. Anthony Lukas, *Nightmare—The Underside of the Nixon Years*.

Intertel's owner was James Crosby, good friend and host of Rebozo and Nixon. Crosby was also the chairman of Resorts International, an immense gambling-and-tourist complex in the Bahamas which (with many a camouflage) had been taken over from Meyer Lansky by the CIA. (Brave men grow bold in the Caribbean and gentlemen turn into pirates.) Resorts International came right out of the Crosby Miller Corporation, in which a controlling interest had been acquired in 1958 by Mary Carter Paint, a corporation originally gotten up by Allen Dulles and Thomas E. Dewey.

If the CIA hierarchy had icons analogous to the Mayflower, they were Allen Dulles, Thomas E. Dewey, and the Mary Carter Paint Company. By such cachet James Crosby of Intertel was to Maheu's CIA pornies and assassination capers as Louisburg Square to Scollay Square. In addition, Intertel may also have been in position to offer HUGHES the Glomar Explorer contract if he would take them on. That meant letting Maheu go. Since Maheu knew a lot about HUGHES, it was a big payment for a real peril.

The changeover in 1970 was accomplished with the maximum of mystery. The man, Hughes, six feet four inches, reported to weigh 97 pounds and, by a Las Vegas doctor's report, next to death, gave over his authority to Maheu's most determined enemies with a proxy which enabled these enemies to bring Intertel's security force into the casinos and drive out Maheu's troops, a dramatic night for Las Vegas, whose citizens were learning about this time that a tall thin man, claimed by his proxy-holders to

be Howard Hughes, had been smuggled out of his sanctuary in the penthouse of the Desert Inn and been flown to the Bahamas (even though he was next to death and swore he would never fly again). There were some, Maheu among them, who offered the mordant suspicion that HUGHES was now a karmic transplant, but then there were others who had been supposing the same since 1958, when the man, Hughes, stopped seeing anyone but a few Hughes Tool Company executives and/or his rotating male nurse-secretaries (five), who received all messages for him. Maybe, by the time of the move to the Bahamas, HUGHES was going into his second karmic transplant; maybe HUGHES was now a computer not unrelated to OCTOPUS at Langley.

But such speculations take us too fast down the stream. Let us keep to what we may suppose we know. It seems clear that HUGHES, now divested of Maheu, would not necessarily want to keep Maheu's friend in his employ. Of course, dropping O'Brien would hardly be fail-safe. It was not comfortable to estimate how much O'Brien had learned about the CIA from Maheu (if for that matter O'Brien had had a great deal to learn about the CIA).



NEVERTHELESS, THE TRANSFERS were made. Sometime after Intertel took over from Maheu, HUGHES replaced O'Brien with Bob Bennett. The son of Senator Wallace Bennett (R), from Utah, Bob Bennett was a churchgoing Mormon; in fact, he was part of the three-man bishopric of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in Arlington, Virginia, a detail of dubious interest until it is fortified with the knowledge that a large number of HUGHES aides, assistants, and top executives were Mormons; indeed, Maheu's most devoted enemies in HUGHES were Mormons. We might wonder how such religious fellows would comport themselves in Las Vegas, but there is always a tendency to underrate the sects we know least. It seems, consulting the *Encyclopaedia Bri-*

tanica, that a secret Mormon society called the Danites was organized for Joseph Smith in October, 1838. They had "the avowed purpose of supporting Smith at all hazards, of upholding the authority of his revelation and decrees as superior to the laws of the land, and of helping him to get possession, first of the state, then of the United States, and ultimately of the world."

It would be an investigator's pleasure to now reveal that there is a modern-day Danite enclave in the CIA reaching out to the Danites in HUGHES, but we shall have to content ourselves with the only Mormon we have—Bob Bennett—and his relations to Chuck Colson and Howard Hunt.


Bennett had been a director of congressional relations at the Department of Transportation, to wit, a public-relations man and lobbyist. Needless to say, both are splendid positions for a mole. In addition, any work Bennett could find concerning highway construction might bring him, if he chose, close to the Mafia; he was thereby twice-connected to voyage out from his one third of a bishopric. Since he had also been friends with Chuck Colson since 1968, and lately of quiet service as the White House contact (that is, informer) in the Department of Transportation, Bennett was on his way to being his own pivotal figure. Consequently, he was in a position to try to do a favor for HUGHES. The good deed (seeking to divert the dumping of nerve gas from the Bahamas ocean floor—a way of protecting future HUGHES investments in the Bahamas) could not be accomplished, but Bennett left a good impression and was hired by his fellow Mormons.

Then "Colson called Bennett to say that Robert Mullen wanted to sell his company. Colson urged Bennett to buy the company and said he would help him find clients."¹² Bennett bought into Mullen & Company, and in one month rose from executive vice-president to president; after nine months he completed the purchase. Earlier than this, sometime "during his first months with the company . . . Robert Mullen told him about the company's relation with the CIA."¹³

This small account of a purchase is invaluable for what it teaches of how to detect a cover story by the incriminating anemia of its narrative. For it asks us to tolerate the idea that a useful CIA front was sold to a non-CIA man who was then kindly informed of the CIA's relation to the company he bought; in return for such courtesy, he proceeded without ado to labor for the agency. Since Bennett will labor long hours, it is comfortable to suspect he has been with the CIA before we have met him.

It is in the political agent's interest to betray all the parties who use him and to work for them all at the same time, so that he may move freely and penetrate everywhere.

—Galtier-Boissière¹⁴



ENTER HUNT. He has been with Mullen & Company since May, 1970, a little better than six months, before Bennett has arrived, and according to his account, he is furious with Mullen because Bennett came as a surprise. "The switch was as unexpected as it was unwelcome."¹⁵ Hunt had seen himself as eventually taking over Mullen & Company. Accordingly we are encouraged by his account to believe Hunt moved over to the White House out of disgust with his situation at Mullen & Company rather than as part of

a more or less orchestrated plan to bring Bennett and Hunt nearer to the administration. It was, in any case, not a shift that was difficult to make, for Hunt was also a friend of Colson's. They had met at the Brown University Club of Washington in 1966. Later, Colson became president of the club and Hunt, vice-president. They met frequently for lunch all through 1969 and 1970, and at one time Colson even thought enough of Hunt to try to make him director of a conservative think-tank, the Institute for Informed America, which would provide intellectual opposition to the Brookings Institution. The scheme lapsed (since Hunt frightened off Jeb Magruder by a proposal to use the think-tank for covert action), but now that Hunt was working for Colson in the Plumbers and Colson was also friends with Bennett, maybe Colson could be forgiven for thinking the prospects seemed fair for a happy family. As early as the beginning of 1971, he even sent a confidential memo to an aide of Agnew's:

"Bob is a trusted loyalist and a good friend. We intend to use him on a variety of outside projects. One of Bob's (new) clients is Howard Hughes. I am sure I need not explain the political implications of having Hughes' affairs handled here in Washington by a close friend. . . . Bob Bennett tells me that he has never met the Vice President, and that it would enhance his position greatly if we could find an appropriate occasion for him to come in and spend a little time talking with the Vice President. The important thing from our standpoint is to enhance Bennett's position with Hughes because Bennett gives us real access to a sort of power that can be valuable, and it's in our interest to build him up."

—Compulsive Spy

It is enough to remind us of Tolstoy's opening sentence in *Anna Karenina*: "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Colson's gang, we know in advance, will be unique.

But we can get a look into how closely Hunt is working with Bennett. A couple of years later, it was found out by way of the minority staff of the Ervin committee that Bennett "suggested to Hunt that Hank Greenspun, publisher of the Las Vegas Sun, had material in his safe that would be of interest to both Hughes and the Committee for the Re-election of the President," and Bennett also arranged "a Hunt interview with Clifton Demotte [about] the episode at Chappaquiddick. . . . Furthermore . . . Bennett learned of [Dita Beard's] whereabouts from a Hughes Tool Company executive . . . [and] acted as an intermediary between Howard Hunt and Gordon Liddy after the Watergate break-in. . . ."¹⁶

This encourages the minority staff to the following conclusions:

(1) While Hunt was at the White House on Charles Colson's payroll, Bennett was, at least, suggesting and coordinating many of Hunt's activities; (2) Bennett obviously enjoyed a close and confidential relationship with some of Howard Hughes' top people at a time when they were furnishing cover for the CIA; and (3) Bennett was acting as a go-between between Hunt and Liddy immediately after the Watergate break-in, and during all of these activities he was undoubtedly reporting periodically to the CIA case officer.

—At That Point in Time

We are even offered a bona fide side-bar. An inquiry came in from HUGHES. The Mormons (we may as well assume it is specifically the Mormons) wanted to know "the cost of bugging the home of Clifford Irving at the time he was writing the spurious Howard Hughes biography. Hunt got an estimate from James McCord and reported back to Bennett." The project proved to be too expensive, but HUGHES, whether the man or the karmic transplant, announced by way of a telephone interview with seven reporters that he had suspicions about the origins of the hoax. "To assume that it's all an accident certainly takes a lot of assuming." It seems HUGHES had decided the genius behind Clifford Irving was Maheu. Dare we say that every unhappy family is happy in its own way?

¹⁶Fred D. Thompson, *At That Point in Time*. The author was chief minority counsel for the Ervin committee.

¹²Nightmare.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴E. Howard Hunt, *The Berlin Ending* (epigraph).

¹⁵E. Howard Hunt, *Undercover*.

III


An Exercise in Epistemology

In an ironic twist, the White House's high priest of snooper, Charles Colson, was himself bugged recently as he uttered some of the Watergate scandal's most indiscreet confessions.

Colson, when he was the top White House hatchet man, was fond of flipping a switch and tape-recording friends and enemies alike. A few days before he went to prison for obstructing justice, however, he was secretly recorded as he bared his soul to Washington businessman and sometime private eye Richard Bast. . . .

Beside Bast's swimming pool, whose fountain made background water music over a "mike" secreted among poolside flowers, the two men discussed how Nixon could rid himself of CIA and military spying on the White House.

—Jack Anderson, July 15, 1974



IF WE HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINING OURSELVES until now with the illusion that we are pursuing a narrative, or hovering over a picture that will soon come to focus, we may as well recognize that we can count, at best, on no more than a glimpse of a narrative—enough perhaps to give us hope this is a narrative which exists and not a chaos. But it is a curious endeavor. The best details often lead nowhere. Nixon, for example, received campaign contributions in 1972 which were as large as \$2 million from W. Clement Stone and \$1 million from Richard Mellon Scaife of Pittsburgh. Nonetheless, the Nixon administration reacted with excessive anxiety to the disclosure of a gift of \$100,000 in 1970 from HUGHES by way of Richard Danner to Bebe Rebozo; in fact Nixon fired Archibald Cox only two days after he had indicated to Elliot Richardson how displeased he was about Cox's zealous investigation of Rebozo. The break-in at Watergate was even explained in some scenarios as the measure of Nixon's need to know how much O'Brien knew about HUGHES's gift.¹⁷ It made no sense. Rebozo had an explanation which was legally impeccable. He told investigators that he was worried about the "appearance" of the gift and so did not give it to the president but put it in his own safe-deposit box, and later, in June, 1973, sent it back to HUGHES. One did not have to believe the story, but in the absence of evidence that the cash had been passed, why did Nixon react so powerfully?

"They must certainly know something very heavy on Nixon," commented Bast. . . .

Colson . . . replied, "They must."

"I mean, if he knows this stuff is going on and he's not doing anything about it . . ." began Bast.

"You know what I think?" interrupted Colson. "You want to know what I really think? . . . I'm loyal to the guy (Nixon) 'cause he's my friend . . . I think Bebe used that (\$100,000) for himself and for the President, for the family, and the girls. I think that the President figures—this is my worst suspicion—that if he really blows this, Hughes can blow the whistle on him." . . .

. . . Bast asked whether the only thing the CIA had hanging over Nixon's head was the \$100,000.

Replied Colson morosely:


¹⁷That would assume it was worth \$250,000 to CREEP to find out a little more about \$100,000.

"Who knows that that's the only \$100,000?"

—Jack Anderson, July 16, 1974

It is a fascinating detail. It is just that nothing comes of it. We still don't know if it is the only \$100,000 or no more than the tail of the mouse left in the trap. Since much that we examine will appear, then tend to disappear, it is nice to think there is something iridescent about a view seen for an instant in the fog.

Perhaps it is the effect of such glimpses to leave us with an afterimage. On reflection, Nixon's reaction to the \$100,000 does not have to be political. Even a political man is entitled to a private emotion. Fighting the attack on Rebozo, Nixon could be expressing the outrage he felt at attacks against himself. Or, maybe the gift just gave him an uneasy feeling from the moment it was proposed. Of course, the hard chance of an inflamed in-house scandal could also have been sitting beneath the money. We simply do not know to which corner the mouse has gone.



THE NATURE OF THE DIFFICULTY begins to disclose itself. We cannot house an explanation because we do not know which of our facts are bricks and which are papier-mâché painted to look like bricks. We can only watch the way the bricks are handled.

It is painful, nonetheless, to relinquish one's hope for a narrative, to admit that study of the CIA may not lead to the exposure of facts so much as to the epistemology of facts. We will not get the goods so quickly as we will learn how to construct a model which will tell us why we cannot get the goods. Of course, that will never be enough—willy-nilly, the habit will persist to look for a new narrative (and damn the papier-mâché bricks).

In the meantime, however, a short course:

Epistemological Model I:

If half the pieces in a jigsaw puzzle are missing, the likelihood is that something can still be put together. Despite its gaps, the picture may be more or less visible. Even if most of the pieces are gone, a loose mosaic can be arranged of isolated elements. The possibility of the real picture being glimpsed under such circumstances is small but not altogether lost.¹⁸ It is just that one would like to know if the few pieces left belong to the same set.¹⁹

Epistemological Model II:

Maybe it is the splinters of a mirror rather than the scattered pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that provide a superior ground for the metaphor. We are dealing not with reality, after all, but that image of reality which reaches the surface through the cracked looking glass of the media.

Epistemological Model III:

What is most crucial is that we do not forget that we are interpreting curious actions. Men who seem to be honest are offering cover. We are obliged to remind ourselves that a life lived under cover produces a chronic state of mind in the actor which is not unlike those peculiar moments when staring in the mirror too long we come to recognize that the face looking back at us must—inescapably—be our own. Yet it is not. Our vicissitudes (but not our souls) stand revealed in the mirror; or, given another day, and another mirror, there we are, feeling wretched, looking splendid.

Epistemological Model IV:

Doubtless the difficulty is analogous to writing a poem with nothing but names, numbers, facts, conjecture, gossip, trial balloons, leaks, and other assorted pieces of

¹⁸Larry Rivers has taught us as much.

¹⁹Is this what Robert Rauschenberg is up to?

prose.

For example:

When we interviewed him in my office on December 10, 1973, he struck all of us as a highly intelligent, highly motivated person. . . . Finally I asked him, "Mr. Martinez, if in fact you were a CIA plant on the Watergate team and were reporting back to the Agency, would you tell us?" He broke into a broad smile, looked around the room, and laughed. He never answered the question; no answer was necessary.


—At That Point in Time

Let us go back to the facts, to the false facts, distorted facts, concealed facts, empty facts, secretly rich facts, and unverifiable speculations of our narrative.

In this connection, nothing we have read about Gordon Liddy explains his long silence in jail so well as the supposition that he is an agent of real caliber. Of his biography we know he was in the FBI in the early sixties, an assistant district attorney in Dutchess County, ran for Congress on the Conservative party ticket, and got a job with the Treasury Department high up in a Customs Bureau drug campaign called Operation Intercept. It was not a position to leave him alien to such intimacies of the CIA, the Mafia, and the flow of profits in the drug trade. Liddy came to the White House to work for Egil Krogh, who was trying to organize the Nixon administration's war on drugs with a projected team of CIA men, FBI men, narcs, and private detectives, an undertaking some would see darkly as a most ambitious cover for Nixon's real intent, which was to commence his own Intelligence on a competitive level with the CIA and the FBI—in other words, his unspoken follow-up to the Huston Plan. It is worth mentioning that during this period, Liddy wrote a memo for Nixon in criticism of the FBI, which Nixon described to Krogh as "the most brilliant memorandum" to come his way "in a long time."²⁰ It is with this background that Liddy comes to CREEP. There is nothing in these details to suggest he could not be a career agent.

We read of how he burns his hand in a flame to impress a girl and threatens to kill Magruder if Jeb touches him on the shoulder again. John Dean describes to us how Liddy offers to commit suicide if that will protect the administration. Liddy offers a lecture on how to kill a man with a finely sharpened pencil. There is nothing in these details to suggest he could not be a career agent.

"The master who instructed me in the deadliest of the Oriental martial arts taught me that the outcome of a battle is decided in the minds of the opponents before the first blow is struck."—G. Gordon Liddy²¹



WE HAVE THE HABIT TO LOOK on the Watergate burglars as ignorant Cubans led by clowns. Being scorned as ridiculous is, of course, a cover in itself; the CIA can count on such a disguise being provided by the wire services. Simple declarative sentences make curious actions appear automatically absurd.

Under examination, the burglars look better. Gonzales had been a bodyguard for Batista, and fought in the Bay of Pigs. Martinez had been a CIA boat captain and made 354 illegal runs to Cuba. Barker was a member of Batista's

²⁰These details are given in a forthcoming book impressively researched by Edward Jay Epstein, *An American Coup D'Etat* (Putnam's).

²¹As quoted in *Nightmare*.

secret police, and an FBI contact in Cuba, then an informer against Castro. By Hunt's own description, Barker became his "principal assistant" during the Bay of Pigs, and Hunt was chief of political action.

The fourth Cuban happens to be Italian—Frank Sturgis, an ex-marine born Frank Angelo Fiorini. He served with Castro in the Sierra Maestra—and would later claim he was already an agent for the Company. In any case, he was good enough to be working as Fidel's personal supervisor in the Havana casinos until the day gambling was eliminated. Then Sturgis decided to defect. To the Mafia and to the CIA. (Or is it simpler to say the Mafia wing of the CIA?) It is a not inconsiderable defection.

Before the Bay of Pigs, Sturgis would act as contact for Santo Trafficante, who with his son Santo Jr. "controlled much of Havana's tourist industry," and was alleged to have received "bulk shipments of heroin from Europe and forward them through Florida to New York."²² During this period, Sturgis joined a CIA unit called Operation Forty, which had been set up to kill Castro and a number of important Fidelistas. Involved in this training were Trafficante and E. Howard Hunt,²³ Frank Sturgis,²⁴ and Robert Maheu. Maheu and Sturgis must have been reasonably well met, since Sturgis is still pivotal enough eleven years later to be chatting with Jack Anderson in the lobby of Washington National Airport on the morning he arrives from Miami with Barker, Martinez, and Gonzales for the last break-in at Watergate, but then it would be difficult to name an investigative reporter in America more pivotal than Anderson.

"I don't know if I told you before," Sturgis wrote to his wife (while in jail), "but William F. Buckley used to work for CIA and I don't know if he still does. When he found out that Howard (Hunt) was going to work in the White House, he told Howard it was good that he could be so close to the President but Howard told him that he was there to take orders and not to influence anyone. That was a good answer!" . . .

. . . Buckley frankly admitted he was a "deep cover agent" for the CIA from July, 1951, to March, 1952, but said he had not worked for them since.

—Jack Anderson, September 18, 1973

It was apparent from the documents that in November 1971, a month after he took part in the Fielding break-in, Martinez mentioned his association with Hunt to his case officer who, in turn, took Martinez to the CIA's chief of station in Miami.

We immediately requested that the chief of station be brought from Florida for an interview. The chief, a heavyset man who appeared rather nervous, told us that in March 1972, Martinez had asked him if he "really knew all about the Agency activities in the Miami area." Martinez had dropped hints about Hunt's activities; the chief said, which had concerned him so much that he wrote a letter to CIA headquarters inquiring about Hunt's status. The answer, we were told, was that the chief should "cool it" and not concern himself with Hunt's affairs.

—At That Point in Time

One does better not to rely on that comfortable picture we have of E. Howard Hunt as an unbinged undercover man in a wild red wig impotently badgering Dita Beard on her hospital bed—the wig may have been chosen to make him startling to a fearful woman.

By the rank of the posts he occupied in his career, it is obvious that Hunt, for a long time at least, was well regarded in the agency. For that matter, he has so many credentials we can wonder how close he came in his own

²²Alfred W. McCoy, et al., *The Politics of Heroin in South-east Asia*.

²³"Strange Bedfellows."


²⁴In *Undercover*, Hunt mentions in passing that he did not meet Sturgis until shortly before Watergate. Of course, he also does not mention that there was a plot to assassinate Castro. Nor does he bother to inform us that Hank Sturgis is the name of a character in Hunt's early novel, *Vimini Run*, which Frank Angelo Fiorini liked well enough to modify into an alias.

mind to becoming director of the CIA. In his autobiography, *Undercover*, he remarks, "Obviously I was never going to be director of Central Intelligence, nor did I particularly want to be," but the year is 1966 and he says it after more than fifteen years of service and such prime positions as deputy chief of station in Mexico (which is where William F. Buckley Jr. worked for him); chief of covert operations for southeastern Europe—Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey; chief of political action for the Guatemala operation which overthrew Arbenz; chief of covert operations for the north Asia command—China, Korea, Japan; chief of station in Uruguay; chief of political action for the Bay of Pigs; chief of Domestic Operations Division (the United States); and chief of covert action for Western Europe.

Before joining the CIA Hunt had been an English major at Brown, served in the navy, the OSS, been a war correspondent for *Life*, published novels, worked in Hollywood, had a Guggenheim Fellowship for one of his novels, and been in Europe for the ECA under Averell Harriman. Later, within the CIA, he collaborated with Allen Dulles in the writing of *The Craft of Intelligence*. He also worked closely with Frank Wisner, Allen Dulles, Dick Helms, Richard Bissell, Track Barnes, Tom Karamessines—there are no larger names in the CIA. If his autobiography fails to mention Cord Meyer or James Angleton there is no reason we cannot speculate on his concealed relations with them, particularly from 1966 to 1970, when Hunt neglects to describe what he is doing for the Company, and the assumption, since he is stationed in America, is capers, domestic capers.

A Dutch manufacturer of electronic gadgetry was demonstrating some ultrasophisticated electronic "sneakies." The Dutch salesman announced that over twenty items of gadgetry had been hidden in the exhibition room and invited his CIA guests to find them. They looked and they couldn't find a single one. Then the Dutchman set about to uncover them, and he couldn't find them. Jim McCord had sneaked into the room before the demonstration, found them all, and removed them. "Jim is one fine operator," said Helms. . . .

—Miles Copeland,
National Review, September 14, 1975



McCord was in the CIA for twenty years but he seems like nothing so much as an FBI man. A devout Methodist, abstemious, soft-voiced in his right-wing opinions, his personality speaks of law and order rather than espionage or counterespionage. With the CIA from the first years of its inception (those years when it was raiding the FBI, and Hoover did not like it, and may for all we know have been casting about for a career agent who could infiltrate the CIA for the rest of his working life), McCord worked for the Company from 1951 to 1970 and became chief of the Physical Security Division of the Office of Security.

As we know, his work had in part to do with finding concealed bugs and dealing with advanced eavesdropping equipment. He was good enough to receive a Distinguished Service Award from Helms, and Allen Dulles once referred to him as "my top man."²⁵ We do not know what he was top man in, but it is not mean praise.

His performance during the Watergate break-in is on the consequence fascinating for its incompetence. McCord, according to Hunt's account, bought only four walkie-

talkies where six had been needed. He delayed charging the batteries. He neglected to disconnect a burglar-alarm system. In the course of the first break-in, he removed his men from the Democratic National Committee offices before the job was done. Then for several days he was unable to process the two rolls of film the Cubans did manage to take because McCord's "man" was out of town. In addition, according to Liddy, McCord "bugged the wrong telephone line. He was supposed to tap O'Brien's."²⁶ So a second attempt was necessary. On the next try, two of McCord's walkie-talkies had uncharged batteries. McCord retaped the locks after the guard had removed the tapes. He then insisted to Liddy on going ahead with the operation. He also retaped the locks horizontally instead of vertically; the tape was therefore visible at a glance. Hunt would finally decide that McCord was a double agent for the Democrats. A double agent he may have been—for the CIA—and a triple agent for the FBI, but a Democrat? McCord?

Whoever he was, McCord broke the Watergate case by his letter in March, 1973, to Judge Sirica: "There was political pressure applied to the defendants to plead guilty and remain silent. Perjury occurred during the trial. . . ."

He also said, "The Watergate Operation was not a CIA operation. . . . I know for a fact that it was not." It is a retired CIA operative speaking, which is to say, a man who may or may not be retired. Authoritative disclaimers by CIA officials bear the same relation to fact that the square root of minus one bears to a real number. The net effect of McCord's remark, therefore, is to make us more suspicious of the CIA. The possibility that he is an FBI man thereby increases an iota.



THE SECOND BREAK-IN TOOK PLACE IN order that the tap on Larry O'Brien's phone that McCord had not put in well enough to function after the first break-in should now be put in again. Hunt thought the project was odd. "O'Brien's in Miami," he said to Liddy. "Why in hell should we tap the phone in his Washington office? . . . What's the rationale? As a friend, colleague and fellow professional, I'm asking you to go back to Mitchell, Dean and Magruder and reargue the case."²⁷ Liddy replied, "Okay. I'll try again, but I hate to do it. They look to me to get things done, not argue against them."

Since Liddy is the conspirator who has remained silent, we do not know his "principal," that is, we do not know who told him to break into Democratic headquarters the first time, nor—it may be more interesting—who insisted on a second time when Hunt thought the only logic was to call it off. It is not impossible that Magruder, Mitchell—or could it be Dean?—had an undisclosed relation to the CIA. Let us spin on the vertigo of that thought.

Mr. Haldeman said he had never understood why Alexander P. Butterfield, the aide who disclosed the existence of the White House tapes to the Senate Watergate committee, wanted to join the White House staff. . . .

"He was soon to become an Air Force General. I have never understood why he insisted, against my advice, on dropping his commission or why he suddenly wanted to be part of the Nixon team."

"In view of his subsequent role," Mr. Haldeman

²⁶Undercover.

²⁷Quoting from Hunt is biting the bullet. Still, it is tempting to quote. From Undercover.

went on, "these actions seem even more curious today. Was Butterfield a CIA agent? Maybe. I just don't know."

—The New York Times, June 23, 1976

In the early Sixties he [Haig] ran a CIA-financed Bay of Pigs rehabilitation program, preceding Alexander Butterfield in the job.

—"Strange Bedfellows"

Colson complained to Bast that the President was always on the verge of coming down hard on the CIA. But, Colson grouched, Nixon was talked out of it by presidential staff chief Al Haig, who feared it would "take down the whole intelligence community."

—Jack Anderson, July 15, 1974

Haig told us there was "no way" he was working for the CIA.

—Jack Anderson, July 15, 1974

Paul F. Hellmuth, the managing partner of St. Clair's Boston law firm, has been associated over the past decade with . . . Anderson Security Consultants, Inc. . . . a CIA front. . . .

Mysterious checks, written for large amounts, would frequently arrive at the office of the firm's secretary-treasurer, Virginia lawyer L. Lee Bean, who would . . . disperse it upon instructions.

The secret instructions often came, say our sources, from James St. Clair's quiet law partner. Some of the mystery money was dispatched to Miami banks and was used allegedly to support the CIA's anti-Castro activities. . . . [Hellmuth] insisted . . . that James St. Clair didn't know "the first thing about the security firm."

—Jack Anderson, July 22, 1974

[Leon] Jaworski had been . . . a director of a private foundation that laundered funds for the CIA.

—"Strange Bedfellows"

We also learned that Paul O'Brien, who had served as counsel to the Committee to Re-elect the President after the Watergate break-in, was a former CIA operative.

—At That Point in Time

Among the officers of OSS Detachment 101 was Clark MacGregor, later a Congressman, a White House staffer, and, after the Watergate break-in, the replacement for John Mitchell as head of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President.

—Compulsive Spy

"Bob Woodward interviewed me on numerous occasions. I have told Woodward everything I know about the Watergate case, except the Mullen company's tie to the CIA. I never mentioned that to him."

—Robert Bennett: House subcommittee testimony

Because Robert Bennett's CIA ties were exposed by the Watergate scandal, he has closed down the Mullen Agency. He now works for the Hughes organization as a vice-president and CIA liaison.

—"Strange Bedfellows"

During the Bast interview, Colson would name Bennett as Deep Throat. At one point, he would say in pain, "Every story that Woodward won the Pulitzer Prize for was fed to him by the CIA."

An observer of the Company, hearing of this, shook his head. "Deep Throat is a cover in itself. Where is the casual reader who will argue with so agreeable a story—one man's revelation pulling down the entire Nixon administration? If Deep Throat told all, it was only because the information had already been neatly collected for Deep Throat to tell." The observer shook his head. "Learn the law of reversal. The victims can be the agents

in these affairs. There is as much need to remain suspicious of Colson as to feel sorry for him, since in attacking the CIA, Colson creates good cover for them. The reaction of the newspaper reader who dislikes old Chuck is to think, 'Even if it is true (and I must say I have had my suspicions of the CIA) I won't believe the story if it comes from Colson.' The Bast interview, you see, bothers me. Colson visits Bast, a private investigator, sits down by the pool next to the shrubbery and never wonders if he is being taped? Colson? Pit-bull Colson?

"By the same guideline, the heroes can be the villains. Beware of the heroes of Watergate. I look at the Washington Post and think, 'Isn't it a brave paper? Isn't that a heroic editor who dares what no editor of no other major paper will dare? Isn't that right in the vein of major newspaper editors as we have come to know them?'"

On publication of this piece, the editor of the Washington Post emphatically denied that he had ever been, or was now, a member of the CIA.

"Never allow yourself," the observer says, "to think you have a fixed platform from which to measure these motions. We're out in the stars with Einstein, I assure you. For instance, you speak of McCord as being inefficient, when what you relate is no more than Hunt's description of how McCord acted in the break-in. Hunt's book could have been written by an enclave."

"Were they wishing to suggest that McCord was dealing with the Democrats?"

"Never look for the answer. Pursue the question into the next question. The answer is invariably smudged, but the questions are beautiful. There is the rapture of the depths descending into the questions."

I also suspected, but could never prove, that the Nixon crowd tapped my telephones. I was only slightly surprised, therefore, by a letter mailed to me on April 15, 1972. It was written by William Haddad, a New York entrepreneur who, until a dozen years ago, had been a prize-winning investigative reporter. Haddad told me he had learned from a private investigator of plans to tap the telephones of the Democratic National Committee. Haddad understood the plot had been hatched by a group of advertising men, known as the November Group, who had been recruited for the Nixon campaign.

—Jack Anderson, Parade, July 22, 1973

A letter from William Haddad to Larry O'Brien, March 23, 1972:

"I am hearing some very disturbing stories about GOP sophisticated surveillance techniques now being used for campaign purposes and of an interesting group here in New York where some of this "intelligence" activity is centered. The information comes from a counter-wiretapper . . . who had come to me highly recommended. . . . Can you have someone call me so you can get the info first hand and take whatever actions you deem necessary."

—At That Point in Time

O'Brien sent the director of communications for the Democratic National Committee to visit Haddad and there was a meeting with the counter wiretapper whose name proved to be Woolston-Smith. He was "a short paunchy bald man who spoke with a pronounced British accent and smoked a pipe." In October, 1973, a year and a half later, two members of the minority staff of the Ervin committee took a deposition from Woolston-Smith.

He testified that he was a private investigator in New York City, a citizen of New Zealand with experience in British intelligence, and a permanent resident of the United States. He acknowledged that he had excellent contacts in the intelligence community and said his New York offices had been used by the CIA, after the Bay of Pigs, as a clearinghouse for those returning from the invasion brigades. This information was consistent with what we had deter-

²³As quoted in "Strange Bedfellows."

mined from other sources. Woolston-Smith was a most mysterious person; there were indications that he had connections with both British and Canadian intelligence, although we could never determine the exact relationship.

Woolston-Smith said he had told William Haddad of the possibility of Republican media control through the November Group as early as December 1971, and that they had discussed the Group many times before the meeting of April 26, 1972. He knew enough about the operation, he said, to know that Gordon Liddy "ran the show."

—At That Point in Time


Since Gemstone, Liddy's first ambitious plan to tap the Democratic National Committee and wire Miami for the Democratic convention, was not even presented to John Mitchell until January 27, 1972, it seems that some undisclosed scheme was already being developed by Gordon Liddy and the November Group in the fall of 1971. Such a probability hardly diminishes the hypothesis that Liddy is an agent of stature. (In fact, the November Group will even be given a million dollars by CREEP before the famous April 7 deadline for campaign contributions. While the majority of this is ostensibly for the November Group's stated purpose, which is advertising, not espionage, the figure is nonetheless interesting. It is equal to the sum Liddy tried to get for Gemstone.)

At any rate, we are left with the following additions:

(1) The Democrats were well aware of the November Group and the possibility that their offices would soon be bugged.


(2) British and Canadian Intelligence can now be added to the soup. Let us think of them as herbs.

(3) Maybe the Democrats were putting in the garlic. Haddad "sent his entire file to Jack Anderson in April 1972" and now "could not remember what was in it. In fact, Haddad said, he sent material to Anderson twice, but had kept no copies." Jack Anderson "had acknowledged receipt of the material from Haddad concerning plans for the break-in, but he said he had since lost it."



OF COURSE, THE CIA HAD INFILTRATED the FBI, and the FBI had unknown men working for it in the CIA. We must assume both had agents in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the IRS, the National Security Council, the 40 Committee, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Special Operations Division, Naval Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Council on Foreign Relations, HUGHES, plus a number of private intelligence companies whose work extended from military-industrial security to private detectives' offices. In turn, these companies, bureaus, groups, and agencies had to the best of their ability infiltrated the CIA and the FBI. Since the CIA, the FBI, and other major intelligence also had had their authority infiltrated by their own unknown enclaves, it is, in certain circumstances, meaningless to speak of the CIA as a way of differentiating it from the AIA, the DIA, the NSC, HUGHES, or the SOD—let us use the initials CIA therefore like a mathematical symbol which will, depending on the context in which it is employed, usually offer specific reference to a CIA located physically in Langley, Virginia, with near to 18,000 employees, understanding that under other circumstances CIA may be no more than a general

locus signifying an unknown factor whose function is intelligence and whose field is the invisible government. Students of Einstein's work on tensor calculus may find it comfortable to deal with these varieties of unknowns. In the world of social theory, however, we are at the point where a special and general theory of relative identity in social relations would be of inestimable use since the only situation for which there can be no cover is anguish, and the operation of the twentieth century may be to alienate us from that emotion in preparation for the ultimate destruction of the human soul as opposed to the oncoming hegemony of the technological person.



friends agreed that Nixon was a fool not to destroy the tapes. They may not have understood the depth of the pot in which he was boiling. There was reason to believe there were copies of the tapes. If Butterfield would reveal their existence, he could be an agent; if one agent was near those tapes, then more than one; what reason to assume duplicates of the damaging tapes were not being systematically prepared all the while he was being set up? Impeachment was certain if he burned the evidence and a copy appeared.

"You do not understand. This man stood at the threshold of his own idea of greatness. He was going to write the peace with Communism. He was going to be immortal. Now, as he loses respect, it is slipping away from him inch by inch." Kissinger smiles sadly over his salad. Across the city, the Ervin committee is holding a hearing in the hot summer afternoon. "People criticize Nixon for being irresolute about Watergate. Why does he not confess what is wrong and end it? they ask. They do not understand that he cannot make a move because he is not in possession of all the facts. He does not know what is going to happen next. He does not know what is going to break upon him next." Kissinger sighs. "Nobody will ever know how close that man was to getting the foreign situation he wanted."


Nixon is not only a Shakespearean protagonist in the hour of his downfall, but Macbeth believing that Birnam Wood will never come to Dunsinane. Of course, he is as appealing in his travail as Ronald Reagan might be playing Lear, but the echo nonetheless of a vast anguish comes back—who else has known such anguish and managed to live in the American world? Birnam Wood will come back to Dunsinane as the tapes one by one get to be taken.

Epistemological Model V:

"Sometimes," said the wise observer, "I think of that story of Howard Hughes being so fearful of bacteria that he kept Jean Peters across the room from him, and then I think, what if the fear of bacteria is the cover, and the double dare not get too close to Jean Peters?"

Epistemological Model VI:

There is hardly an episode in Watergate which was not presented to us in a way that makes it seem more stupid than it ought to have been. Or, is it closer to say that what we hope to perceive is more brilliant than the level at which we have been encouraged to perceive it?



HE TAPES, FOR EXAMPLE. IF A TAPE can be made, a copy can be made. Until we brood upon the matter, it is natural to assume the copy is equal to the original. We do not stop to think that the poor tapes we thought were the originals could in fact have been inferior copies. The remarkably bad quality of the tapes might have been produced by design. There are advantages to a tape which can hardly be heard: The affair is downgraded, and seems less sinister. No cover is more comfortable to a clandestine operation than the appearance of ineffectuality. Let us remind ourselves of how inept the Secret Service seemed in its taping operation. Possessing all that White House power, all those funds, all that available electronic equipment—yet the product sounds like it was recorded in the glove compartment of a moving car. Admittedly, there were technical difficulties to the taping, but the product still seems inadequate. Nixon must have suffered another turn of the screw. Since he cannot know if the tapes he hears are the unique, original, and only tapes, or a debased copy prepared by his enemies, he cannot even be certain whether it is a trap to encourage him to take advantage of the garbled sound and rephrase the transcripts in his favor. He takes the plunge. But his emendations are discovered later by the House Judiciary Committee. A corrected transcript is presented to America. How can Nixon not wonder whether somebody substituted a subtly clearer version of the tapes to John Doar's staff?

All the while, Nixon has to confront another question. If he evades every snare, pit, impressment, and delusion, if he even manages to work his way through the Senate to the edge of being declared not guilty in the impeachment, how can he be certain that in the last minute after the very last of all these abominably unexpected breaches in his cover-up, the missing eighteen minutes will still not appear? Then he can envision how America will spank the horse, and he will twist forever in the wind.

IV


A Crisis in Criminology

I received a telephone call from L. Patrick Gray, the Acting Director of the FBI—a man I had never met. Gray told me he was disturbed by reports suggesting the FBI was not conducting a thorough investigation. "That is simply not true," Gray told me. "I assure you this matter will be pursued wherever it leads, regardless of my position in the Administration. Let the chips fall where they may." I told Gray I appreciated his call, and he concluded our talk with an unexpected comment: "Mr. O'Brien, we Irish Catholics must stick together."

On July 7, following Gray's call, I was visited by two Secret Service agents. . . . They told me they had been instructed to report to me that the FBI's exhaustive examination of the National Committee offices had uncovered no telephone bugs or other electronic devices—that "the place was found to be clean." I accepted their report without question. I knew the FBI had torn the place apart—removing ceiling panels, dismantling radiators, and the like—and if they said there were no bugs, then I assumed there were no bugs. Later evidence, of course, revealed that bugs had been placed on my phone and that of Spencer Oliver, Executive Director of the Association of State Democratic Chairmen. To this day I cannot explain the discrepancy between those

facts and the report I was given.

—No Final Victories



HEN HUNT'S TEAM WAS caught, McCord had already removed a few panels from the ceiling of O'Brien's office. It is not so very well known that an excellent and advanced kind of eavesdropping can be achieved by driving a nail into the flooring of the office you wish to monitor from the ceiling of the office below. A listening device is then attached to the nail. The sophistication of this method is that it is not possible to detect the bug from the office being taped, since the listening device attracts no more attention than any nail in the floor. The first question to ask of many a break-in is not therefore which office was entered, but who is working in the office above. By this logic, a real interest in O'Brien's conversations could best have been satisfied by a break-in on the fifth floor—in order to tap the sixth. Since we are already on the sixth, who inhabits the seventh?

That part of the seventh floor of the Watergate Office Building, which rested unmistakably over Larry O'Brien's quarters, was occupied at the time by no less than the office of the secretary of the Federal Reserve Board. Can matters be this simple? It is not seemly that great financial secrets should be discussed in an office of a building which looks to have been designed by an architect with a degree in Mafia Modern, but interest augments when we learn that one of the computers of the Federal Reserve Board is located in the basement of the same Watergate Office Building. If, on a given day, the Federal Reserve Board had sealed itself in to discuss a change in the discount rate, is it wholly inconceivable that a CIA man (a veritable Grand Mole of a banker) installed for years on the Federal Reserve Board might have phoned in to the computer in the Watergate Office Building basement an apparently routine question that would yet manage to tell his undercover assistant in the basement what the shift would be in the discount rate? Assuming that this assistant has been sequestered with the computer to maintain his discretion during these important deliberations of the board, the question is whether the basement assistant could not manage to make an innocent phone call to somebody on the seventh floor. Since we are assuming the man on the seventh floor is not part of the team to which the man in the basement belongs, the conversation would have to go something like this:

Basement: I hear Vida Blue is pitching today.

Seventh floor: Impossible! He pitched two days ago.

Basement: (Indignantly) Who did?

Seventh floor: (Triumphantly) Vida Blue!

That was what the basement wanted to hear said on the seventh floor and said loud enough for the nail in the ceiling of the sixth floor to pick it up—the names of baseball pitchers having been geared to the rise and fall in the discount rate. Now, whoever monitored that conversation could pass the information along. Since more than one team would presumably be working to get advance information on the change in the rate, let us assume our team got the word out with a possible lead of three hours over all the others.

"How much would such information be worth?" a banker was asked.

"Conservatively," he replied, in the rich and pompous voice which is privy to large sums, "billions."

"For just a few hours' lead?"

"That is time enough."

The possibility is now open that the CIA was using the

break-in to the Democratic National Committee as its elegant cover to the real operation, which was to tap privileged Federal Reserve Board information. Elegance offers its exquisite use of resources, so one would not claim the CIA had no interest in O'Brien nor in Oliver. O'Brien and Oliver had had their propinquity with the CIA, after all. While we know they cannot be in Intelligence—since how may we conceive of a good liberal Democrat who is?—nonetheless, they might attract an enclave in the CIA (if, of course, it is an enclave performing the break-in under the auspices of CREEP and not just a burglary by red-hot amateurs executed at the third rate of CREEP stupidity). Yes, some enclave might legitimately have been curious to know more about what O'Brien and Oliver knew of Chappaquiddick, or Eagleton's secret medical file, or HUGHES in relation to Maheu, Lansky, Rebozo, and Nixon on one side, or HUGHES, Bennett, Hunt, and Helms on the other. Name the teams; HUGHES is on all of them. Recognize that with the Democratic Committee break-in as cover, the operation has power over CREEP—which is to say ultimately over Nixon—even if its burglars are caught. That is elegance. Obtaining neither their first objective—the Federal Reserve tap—nor the second—lines on O'Brien and Oliver—the entrepreneurs still end with more power over the presidency than before. Once everybody made certain the election was won in spite of Watergate, there would be even more power.

Of course, a risk was taken. If Watergate had broken too early, McGovern might have been able to get his campaign turned around (although the thought does not ring loud in the lost ether) but

then Watergate never burst until the election was safe and the operators could begin to apply that wrenching pressure on the bones of the Nixon administration.

It must, however, be immediately visible that while this last scenario violates no facts, it is only a literary fancy—not an iota of proof. Just another model. Perhaps we can modernize William of Ockham's razor by saying: The simplest model which satisfies all the facts is likely to lead us to inexplicable facts.

Four of the five men arrested in the bugging attempt at the Democratic National Committee headquarters Saturday morning were registered as guests at the Watergate Hotel on April 28, the same night that two other firms in the Watergate building were broken into. . . .

The firm of Freed, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Kampelman, located on the 10th floor of the Watergate Building, 2600 Virginia Ave. NW, was broken into on May 18, but officials of the firm did not report the incident to police until yesterday. . . .

A spokesman for the Freed law firm said yesterday that the burglary was not immediately reported to police because nothing appeared to be missing, and employees did not associate the incident with political espionage until disclosure of Saturday's break-in. . . .

On April 28, the night four of the five bugging suspects were registered at the Watergate Hotel, according to police, the 11th-floor offices of the Sterling Institute, a management consulting firm, were broken into and \$1,100 worth of typewriters and calculating machines was stolen. . . .

The same night, police records show, the law firm of Boykin and DeFrancis, located on the eighth floor of the Watergate, was forcibly entered and \$525 worth of office equipment was stolen.

—The Washington Post, June 21, 1972

Maybe if our scenarios have had a purpose, it has been to flavor our reading with the temperament of an agent, a way of saying that we have become sufficiently paranoid to see connections where others see lists. So let us look at a list of the offices in July, 1973, on the seventh and eighth floors of the Watergate Building, and take the pleasure of wondering how many of those names and corporations have no relation to Intelligence.

701 Defense & Aerospace Center of Sterling Institute, Inc. H. F. Dean Human Factors Research Associates, Inc. Inst. for Psychiatry & Foreign Affairs	805 Division of Federal Reserve Bank Operations 808 Foreign Banking Authorities Office of Defense Planning Securities Stat Methodology & Procedures Section
704 Harris Intertype Corp. Harris Shire, Con- ductor Radiation, Inc. R. F. Communications, Inc.	811 Interstate General Corp. L. E. Steele 812 Armistead I. Selden, Jr. Boykin & De Francis
707 EDP Technology Systemed Corp.	815 Perkin Elmer Corp. Joseph Dixon, Manager
711 Federal Reserve Board Office of Sec'y	

When we add the three robberies in the last news story and include the possibility of break-ins to other offices we know nothing about by burglary teams who were removing taps that others had been putting in, there is now posed to our brand-new agent-type brain a further question: What part of the Watergate Office Building was not being tapped?

Our procedure has conducted us to the point where we have to recognize that we have used up our last scenario in order to bring us to a place where we have no scenario to replace it. Now, we know less than before of what might possibly be going on.

V

A Tension in Teleology

Said the CIA:
Authority imprinted upon emptiness
is money,
honey.

Bang bang Howard.
We don't need you.
We need
The space where you were.

—Anonymo L.Rivera



LIKE A MAIN GEAR IN THE CLOCKWORK is Nixon's anguish. As we hear the tick, we dwell in the fascination of the inexorable.

Next to Nixon, Hunt is an idler gear. His anguish is all of his existence, but it moves us less. The main gear goes until the last of the tension in the spring runs down, but the idler gear never runs down—it is merely attached to the alarm. So its end is not inexorable but catastrophic—as when the clock is dropped and the idler gear is broken.

Hunt was broken. The style of *Undercover* has that numbness of affect which comes from a fall. He writes without feeling more for one period in his life than another as though he is saying it is costly enough to locate the episodes. He is like a semiconscious victim who senses that coming awake will be equal to crawling up a slope of broken glass. The horrors to come will be greater than the ones he has known already.

Yet, as with Nixon, there is no danger of getting to like Hunt too much. We can decide that Nixon was set up by Watergate and feel no great pity because we can also

remember the war in Vietnam he kept going for four years in order to assure his reelection. One can always recall the voice Nixon used when he spoke of the North Vietnamese as "my enemy," on the day he ordered the Christmas bombing. He had always wanted to be an actor and he ended by playing the classic role of the criminal who is convicted for the wrong crime. So one does not have to feel an overcharge of compassion for Nixon—just enough to water our imagination. Your enemies succeed after all when they dry up your imagination.

By the same token, there is a built-in limit to how much compassion we can feel for Hunt. We have only to read his account of his own methods on a caper in the early fifties:

The Mexican Communist leader was then visiting Peking. On the day of his departure Bob North airmailed me a copy of a Chinese newspaper announcing his departure, sending a duplicate copy to CIA headquarters. To replace the departure announcement I fabricated a story in which the Mexican Communist was quoted as deprecating fellow Mexicans and saying, among other things, that Mexican peasants could never hope to achieve the cultural level of the superior Chinese. I cabled the fabrication to headquarters, where a special type font had been made by reproducing samples from the local paper. My fabricated story was set in this duplicate type and the entire front page of the local paper re-created by technical means. A dozen copies were pouched to me and were received before the target Communist returned to Mexico.

The fabricated newspapers were made available to local journalists who published facsimilies of the offensive interview together with a translation into Spanish. The target's protestations of innocence gained no credence whatever, for technical tests conducted on the duplicated Chinese paper affirmed that the type in which the story was printed perfectly matched other type samples in the same newspaper and so had to be authentic.³⁰

—Undercover

A footnote says, "It was this sort of technical assistance from CIA that I lacked when I undertook to fabricate two State Department cables in 1971."


No, we do not have to like him too much. Self-pity is Hunt's companion, and bitterness is his fuel. He writes with the tightly compressed bile of a disappointed man; the reader is to be reminded that his early prospects were happier than his later ones. Photographs taken of him on the beach at Acapulco a few months out of OSS show the would-be screenwriter looking well built in bathing trunks. He bears a bit of resemblance to Hemingway, and is at pains in *Undercover* to show pictures of himself skiing and hunting. For that matter, he is also adept at fishing, squash, golf, tennis, riding, boxing, and screwing—so the autobiography suggests.

It would be a bet Hemingway is his hero, and that Hunt in the late 1940s was torn between a life as a great novelist and a social life as a spy. We can guess how he chooses. He is, with everything else, a social climber, and drops on the reader every big name he knows from Eisenhower and Nixon down, making a show of his good WASP family origins (Hunt's Point in the Bronx is named after a relative who goes back to the Revolutionary War, and Leigh Hunt is on the family tree) as well as his wife's sterling ancestry ("In addition to being descended from the Presidential Adams and Harrison families, my wife was one-eighth Oglala Sioux. . ."). Before Hunt, she has been married to the Marquis de Goutière. No matter that her maiden name is Wetzel and Hunt is from Brown, not Princeton (a full demerit in the early CIA), he will still look to climb high into the good life of Oh So Social. "The service plates were Revere gadroon, the crystal was an opaline. . ." is a line from one of his novels, and he will make a point of asking Bill Buckley to be godfather to his children. At the end, when tragedy strikes, he and his family are living in a house called Witches Island in Potomac, Maryland, in "what was to be our

³⁰This story is a perfect example of how a fact can be wiped out by an artifact.

final family home. On its ample acreage were paddocks, a stable, outbuildings and woods." He is the perfect reader for the magazine edited by the godfather of his children.

Now, he had been caught on an operation which had for one of its tasks the tapping of Oliver's phone. Hunt could mention Oliver casually in his book and make no connection between the Spencer Oliver with whom he had dinner and the R. Spencer Oliver whose phone was tapped. He does not ask if they are not most certainly the same man. Such calm, however, is for his book. From Hunt's point of view, Oliver might have little or a great deal to do with Watergate. In the ongoing crisis of trying to solve the mystery of his life with all the working experience of his career, how is Hunt to measure the relevant importance of that detail, or of McCord and Fensterwald? McCord, for instance, has taken Bernard Fensterwald for his lawyer to go before the Ervin committee, Fensterwald who is chairman of the Committee to Investigate Assassinations. The unspoken shock to the media would not be small. It is a way of saying Watergate is related to Dallas. What enclave now wanted the media to think that way? Dallas and Watergate. That would be the scoop of the century. The people behind McCord might be serving some kind of notice.



WE ARE TRYING TO LIVE IN THE measure of Hunt's anguish, but it is impossible to speculate here. We do not know, after all, whether he had anything to do with Dallas. The photograph of the two bums arrested by the police in Dealey Plaza shortly after the murder does show a resemblance to Hunt and Sturgis but there is an indigestible discrepancy in the height. On the other hand, Hunt was chief of covert action in the Division of Domestic Affairs at the time; that is a perfect desk from which to have a hand in such an assassination (especially if it has been brought off by some variant of a Mafia and anti-Castro Cuban team). At the least, we have to assume that Hunt would have been in position to pick up enough to embarrass the CIA profoundly. But then it is staggering to contemplate how much Hunt may have found out about matters he had not necessarily been active in himself. If no one in the CIA could locate to a certainty the details of other operations, still a tremendous amount might be learned through gossip, or by reconnaissance through those more or less secret files which would be more or less available on long, dull office afternoons. And he was a writer of suspense novels, no less. What material might be at hand! To the degree the CIA is bureaucratic and not romantic there would be formal procedures in getting to the files which could be winked at, breached, circumvented, or directly betrayed. To the degree the CIA was a culture, then Hunt was a living piece of inquiring matter, and in the years from 1966 to 1970 as his career in the CIA was ostensibly winding down, he had time to do a little research on some of those hundred and more murders in Dallas supposedly connected to witnesses of the assassination, time to get a line on who might be doing the job. For the CIA, whether implicated or not, could hardly be without interest in a mop-up operation of such magnitude. Over a hundred murders to keep the seepage of information under control!

So Hunt may have known a great deal about Dallas. We have to hold this in our attention when we begin to think of the nightmare within Hunt's nightmare—the death of his wife in the crash of United Air Lines Flight 553 from Washington to Chicago on December 8, 1972. The plane had crashed on landing at Midway and she was one of 45 people who were killed. We do not know how much


Hunt knew nor how much he had told his wife. We know that she was making payments to the Cubans with White House money, but that is hardly a piece of information worth silencing by the risk and carnage of sabotaging an airplane. An investigator, Sherman Skolnick, in Chicago, would lay the claim that twelve people in one way or another connected with Watergate were on the plane, and he would remind us that White House aide Egil Krogh, Gordon Liddy's old White House boss, was appointed under secretary of transportation the next day and would supervise the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration in their investigations of the crash. That is not an automatically insignificant detail. On December 19, Alexander Butterfield would be appointed the new head of the F.A.A.³¹



L F HUNT AND DOROTHY HUNT HAD KNOWN a great deal about Dallas and were threatening to tell the world, then Hunt would not have to brood over such details. He could assume his wife's plane had been encouraged to crash. Of course, we would no longer be talking about anguish, but masterplots and last-reel peril. The likelihood is that Hunt and Dorothy Hunt were trapped in a smaller game, and the crash was a mixture of inefficiency, cynical maintenance, and who knows?—some overload of psychic intensity among the passengers. (Why else do great athletes live in such fear of traveling by air but that psychic intensity is also a species of physical charge and can even distort the workings of an electronic system?)

No, it is more likely Hunt was living with the subtle horror that attends every inexplicable crash—is there a psychology to machines? Had there been an intervention of moral forces, a play of the dice from the demiurge? At the least, Dorothy Hunt's death was evidence of the raised law of coincidence in dramatic and dreadful events. Great or livid events could indeed be peculiar in their properties, and maybe no perfect conspiracy ever worked, since people were so imperfect—only imperfect conspiracies succeeded and then only when a coincidence drove the denouement home. Was it possible that Hunt was finally obliged to look over the lip of tragedy itself—a view which leaves us, the Greeks were certain, babbling and broken? Did he come to think that a psychic vortex pulls in a higher incidence of coincidence itself?

"A man may defend himself against all enemies save those who are resolved that such a man as he should not exist."
—Tacitus, epigraph to *Undercover*



S TILL, HE IS NOT JUST ONE MORE anti-Communist with nothing but the righteous moral equivalent of tunnel vision. He has also had a life. It is almost an appealing life. He has had dyslexia as a boy and played trumpet in a high-school dance band. What is most irritating about Hunt is that he is nearly large

³¹For that matter, Dwight Chapin, appointments secretary to Nixon, moved over two months later to an executive position at United.

enough to be a protagonist in a good and solid novel, and yet—hatred has certainly dried his imagination—he is never large enough. No moment of wit will ever separate his soul from his disasters.


All the heavier must those disasters sit on him. Those disasters pose insoluble questions. Their lack of an answer promises insanity.

What, for instance, can he make of that list of offices on the seventh and eighth floors of the Watergate Office Building? Or of those extra break-ins he may now be hearing about for the first time? With his sophistication in the infiltration of one group of intelligence by another—he has after all been chief of covert action in the Domestic Operations Division—how could Hunt not entertain the hypothesis that a species of trench warfare in bugging and counterbugging had been going on in the Watergate Office Building long before his operation ran into its peculiar trap? Let us even assume that everything he has told us is only a cover story for the more serious job he assumed he was doing. After the arrests, how can he be certain he was told anything accurate?

There is a tool of inquiry provided by Lenin. He suggested that when a political event occurred whose origin or motive seemed incomprehensible, then ask the question: "Whom?" Whom does this benefit? Whom did Watergate benefit? Hunt would ask the question. And he would have to face the nightmare that the Nixon-Kissinger wing of the CIA, which by now for practical purposes could be described as the Rockefeller-Dérenie wing, had been mangled at Watergate by the Cold War wing. If so, however, then he, Hunt, had also been set up in the process, had been sacrificed by his own people to implicate Nixon. There was a centrality to such a hypothesis no agent could ignore.

There are not only dimensions to paranoia but degrees. Cold paranoia can serve as the assistant to brilliance, but fevered paranoia (where the heat comes from the thought that one is being done in by one's friends) is the true hellion of hysteria. All panics are loose, all proportions are lost. In such a fry, how can one ignore the smallest detail?

Hunt could even begin to brood over people like R. Spencer Oliver, whose phone happened to be the other line tapped at the Democratic National Committee. Hunt could remember a dinner with a young Democrat named Spencer Oliver who had been out with Mullen, Bennett, and himself back in 1970 or 1971. During the meal, Oliver had made a point of mentioning the names of a few CIA officers Hunt knew personally. Oliver had been surprisingly knowledgeable. Mullen and Bennett had even wanted to take Oliver into Mullen & Company as a partner! But Hunt had disapproved.



EFFECT ON THE PHENOMENON:

A higher incidence of coincidence itself. The more central the dreadful act, then the greater is the number of accidents, disasters, and astonishing connections which surround it. By such a cosmic thesis, more than one assassination plot would come to collision on those murderous days of our history (when Americans began to live in fear of more than the atom bomb) and so, too, more than one agency, more than one enclave, more than one motive, yes, more than one plot have been set up, or unhinged, at Watergate. We have to free our minds of a hundred certainties we have been provided (and have provided ourselves) on that third-rate burglary. We have preferred to rely on the testimony of a hundred skilled and professional liars rather than face into a vision of reality which would recognize that Franz Kafka is the true if abstract historian of the modern age, and the Möbius strip is the

nearest surface we can find to a plane.³²

To free our minds! We live in one existence, but have the overlay of another upon us. We strive to make our history, and sense, with the uneasiness of confrontations never faced, that we may dwell under the overall domination of an invisible second government (at odds with itself?) whose touch is subtle, but whose scenarios sit like an incubus upon Intelligence itself.

Of course we also live in a world more dazzling with the montage of startling connections than a Kenneth Anger film. Maybe, it is our reward. During that season when Bobby Kennedy, weary from stalking Jimmy Hoffa, would relax with Marilyn Monroe, we find out Hoffa, in his turn, hired a wiretapper, Bernard Spindel, to listen in on Bobby.³³ Spindel, who must have been as proficient as Gene Hackman in *The Conversation*, was going to be arrested eventually and would die in jail. There is reason to think the Kennedys never forgave him, for Spindel seems to have gotten some tapes on Bobby, and the wiretapper's widow appears to have kept and concealed them. She rose up to the polluted surface of the news a year or two ago, Mrs. Barbara Fox Spindel. A small munitions company she owned had been offering (by the claim of its promotion material) to be able to produce fatal exploding cigarette packs and other small works of surprise for the use of the CIA and other espionage. Her company and her name became connected by way of the newspaper story to Lucien "Gus" Conein, an old CIA hand who had long worked for General Lansdale, the

CIA station chief in Saigon. Conein denied the connection vehemently, of course, but then we can imagine how quickly somebody in his line of work is going to admit a professional association with Mrs. Spindel.

Now, it happens to be Conein, an old Company associate, whom Hunt interviewed when Chuck Colson was looking for a way to cook up a few false Kennedy cables on the assassination of Diem. It is a long trail which leads from the tragedy of Marilyn Monroe to E. Howard Hunt and his thunderstruck fun and games, and there is not much voltage in these connections. No shock comes across the gap. It is just that like Agatha Christie's characters we all seem to end up knowing one another. Before too long, if irony does not paralyze, we may be singing, "No man is an island, intire of it selfe" in the god-awful music of Ernest Hemingway's final whiskey-cracked voice. Listen to his record.³⁴ What a crazy country we inhabit. What a harlot. What a brute. She squashes sausage out of the minds of novelists on their hoofed way to a real good plot.

³²A Möbius strip is like a paper band curved into a circle, but twisted a half turn before it is glued. If you start drawing a line down the middle of the band your pencil will end up on the opposite side of the paper once you have circled the ring. Stated by its paradox, the top surface of the plane is now the bottom surface.

³³Robert F. Slatzer, *The Life and Curious Death of Marilyn Monroe*.

³⁴Ernest Hemingway Reading, *Cuedmon Records TC 1185*.

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THE WASHINGTON POST

August 24, 1976

Guineans Say Purged Official Testified He Had Worked for CIA

DAKAR, Senegal—Diallo Telli, the Guinean justice minister arrested on charges of plotting to overthrow the Guinean government, has testified that he worked for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, according to a broadcast on Radio Conakry. Telli, an African Unity member from 1964 to 1972, said in a deposition that the idea that he work for the CIA was first advanced in 1971 by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, then a presidential national security adviser, the broadcast said.

A State Department spokesman in Washington said, "The charge is groundless, absurd." The U.S.

embassy in Guinea will issue a strong denial, he said.

A number of senior officials in Guinea are being arrested in an internal government purge, and numerous unverified accusations are being made, a State Department source said.

CIA spokesmen were unavailable for comment.

According to the broadcast, Telli said he actually was recruited into the CIA in November, 1974, with the Liberian ambassador in Conakry acting as mediator, and that his job was to supply the U.S. government with information about Guinea's domestic politics.

THE WASHINGTON POST

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Ros-

selli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Pearson, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to

the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents

testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan attended during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967

interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots—Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1963 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonym AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cu-

bans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong likelihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

NEWS, Detroit
14 Aug. 1976

U.S. intelligence agencies need to be strengthened

The intelligence-gathering services in this nation are in serious trouble, brought to low esteem at home and abroad through public grilling before congressional committees. A rebuilding operation is desperately needed and vital to national security.

Liberal politicians, through their probing, have revealed the operating methods — and some excesses — of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The hearings humiliated officials. What happened was a blood-letting before the eyes of the world.

Much of what went on should not have been disclosed in so public a manner. But it happened. Now the country must heed its lessons and reshape the intelligence operations of both the CIA and the FBI.

Some basic decisions are required.

First, the public must accept the fact that an intelligence-gathering network at home and abroad is a vital necessity. Our leaders must be forewarned of foreign dangers in time to raise defenses. And the nation cannot let foreign spy networks operate unchecked at home.

This fundamental objective may be difficult to achieve because Congress — to put it simply — blew the cover of our intelligence system. Too much was disclosed and foreign information sources, fearing public exposure, have gone underground. Friendly foreign agencies, faced with similar fears, no longer tell all to the CIA. The trust the agency enjoyed has been eroded.

Of all the lessons learned, the most important is that Congress cannot keep secrets and congressmen make poor spymasters.

Those who say the CIA has been utterly shattered by the investigations are wrong. The damage has been extensive but the CIA still serves a useful purpose.

In recent times, the worth of the CIA has been reinforced by the use of its reports on the Soviet economy (probing such matters as the reasons for the failures of Soviet agriculture) and strength of the Soviet defense establishment. In gathering and analyzing this kind of information, the CIA has been superlative.

This function must be carefully preserved.

A sensible American public will accept the need for information-gathering. Defense leaders must know, as they have known, about the kinds of missiles being developed by our adversaries and they must continue to get that information early enough to raise countermeasures against them.

But as the United States unleashes the intelligence community to gather information, it must not allow its servants to abuse their powers. Therefore, restrictions are needed.

This is peacetime and not wartime, a fact that makes a difference in what an elected government allows the CIA and the FBI to do. In wartime, a nation can justify the assassination of a spy who sends information from a port city to submarines

on sailing dates of convoys. He is there to kill merchant sailors and assassination is his due.

But assassination plots hatched in peacetime are repugnant to the American public. There is also little tolerance for interference in the political affairs of other nations.

But how do legislators write a regulation to prohibit foreign political interferences? There is always the possibility that U.S. leaders may discover a situation in which that kind of action might prevent a war.

Judgment, therefore, has to be used by someone.

The country has learned about the abuses exercised by President Nixon in his handling of the CIA. People ask whether the nation wants a president to have that much power over such an agency.

The CIA must answer to some person, some committee, some public body which in turn answers to the people. President Ford has issued a 35-page directive to the CIA setting out his limitations on its operations. Congress has answered by giving seven separate committees (made up of 29 senators and 20 representatives) some claim to hear intelligence disclosures.

Too many people are now privy to secret information and this trend must be reversed. An intelligence gathering system governed in this way will be a useless sieve.

This raises a vexing question. Does this nation want to protect its secrets with a law which would make disclosure a criminal offense, like the British Official Secrets Act?

The United States has laws of that kind to protect tax and census data, cotton futures, grand jury proceedings and private communications between doctors and patients, lawyers and clients.

While every other Western nation has strong security laws, the United States tolerates Counter Spy, a magazine published for the avowed purpose of disclosing the identity of CIA agents everywhere, endangering all of those named.

If this goes on, and the press does not exercise a higher sense of responsibility, the nation may get a statute it does not want. Congress will feel required to act if CIA agents are put at risk.

What about foreign spies who operate within U.S. boundaries? Twenty-seven hostile nations maintain spy networks in this country, based either in Washington embassies or UN delegations, according to Col. R.D. Heintz Jr., Detroit News military analyst.

What is to be done about this? Do our authorities let the Soviet KGB do what it likes? Do they keep track of it? Do they trap its agents? Do they frustrate and confuse it?

Washington has been naive about the intelligence business. The people must now tell their politicians in blunt terms that the peep show is over so far as the spy business is concerned. The United States must repair the damage that has been done and tighten up its security again.

GENERAL

NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, AUGUST 24, 1976

Issue and Debate

Conflict Continues Over U.S. Effort To Halt Spread of Nuclear Weapons

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22—

The Ford Administration is engaged in protracted and intricate negotiations with more than a dozen nations to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time, critics of these efforts have become more vocal, charging that the Administration's nonproliferation diplomacy is too little and

At stake is whether the present nuclear weapons club, consisting of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, and perhaps India and Israel, is going to be enlarged.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger recently traveled to Iran and Pakistan to try to persuade the leaders of these countries not to buy certain nuclear power facilities that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. He has been having similar talks with other potential buyers, such as Brazil, South Korea and Argentina, and with the suppliers — West Germany, France, Britain, the Soviet Union, Canada and Japan.

Administration officials working on the problem do not evince great optimism about the ultimate outcome, but they do point to progress in heading off the nuclear trend in South Korea and Iran.

As a backdrop, the arms control community, joined by a number of members of Congress, has kept up a drum beat of criticism. Most notably, Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, Democrat of Connecticut, who is chairman of the Senate's Government Operations Committee, has been seeking to use the committee's powers under the Export Reorganization Act to prod the Administration.

It is Mr. Ribicoff's belief, shared by a number of his colleagues, that there is a good chance of preventing enlargement of the nuclear weapons club if only the Administration will attach stiffer terms to American nuclear exports.

The Background

The treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, known popularly as the nonproliferation treaty, entered into force in 1970, and there are now more than 100 participating nations. In the treaty, states possessing nuclear weapons pledged not

to help others to gain a nuclear capability, and states without nuclear weapons promised not to acquire them. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which is based in Vienna, was designated to monitor all nuclear activities in the states that had no nuclear weapons.

The treaty has some significant loopholes, including the right of a signer to renounce participation upon giving 90 days' notice and the right to carry on any nuclear activity short of actual manufacture of a nuclear weapon.

In May 1974, India, one of the many key nations that did not sign the treaty, exploded a nuclear device fashioned from resources and made in facilities provided in part by Canada and the United States. The explosion brought home to official Washington — as previous protests from arms control advocates had not — the link between the export of nuclear technology and facilities for peaceful purposes and the possible spread of nuclear weapons.

Three facts were responsible for this link. First, the United States no longer had a monopoly on the export of nuclear facilities and technology; other countries also could sell.

Secondly, the high price of oil and other fossil fuels, made nuclear energy an attractive alternative, and many countries now wanted to buy nuclear power plants.

Third, because of the increased demand for uranium to fuel these power plants and because the United States and the Soviet Union, now the sole exporters of enriched uranium, had not increased output to meet this demand, there was a shortage of nuclear fuel. Thus many countries wanted to buy reprocessing and uranium-enrichment facilities to produce their own fuel.

The United States does not export these facilities, but other countries do, and that is the problem. Weapons-grade nuclear material can be produced in them.

Almost all of the more than 400 nuclear power plants either operating, under construction or planned in almost 40 countries, are light water reactors. These reactors can be fueled by uranium enriched to less than 1 percent, far below the requirements for a nuclear bomb. They can also be

fueled by weapons-grade plutonium chemically reprocessed from the spent fuel of a nuclear power plant.

As sweeteners for sales of nuclear power plants at about \$1 billion each, France has agreed to provide Pakistan with a reprocessing plant and West Germany has promised to sell Brazil an uranium enrichment facility. The United States also continues to sell India fuel for its nuclear reactor, despite the Administration's acknowledgment that India diverted materials from previous sales to carry out its nuclear explosion.

Administration officials and critics agree that the goal is to prevent the sale of reprocessing and enrichment facilities: the issue is how. More specifically, the issue is whether and how to use the sale of nuclear fuel — the one area of exports where the United States still is dominant — to stop the sale of these facilities or to get strong safeguards against the diversion of weapons-grade fuel from these facilities to the production of nuclear bombs.

Administration View

The Administration's position is based on the assumption that the nuclear cat is already out of the bag, that with the passing of the American monopoly and the widespread availability of nuclear technology and materials, many countries can now produce nuclear weapons if they are determined to do so. Thus the Administration has emphasized safeguards, not prevention.

The Administration has specifically rejected any idea of a unilateral embargo, or a bilateral embargo with the Soviet Union, on the sale of nuclear fuel for power plants as a means of preventing the sale of reprocessing and enrichment plants. Two reasons were given for this: a reluctance to work with Moscow against allies of the United States and a desire to avoid raising questions about the reliability of the United States as a long-term supplier of nuclear fuel.

The idea is to use the advantage the United States possesses as a fuel supplier to promote the sales of American nuclear power plants. This would provide a commercial advantage as well as the opportunity to impose stringent safeguards on all

nuclear facilities in the buyer's country.

At the same time, the Administration has had some success in persuading suppliers to impose tougher safeguards against the diversion of fuel from peaceful power facilities to bombs. All suppliers now reportedly insist on inspection of facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In at least one instance where the Administration felt it had leverage to prevent a sale, it used the leverage. Thus, South Korea was dissuaded from buying a reprocessing plant from France when it was pointed out that completion of the sale would by law lead to a cutoff of American military sales to Seoul.

In all cases, the Administration has pressed home to the purchaser the point that reprocessing plants are highly uneconomical.

Opposition View

Mr. Ribicoff and others have argued that once a country has a reprocessing or enrichment facility in its territory, no safeguards are adequate. Mr. Ribicoff would favor an embargo on fuel sales to all suppliers and buyers of reprocessing and enrichment plants.

Specifically, Mr. Ribicoff wants the Administration to take a tougher stand on the proliferation issue before the United States' virtual monopoly as a fuel supplier comes to an end. By the mid-1980's a number of other countries will be able to provide low-grade uranium for power plants and enriched uranium and plutonium that could be used for bombs.

In the meantime, and in order to make his plea more acceptable to other supplier countries, he has proposed a market-sharing plan for the sale of nuclear power plants. The details of this plan are sketchy, but the idea is to work out way for each supplier to gain some of the huge profits available from the sale of power plants without trying to gain a competitive advantage by offering to sell reprocessing and enrichment facilities as well.

The Outlook

The Administration and its critics seem to be moving toward a compromise approach that might also be acceptable to buyers.

The idea is to foster multinational reprocessing and enrichment plants as a substitute for nationally owned and operated plants. In return for not building their own plants, nations would be assured a reliable supply of uranium from the multinational plants. Iran has reportedly agreed to this kind of approach, and efforts are under way to persuade Pakistan.

In the last analysis, it may

be that the United States will have little influence over a nation's decision to build a nuclear bomb. The list of non signers of the nonproliferation treaty shows that local and regional conflicts and rivalries remain a dominant

consideration. The nonsigners include India, Pakistan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, China and Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina.

Interested parties in the United States are doing what they feel they can to post-

pone the day of reckoning, hoping but not expecting that such a day will never come.

WASHINGTON POST

20 AUG 1976

Taiwan Seen Reprocessing Nuclear Fuel

By Edward Schumacher
Special to The Washington Post

U.S. intelligence reports over the past six months indicate that Taiwan has been secretly reprocessing spent uranium fuel, an operation that can produce atomic weapons material, according to officials of two U.S. government agencies.

Officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) who have had access to the closely held reports said it is unclear how long Taiwan has been engaged in the secret operation or how much bomb material may have been produced. However, they expressed doubt that Taiwan has amassed enough material to make an atomic bomb.

The United States, Taiwan's major supplier of nuclear power reactors and enriched uranium fuel, has not yet formally confronted Taiwanese officials with the reports of secret reprocessing, according to knowledgeable officials.

The United States is said to be fearful of revealing the source of its intelligence, particularly while still seeking to learn the full extent of the secret work.

Confirmation that Taiwan is producing nuclear weapons material would place the Ford administration in an agonizing position, especially during the pre-election period.

Strong U.S. sanctions, including termination of export licenses for Taiwan's ambitious nuclear power program, could cause serious repercussions in Taiwan and among Republican conservatives in the United States.

Failure to take action could cause major difficulties with mainland China, multiply the nuclear wor-

ries of Japan and of less-developed Asian states, and accelerate a worldwide drift toward nuclear proliferation.

A Taiwan embassy spokesman denied that Taiwan is doing clandestine work.

Several usually knowledgeable U.S. officials disclaimed any knowledge of the reports of secret reprocessing, pointing out that Taiwan has openly acknowledged construction of a small scale "hot cell" reprocessing plant under international safeguards.

But another senior official confirmed the existence of the reports of secret work, and suggested that there is disagreement within the government about their significance.

ACDA officials said they have been stalling on an application to export two additional nuclear power plants to Taiwan, a move they hope will be taken by Taiwan as a signal to stop secret reprocessing. The export application was submitted in January.

Four other large U.S. nuclear power plants were approved for export in 1972 and 1974 as part of a Taiwan program designed to provide half of the island's electricity needs from nuclear sources in 1985.

The select group of U.S. officials aware of the secret intelligence reports is concerned not only that Taiwan can now produce plutonium, the nuclear bomb material, but also that it apparently is willing to jeopardize its civil nuclear program and to break international safeguard agreements designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

All of Taiwan's known nuclear reac-

tors are subject to international inspection by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA). Secret reprocessing of the spent fuel from these reactors would violate Taiwan's agreements with the IAEA. The status of these agreements is politically tenuous because Taiwan was ousted in 1971 as a member state of the IAEA.

There is a theoretical possibility that Taiwan could have purchased spent fuel from another nation as the basis for its reprocessing, a U.S. official pointed out. But there is no evidence that such a transaction has taken place.

A reprocessing plant can manufacture plutonium for nuclear weapons—or for use in recycled civilian fuel—from the irradiated refuse of an atomic reactor. Though generous with technical information and training about reprocessing in past decades, the United States has come increasingly to believe that reprocessing plants pose a grave danger of nuclear weapon proliferation.

India manufactured the plutonium for its 1974 nuclear explosion in its own reprocessing plant. In the past year the United States has dissuaded South Korea from purchasing a reprocessing plant from France, and is attempting to stop purchases of such facilities by Brazil and Pakistan. A provision of the recently enacted U.S. foreign military aid law cuts off U.S. economic and military assistance to any country importing a reprocessing facility.

In 1969 the Nixon administration turned down a request from Taiwan to purchase a reprocessing plant from the United States. This precluded Taiwan from importing major U.S. components that are on export control lists. However, ERDA officials said Taiwan did purchase widely available parts, such as special laboratory glass, which are not so controlled.

An ERDA spokesman said 713 Taiwanese have studied nuclear technology in U.S. government laboratories and universities under official U.S. sponsorship as a result of "atoms for peace" and successor programs.

Despite the U.S. change in policy about reprocessing, a Taiwanese nuclear scientist, Chung Woo, was trained in reprocessing for a full year ending this past June at ERDA's Argonne Laboratory outside Chicago, the agency said.

Since the early 1970s, Taiwan has been constructing a small-scale "hot cell" reprocessing facility at its Institute for Nuclear Energy Reaction with parts obtained from around the world.

This plant, which is reportedly undergoing "cold" test runs with water, has been visited by IAEA inspectors on the understanding that it will be placed under international safeguards.

Last October Taiwan informed the United States of its intention to reprocess spent fuel from a U.S.-supplied Thor research reactor in the

of cell" plant, which is located at a campus-like research center near Lung Tan about 75 miles from Taipei.

Under bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, the United States must give permission before American-supplied material can be involved in reprocessing.

A senior State Department official said Taiwan's request is still under consideration. "There's no final turn-down, but they know we don't favor reprocessing," he said.

American, European and Canadian experts said that one-half pound to a pound of plutonium per year could be produced in the hot cell plant from the spent fuel of a large Canadian-supplied research reactor on the island. This amount is far short of the 18 pounds of plutonium estimated to be needed for a sophisticated nuclear device, though enough to provide knowledge of plutonium handling and explosive fabrication.

Taiwan has built an independent nuclear system around the Canadian reactor and its hot cell reprocessing plant which would make possible the creation of a small plutonium stockpile available for bomb uses without violation of present international safeguard standards.

The supply system begins with natural uranium imported from South Africa which does not list its imports with the IAEA.

In 1973 Taiwan constructed its own plant to fabricate the imported natural uranium into fuel rods suitable for use in the Canadian reactor.

This plant is listed with ERDA as having the capacity of fabricating 25 to 30 tons of uranium per year—twice

the normal fuel rate for the Canadian reactor.

Canadian experts said that plutonium production could be maximized by running fuel rods through the reactor at a higher than normal rate.

The Canadian reactor is a large 40-megawatt "NRX" research reactor similar to the one used by India to produce the material for its 1974 atomic explosion.

Taiwan purchased the reactor in 1969 for \$35 million. Taiwan also purchased 19.5 tons of Canadian "heavy water" for operation of the reactor, but its supply of this necessary chemical is running low, U. S. officials said.

Taiwan does not need outside approval to reprocess the spent fuel from the Canadian reactor to obtain plutonium. Canada has no agreement requiring its permission.

Canada broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1970, further diminishing its authority over and interest in the uses of its reactor.

The fuel rod fabrication plant, Canadian reactor and hot cell reprocessing facility are listed with the IAEA under safeguard arrangements designed to account for all nuclear activity to prevent the clandestine development of nuclear weapons by nations which do not have them.

The safeguards in Taiwan include tamper-proof cameras, sealed fuel stockpiles, mechanical accounting devices and IAEA inspections about four times a year.

The safeguards, however, do not prohibit reprocessing or the building of a plutonium stockpile. With a supply of plutonium, Taiwan would be only a few steps away from a usable weapons, U. S. officials said.

Sources familiar with the U. S. in-

telligence reports of secret reprocessing on Taiwan said these did not emanate from the known hot cell pilot plant, which is not yet in operation. One source said different stages of the secret reprocessing work apparently are being done in different places.

Taiwan is believed to be doing research on development of offensive missiles capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Taiwan already possesses U. S. jet aircraft capable of making a bombing run across the Taiwan straits to mainland China.

China has exploded at least 18 nuclear devices, including thermonuclear (H-bomb) weapons since breaking into the ranks of atomic-armed states in 1964.

Chinese officials have recently said that Taiwan will have to be liberated by force. But it is considered unlikely that China would use atomic weapons against an island it considers its own and expects to control some day.

Taiwan has signed and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty forswearing the development of atomic weapons.

Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's Nationalist Chinese government is believed to be divided between a large faction favoring concentration on economic development and a small but powerful hawkish element which insists that Taiwan develop a nuclear deterrent as a last resort against an attack by China. The hawks argue that the U. S. commitment to defend Taiwan is weakening.

Staff writer Don Oberdorfer contributed to this article.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

30 August 1976

Halting 2 nuclear hopefuls

By Harry B. Ellis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Is the ability to make nuclear weapons spreading throughout the world, despite strenuous U.S. efforts to prevent it?

The question gains fresh urgency with reports that Taiwan — the offshore island nation claimed by China — secretly is reprocessing spent uranium fuel into weapons-grade plutonium.

For six months, reports the Washington Post, the government of Taiwan Premier Chiang Ching-kuo — which officially has fore-sworn the development of nuclear weapons — has been accumulating a small stockpile of potential bomb material.

This could be done by reprocessing spent fuel from U.S.-supplied nuclear-power reactors designed to produce electricity, or from a research reactor which Taiwan bought from Canada.

The reports, which Taiwanese officials brand as false, come at a time of hints from Peking that China might use force to seize Taiwan.

"My guess," said a source close to the

Taiwanese Government, "is that Taiwan is going to try to get into the position of having a potential for nuclear weapons like Israel and other small technologically advanced countries that feel threatened."

But, said the source, the Taiwanese, "who are extremely worried about the United States deserting them," are unlikely to do anything to hasten that desertion.

In the end, the source said, Taiwan probably will comply with whatever nuclear conditions are laid down by the United States rather than risk the loss of American military and diplomatic support.

Nonetheless, "The Taiwanese, again like Israel, want every [military] option open to them." Thus their development of a "scientific and technological" background for a nuclear-weapons potential would not be surprising.

The whole situation is fraught with difficulties for President Ford's administration:

- By law, the United States cannot supply economic or military assistance to any nation buying a nuclear fuel-processing plant.
- The United States and Taiwan are bound by a mutual-defense treaty signed in 1954.
- Taiwan, the island bastion seized by the late Generalissimo Kai-shek when his forces were driven from mainland China by the Communists, still commands strong support from many conservative Americans.
- A Taiwan reprocessing facility, if it exists, would undercut U.S. efforts to prevent Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, and other nations from developing a nuclear-weapons capability.

After months of tough negotiation with American officials, Iran reportedly has agreed to forgo acquisition of a fuel-reprocessing

plant. This appears to clear the way for the sale of up to eight U.S.-built nuclear-power reactors to Iran — joining two other reactors being built by West Germany.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has failed to dissuade Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from buying a reprocessing plant from France, for which a contract has been signed.

Brazil, over U.S. objections, is buying a fuel-reprocessing plant from West Germany. German and Brazilian officials insist the plant will

not be used to produce a weapons capability.

Nations known to possess nuclear weapons include, in addition to the United States and the Soviet Union, China, France, and Great Britain.

In 1974, India exploded a nuclear device which intensified U.S. efforts to prevent the international sale of reprocessing plants. Israel is widely believed to possess a nuclear-weapons capability, though the Israelis are not known to have exploded a nuclear device.

WASHINGTON POST
31 AUG 1976

For the Record

Arms Sales to Iran: An Analysis

The Senate Foreign Assistance Subcommittee's staff report on U.S. military sales to Iran appeared on Aug. 2, just before Secretary of State Kissinger arrived in Tehran for talks with the Shah. It set off renewed controversy over American arms shipments to the Middle East. These excerpts are taken from the report's findings:

Iran has purchased large quantities of some of the most sophisticated equipment in the U.S. inventory including the F-14 Tom Cat Fighter and the DD993 modified Spruance Class destroyer. The F-14 system is so complicated that the United States Navy is having major difficulty keeping it operational; Iran's Spruance Class destroyer will be even more sophisticated than those being procured by the U.S. Navy. Iran is already the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf area. Upon delivery between now and 1981 of equipment ordered to date, Iran, on paper, can be regarded as a regional superpower. Although future purchases of new U.S. equipment and related services are likely to decline in absolute terms from the fiscal year 1974 and 1975 levels, any additional sales will add to an already sizeable inventory.

—Iran is considering the purchase of additional sophisticated equipment such as the F-16 or F-18 and AWACS aircraft;

—To pay for new systems and complete its planned purchases of such systems as the Spruance Class destroyer, Iran has proposed barter arrangements (weapons for oil) to compensate for a reduction in normal oil revenues;

The government of Iran is attempting to create an extremely modern military establishment in a country that lacks the technical, educational and industrial base to provide the necessary trained personnel and management capabilities to operate such an establishment effectively. Iran also lacks experience in logistics and support operations and does not have the maintenance capabilities, the infrastructure (port facilities, roads, rail nets, etc.), and the construction capacity to implement its new programs independent of outside support.

—Most informed observers feel that Iran will not be able to absorb and operate within the next five to ten years a large proportion of the sophisticated military systems purchased from the

U.S. unless increasing numbers of American personnel go to Iran in a support capacity. This support alone may not be sufficient to guarantee success for the Iranian program;

—The schedule for virtually every major program except equipment deliveries to the point of entry into Iran has slipped considerably due to the limitations noted above;

—In the face of immense obstacles, our investigation indicated that the Iranian armed forces are making a maximum effort to ensure the success of the modernization program; their efforts, however, are hampered because of rapid expansion in the civilian sector as well. The military, for example, has difficulty in matching civilian salary offers to the growing, but still insufficient numbers of trained personnel.

The 1972 decision by President Nixon to sell Iran the F-14 and/or the F-15 aircraft and, in general, to let Iran buy anything it wanted effectively exempted Iran from arms sales review processes in the State and Defense Departments. This lack of policy review on individual sales requests inhibited any inclinations in the embassy, the U.S. military mission in Iran (ARMISH-MAAG), or desk officers in State and DOD to assert control over day-to-day events; it created a bonanza for U.S. weapons manufacturers, the procurement branches of the three U.S. services and the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

—Between 1973-75, the activities of U.S. arms salesmen, official and private, were not closely supervised by executive branch officials charged with doing so, or by the Congress;

—Each of the U.S. services, particularly the Air Force and Navy, was trying to sell equipment for its own reasons, usually to lower per-unit costs of its own procurements or to recoup part of its prior research and development investment. On occasion, the services fiercely competed with each other for sales to Iran, e.g. the Air Force and Navy to sell the F-15 and F-14 respectively;

—The services often did not inform the Iranians of the full extent of the training, logistics, and maintenance implications of the systems they were trying to sell. Thus, Iran may have been unaware of the complexities involved in translating its purchases into an

effective fighting force. Problems in all of these areas are very serious;

—Discussions both in Washington and Iran have confirmed that until recently U.S. appreciation of the management problems of the arms programs in Iran was extremely limited;

—Secretary Schlesinger's decision to appoint a senior civilian Defense Representative in Iran in September, 1975, to oversee and coordinate U.S. military programs in Iran is considered by virtually everyone to be a positive and necessary development, given the chaos and problems that had emerged in program management and implementation. Nevertheless, until there is clear policy direction and effective program management in Washington, the problems in the field (Iran) will continue. Deputy Secretary Ellsworth issued a directive in February, 1976, that he hopes will ensure coordination and policy direction within the DOD;

—Evidence gathered indicates that the Iranian arms sales program is not yet fully under control. Only with more effective control from Washington can the inherent propensity of civilian contractors and U.S. armed services to sell in an unrestrained manner be curbed.

The presence of large and growing numbers of Americans in Iran has already given rise to socio-economic problems. Although many of these have proven to be manageable, they could become worse should there be a major change in U.S.-Iranian relations.

—On the whole, U.S.-Iranian personal relationships are excellent, if somewhat formal;

—We were told that some of the early problems were due to the presence of large numbers of young, single American male civilians without adequate recreational outlets. Decisions by some of the private companies to limit the number of unattached male employees have improved social relations, especially in more traditional cities such as Isfahan;

—There are many other foreigners in Iran as well as Americans, including British, German, South Korean, French, Filipino, Indian and Pakistani;

—Anti-Americanism could become a serious problem in Iran, as it has elsewhere, if there were to be a change in government in Iran. The possibility of a future crisis situation cannot be totally ignored and for this reason contin-

agency plans to deal with such an emergency are necessary.

The U.S. having sold sophisticated arms in large quantities to Iran, has assumed a growing and significant "commitment" in terms of supporting that equipment—an unstated but nevertheless real obligation to train Iranians and to provide logistical support for the lifetime of the equipment. To the extent that the decisions to sell the arms were politically motivated, a failure to

provide follow-on support to the satisfaction of Iran would violate the political benefit of having made the sales. The deep involvement of U.S. personnel assisting Iran in program implementation has significant foreign policy implications for the United States in the Persian Gulf.

—The U.S. cannot abandon, substantially diminish, or even redirect its arms programs without precipitating a major crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations;

—If Iran is not able effectively to use the equipment it has purchased, it may blame the U.S. for the failures;

—There is general agreement among U.S. personnel involved with the Iranian programs that it is unlikely that Iran could go to war in the next five to ten years with its current and prospective inventory, i.e. purchases to date of sophisticated weapons (as distinct from some of the less sophisticated ground equipment) without U.S. support on a day-to-day basis.

NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, AUGUST 30, 1976

U.S. Influence on Iran: Gigantic and Diverse

By ERIC PACE

Special to The New York Times

TEHERAN, Iran, Aug. 29—United States policies, products and personnel have had an enormous impact on this ancient Middle Eastern kingdom in recent years, largely through the sale of substantially more than \$10 billion in American-made military equipment to the Iranian regime since early 1972.

The effects have been diverse: English has been made the basic language for many military activities here; Iranian intelligence, is to acquire a huge United States-designed communications monitoring installation; and thousands of United States military experts and other citizens have arrived, helping to fuel a real-estate boom.

Many aspects of this American impact were criticized in United States Senate staff study published Aug. 2. It said United States arms sales to Iran had been chaotic and were "not yet fully under control." It also reported that some overly sophisticated equipment had been sold, that numerous United States military experts might be needed here for years, and that Iran could not wage full-scale war in the near future "without U.S. support on day-to-day basis."

A traveler in Iran sees and hears much that confirms the report's main points. Signs of overheating in military sales to the kingdom have been particularly evident where training is involved: there is a shortage of skilled Iranian pilots to fly the new kinds of jet aircraft.

Qualified informants have also reported that quantities of new ground equipment are being put into temporary storage for lack of trained Iranians to operate it. A too hastily mounted program to train Iranians to fly new helicopters led to a strike by American instructors in central Iran last year.

Yet words of praise for and confidence in United States armaments supplies and United States-armed Iranian troops are

also heard: Manouchehr Gangi, an adviser to Iran's Prime Minister, said in a recent interview that Iran bought more military equipment from the United States than from other countries because "we believe American technology is furthest advanced." Shah Mohammed Roza Pahlavi said at a recent news conference: "I you supply us with what we need, O.K., we are very happy with you; we have had such good relations for a long time, we trust you."

And after American-equipped Iranian troops helped quell insurgents in Oman, the commander of the Omani armed forces said in an interview that "the war would certainly not have been won as quickly as it was won without Iranian assistance."

A further sign of the Shah's approval of American arms and arms sales practices was Iran's decision, announced in Washington last week, to buy 160 F-16 fighter planes at a cost of about \$3.4 billion—in addition to the \$10 billion already committed for other arms.

Quiet Opposition

Yet some quiet but fervent opposition exists in this police state to the Shah's militaristic and dictatorial rule. It was underscored here yesterday when terrorists killed three United States civilian employees of Rockwell International, an American company that has contracts with the Iranian armed forces—including one for setting up the communications monitoring installation. The killers, said by Iranian officials to be self-styled "Islamic Marxist" guerrillas, escaped and American Government and business installations here have stepped up security precautions.

The roots of the huge United States role in Iran lie decades back. A United States diplomatic legation was opened here in 1882. An American financial expert, Morgan Shuster, was brought here as treasurer-general in 1911 and labored to reorganize the country's financial system. In the 1940's, a United States Army mission was set up to help improve the Iranian Army.

But American military and commercial involvement became much more substantial

and significant after Iran's oil revenues began booming in 1973—providing the Shah with what at first seemed ample funds to capitalize on the Nixon Administration's decision in 1972 to let Iran buy almost anything it wanted in the way of conventional United States armaments.

As the oil boom got underway many American defense industry executives made pilgrimages to the office of Gen. Hassan Toufanian, Iran's Deputy Minister of War, who is the Shah's chief military purchasing officer.

Repeated Criticism

Iran's growing reliance on American hardware and military skills, and the energetic sales methods employed, attracted repeated public criticism—even before the publication of this month's Senate staff study, which was prepared by Robert Mantel and Geoffrey Kemp, specialists in arms control for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on foreign assistance.

There have been much-publicized allegations and denials of corruption in various aspects of the arms trade. In January 1975 the United States General Accounting Office compiled a confidential report concluding that American arms sales to Iran were beginning to impose a drain on critical skills needed by the United States' own armed forces.

The Senate staff study, which appeared with a foreword by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, helped to shift attention in Washington and Teheran to some of the reporter's main conclusions.

On the subject of the United States arms sales program in general, the report said that in past years "chaos and problems had emerged in program management and implementation." It also said that the United States armed services, in their unbridled eagerness to have arms sold to Iran "often did not inform the Iranians of the full extent of the training, logistics, and maintenance implications of the systems they were trying to sell."

Yet Mr. Gangi defended Iran's purchases in an interview at his office, saying: "We buy what our needs dictate and after much research and study of the equipment."

The Shah's dependence on United States arms supplies is less than total, however. At least \$2 billion worth of munitions have been ordered from

other countries—notably from Britain, which has provided Iran with hundreds of Chieftain tanks and is expected to provide well over 1,000 more. Various explanations are given for the Shah's huge arms purchases, but the Shah explained his reasoning succinctly to a visitor here earlier this year: "We've got to see to the de-

fense of our country more and more; the U.N., outside pacts—all of this is good, but you cannot depend on it entirely. We cannot take chances."

A traveler encounters many signs of faulty planning in Iran's arms acquisitions, however—even though one well-informed Teheran intellectual reported recently that roughly only a third of the more than \$10 billion in arms ordered from the United States had actually been delivered.

Undue Haste

There have been many signs of undue haste in buying the arms. One early victim was the serenity of the central Iranian city of Isfahan, where indignant Iranians last year alleged that bored American helicopter pilots, brought in to teach Iranians to fly Bell military helicopters, had passed the time by drinking, fighting and even racing motorcycles into a mosque.

One basic problem, American expatriates reported, was that the instructors did not seem adequately screened, briefed and trained before they were sent to Isfahan. After labor problems involving the instructors arose last year, the Bell Company acted hastily to make amends—but dismissed scores of the instructors.

Contrasting View

The Senate staff study also said that the September 1975 decision of James R. Schlesinger, then Defense Secretary, "to appoint a senior civilian defense representative in Iran to oversee and coordinate U.S. military programs in Iran is considered by virtually everyone to be a positive and necessary development, given the chaos and problems that had emerged."

Nonetheless, the study contended, "evidence gathered indicates that the Iranian arms sales program is not yet fully under control."

A contrasting view of the present United States sales program was given in an interview here, before the Senate report appeared, by the senior Defense Department representative, Eric Von Marbod.

"I feel that we in the De-

partments of State and Defense and in this mission in Iran are acting responsibly. We are not huckstering, we are not fueling an arms race, and we are not proposing military systems that Iran does not need for its valid self-defense needs," Mr. Von Marbod said.

He is the third-ranking official of the United States Embassy here, charged with overseeing American military sales and other aspects of Defense Department activities in Iran.

The Shah himself, asked at the recent news conference whether the program was out of control asserted: "As far as I know, I think we have absorbed these arms so far easily, very easily; whatever we will get in the future will also be absorbed."

Much of this expenditure is for sophisticated armaments, notably the complex Grumman F-14 Tomcat fighter and a modified model of the Spruance-class destroyer, which is to be more sophisticated than those being obtained by the United States Navy.

And Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger said at a news conference here earlier this month that Iran planned to spend \$10 billion for military purchases from the United States from 1975 through 1980.

Yet the delivery of further masses of advanced material—only 14 Tomcats have been delivered. So far, and no Spruance-class destroyers—will clearly be something of a jolt in a country where the illiteracy rate is well over 50 percent

and where military experts have reported that for years many Iranian conscripts needed glasses, or better glasses.

In this tightly disciplined state, there has been very little public discussion of the wisdom of the country's advanced arms acquisitions. The Iranian news media, which are Government-owned or influenced, have not reported that the United States.

General Accounting Office has concluded that there are areas in which the Tomcat has not shown itself fully capable of defending American fleets against missiles.

No Practical Use

In private, however, a traveler hears complaints, even among some United States military experts, that the Tomcat and some other items the Shah has been buying are indeed too complicated to be practical for use by the Iranian armed forces and, in some cases, are not needed anyway.

But it is understood that Grumman executives sold the Tomcat partly on the basis that it was the only plane capable of knocking out a Soviet mig-25. This is a potent sales point here since Iran regards the Soviet Union, its neighbor, as a potential enemy.

The importance that the Shah's regime continues to ascribe to the F-14 and other sophisticated weapons was underscored in the Senate staff study. The authors, who visited Iran for 16 days this spring, reported: "We were told that, because of the pri-

ority given to 'prestige' systems such as the F-14, already-trained personnel assigned to other systems that are more relevant to near-term threats have been transferred to the newer systems, with a resultant unmeasurable degradation in overall force effectiveness."

Discreetly, United States officials have generally refrained from commenting publicly on the quality of Iranian military manpower. But one cashiered Bell pilot-instructor said "these trainees just plain don't react to a near-miss situation," while another voiced his extreme reservations about ever flying in combat with most of them.

Yet well-placed Iranians say the Government, for better or worse, is trying to force the pace of social change and modernization precisely by making extreme demands on the Iranian labor force.

Under the circumstances, Iran is leaning heavily on United States military experts here, both uniformed and civilian. The Senate report said that if there were a crisis in the area "the United States personnel in Iran could become, in a sense, hostages." Informed estimates of the total number of United States citizens in Iran now go as high as 27,000.

All told, 1,435 United States Department of Defense personnel were assigned in Iran last February, the last date for which exact figures are available, and they had 1,941 dependents with them.

In addition, more than 40 American companies are estimated to have 2,941 employees in the country.

The Senate staff study reported that most informed observers believed that the total number of United States citizens in Iran "will increase to 50,000-60,000 or higher by the end of the decade"—although by some accounts this projection is excessive and out of date.

Many informed American expatriates endorse the Senate study's carefully hedged statement that "there is general agreement among the U. S. personnel involved with the Iranian programs that it is unlikely that Iran could go to war in the next 5 to 10 years with its current and perspective inventory, i.e., purchases to date, of sophisticated weapons (as distinct from some of the less sophisticated ground equipment) but without U. S. support on a day-to-day basis."

But the Shah gave surprisingly harsh answer when he was asked by an American journalist this spring what he would do if Washington were to cease providing Iran with arms.

"If you try to take an unfriendly attitude toward my country, we can hurt you as badly, if not more so, than you can hurt us," he said, adding, "not just through it—we can create trouble for you in the region; if you force us to change our friendly attitude the repercussions will be immeasurable."

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Poor Nations Given Mainly Military Aid By Communists in '75

Economic Assistance Was Less
Than Half the Arms Total,
According to CIA Study

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter
WASHINGTON — Communist countries sent more than twice as much military aid as economic aid to the world's poor nations last year, according to a new study by the Central Intelligence Agency.

In both categories they still trail far behind totals supplied by Western governments, however.

The Soviet Union, China and Eastern European nations in 1975 delivered \$1.55 billion of arms aid and \$690 million of economic aid to the poorer nations of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Europe, the CIA report said. This represented a \$50 million drop in military supplies and a \$350 million drop in economic assistance from 1974.

The CIA refused to say what American economic and military aid figures were during calendar 1975. Figures on a fiscal-year basis are freely available, however, and show that in the year ended last June 30 U.S. economic aid totaled \$5.9 billion while

military aid was \$2.9 billion.

The CIA said Communist military deliveries equal 22% of those supplied by all sources, while the economic assistance equals only 2% to 3% of the world total.

New Agreements Cited

The ratios are quite different when new agreements—goods promised but still undelivered—are considered. The Communist nations agreed to supply \$925 million of arms, down from \$2.75 billion in 1974, and \$1.85 million of civilian aid, up from \$1.61 billion in the previous year. Both 1975 figures comprise less than 10% of world totals.

The bulk of such aid, both promised and delivered, comes from the Soviet Union, with Eastern Europe's totals exceeding those of China.

The big drop in new military agreements reflects the changed political situation in the Middle East. The CIA said the huge resupply effort following the 1973 Mideast war has ended. In addition, Moscow's cooled relations with Egypt, long a favored recipient, have halted arms flows to that country.

Even so, the bulk of Soviet arms shipments went to the Middle East. Iraq and Syria still get sizable amounts from Moscow, though there has been a decrease in new commitments, while Libya has replaced

Egypt as a major recipient.

"Large deliveries to Libya are resulting in a buildup of modern equipment that is giving Tripoli arsenal status among Arab belligerents," the CIA study said.

Technicians Trained

The report also said the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations last year were training 8,090 military technicians from less-developed countries, while China was training an additional 1,210. Two-thirds of the Soviet-trained technicians came from the Middle East and South Asia, particularly India, while nearly all those in China came from Africa.

The increased economic aid also reflects Soviet actions for the most part. Moscow has promised huge new assistance programs to two border states—Afghanistan and Turkey—with which it hopes to improve relations. It promised those two nations more than \$1 billion of new credits during 1975.

China, meantime, reduced its modest foreign-aid program. Its new arms agreements totaled only \$25 million, down from 1974's \$75 million, while economic programs fell \$2 million, to \$269 million. The biggest Chinese foreign-aid projects are in Africa, notably the Tan-Zam railroad in eastern Africa, which is nearly completed.

READER'S DIGEST
September 1976

U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Who's Ahead?

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has engaged in the most awesome military build-up in history, a breathtaking dedication of national resources to a seemingly endless variety of new weaponry. Meticulous monitoring of this great Soviet leap forward—via a global intelligence network which includes the most sophisticated surveillance satellites—has been the constant concern of Lt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Here, in a distillation from a lengthy series of interviews, General Graham (recently retired, and now a research professor at the University of Miami's Center for Advanced International Studies) talks about the Kremlin's new military climb and its implications for the United States and the world.

*An interview with
LT. GEN. DANIEL O. GRAHAM
Former chief of the Defense
Intelligence Agency*

By RALPH KINNEY BENNETT

Q. As a longtime observer, how would you characterize the balance of military power between the United States and the Soviet Union?

A. By most standards of measuring military forces, the Soviets have surpassed or are surpassing us—despite the "spirit of détente" and the ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In the past decade, the Soviets have gone from 224 intercontinental ballistic missiles to more than 1600. In sea-launched ballistic missiles, they've gone from 29 to around 800; in nuclear warheads, from 390 to around 3500.

America has fallen from being 600 ahead in ICBMs to about 600 behind; from 16 nuclear missile submarines ahead to 13 behind; from 2900 tactical aircraft ahead to more than 350 behind. The Soviets have more major surface ships than we; they have 168 ground divisions compared to our 19; their 34,500 tanks dwarf our 9000. And more ominous than the sheer numbers is the single-minded speed with which the build-up occurred.

Q. But hasn't the United States chosen to spend its defense dollars on higher-quality weapons, while the Russians have gone after quantity?

A. It's clear that the Soviets are striving mightily to achieve both numerical superiority and quality. We thought we were far ahead with MIRV, the multiple-warhead-on-one-missile technology. But since 1972 the U.S.S.R. has tested and deployed four new ICBMs—all of considerably heavier pay load than ours, three of

them with MIRV warheads. One of these new ICBMs—the SS-18—is so big that it could carry 45 MIRV warheads of the size and weight carried on our Poseidon submarine-launched missile.

In addition, the Soviets have begun deploying a new, big-warhead, submarine-launched missile (and new subs to carry it) that can hit any U.S. target from far out at sea and even from the subs' home ports. Their new MIRVed missiles and improved warhead accuracy approach our own technology. Their new ships have the latest in propulsion units and bristle with sophisticated missile systems. Five or six years ago, we in intelligence ruled out the possibility of the Soviets' ever matching us in naval aviation. Now they are building a fleet of aircraft carriers.

Q. Some observers claim that the Soviet economy will collapse under the weight of all this weaponry. Do you agree?

A. The Soviet system is pervasively military. Its economy stays on a virtual war footing even in peacetime, with the military getting first choice of both human talent and material resources. Some 75 percent of total production goes to the building of what Kremlin leaders frankly call the "might" of the nation, with only 25 percent going to the civilian goods and services sector. In the United States, these percentages are almost exactly reversed.

In the past few months, as the result of intensive investigation, we have realized that the Soviets are spending double what we had previously supposed on their military—12 to 15 percent of their gross national product (compared with 5.5 percent for us, and most of ours goes for pay, pensions, etc.).

Q. How is the Soviet Union likely

to use this military might in the not-too-distant future?

A. As of today, neither the U.S.S.R. nor the United States could launch a nuclear attack without suffering terrible damage in return. Invasion is out of the question, too. But there are many plausible scenarios in which Russia's burgeoning power would be an awesome factor. These might include a Soviet military move against Yugoslavia in the wake of Tito's demise, the introduction of Soviet troops into the Middle East or the Persian Gulf. I am afraid we may soon find that we would have to back down to powerful Soviet air, land and sea forces in such situations.

Q. In the West, it is often said that nuclear war is "unthinkable" because neither side could survive. Do the Soviets have the same perspective on nuclear war?

A. Not at all. One recent declaration of Soviet war doctrine, published in the nation's foremost military journal, restates the standard Kremlin view that war is an instrument of policy and, in fact, extols nuclear weapons as an enhancement of that policy. Nuclear weapons, it says, mean that "immeasurably more effective means of struggle are now at the disposal of state power."

The Soviets have not built up their forces, as we have, purely to *deter* a nuclear war. They build their forces to *fight* a nuclear war, and see an enormous persuasive power accruing to a nation which can face the prospect of nuclear war with confidence in its survival.

Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the Soviets' strategy is their civil-defense program. It is now a high-priority matter, with a budget of more than \$1 billion a year. About 20 million young Russians receive civil-defense training every summer as part of annual war games. Sample exercises are: convoy evacuation practice at Leningrad; the adaptation of large refrigerator ships for evacuating the population of Sevastopol; the nationwide organization of ambulance and bus convoys to carry the sick away from major cities. In rural areas, there are readiness tests for those people assigned to receive evacuees from the cities.

The Kremlin firmly believes that it can hold Russian casualties from a nuclear exchange to only ten million. No country of the free world would be able to describe this many deaths as "only." But the Soviets absorbed more than 20 million casualties in World War II. Furthermore, the communists were willing to kill off some six million of their own people just to collectivize agriculture. We should not make the mis-

take of projecting our rationality onto an adversary who does not share our idea of what risks or costs are acceptable.

Q. Many of the proponents of détente and the SALT agreements maintain that these efforts are the only alternatives to nuclear war. Do you agree?

A. American negotiators often seem overly enamored of "reaching an agreement." That becomes a goal in itself. For the Soviets, a "spirit of détente" is an ephemeral matter, of value largely to inhibit our defense effort. They are looking for agreements that advance their perceived strategic goals.

Verification of treaty compliance is also a serious problem. Any successful SALT agreement obviously requires knowledge of what the other side is doing. Unfortunately, the Soviets consistently attempt to deny us information. They have gone to the trouble of placing acres of naval construction yards under cover, for instance, in order to deny us information on their missile-carrying submarines. They also try to deny us all technical information on their weapons development by working at night when they can escape satellite photography. Stepped-up use of such tactics of deception and counter-action seems hardly in the spirit of détente.

In the pre-détente era, Soviet military adventures such as the Berlin blockade, the grab for South Korea, the aggression against South Vietnam, the attempt to place missiles in Cuba, all failed. During the détente era, we have seen no fewer communist military adventures—just more successful ones. Consider the conquests of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Angola; consider the strong positions in Syria, Iraq, India, Somaliland, Mozambique, Guinea.

I am convinced that the détente policies that we have pursued lead toward nuclear war, not away from it. The Soviets have consistently shown constraint when faced with superior military power; they have shown less constraint as they perceive us allowing them a military advantage.

Q. What aspect of American defense do the Soviets most respect?

A. The Soviets fear our superior military technology. We have more than once overtaken and left them far behind. Their first challenge to our strategic superiority was their long-range missile program. But, within a remarkably short time, U.S. Minuteman ICBMs and Polaris submarines wiped out the early hopes of the Soviets to surpass us. A Soviet head start in the development of an

anti-ballistic-missile system was also met with a U.S. response that put them a decade or more behind us in technology.

Q. But some experts believe that we are dealing away our technological edge. Are they right?

A. I am deeply concerned that we have traded away superior technology in the name of "arms control," as in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. And, with the government's blessing, we have sold militarily crucial technology to the Soviets. For example, a sale of 164 machines that manufacture tiny ball bearings milled to extreme tolerances made it possible for the Soviets to catch up with us in the critical MIRV area. These tiny bearings reduce the friction of the moving parts in the guidance system of a MIRV warhead, thereby enabling the missile to change direction in flight rapidly, and thus get sharper on-target accuracy.

Our long lead over the Soviets in computers makes many of our weapons systems technically superior. The on-board computer of a U.S. ICBM, for example, may have to make 800,000 mathematical calculations in the first nine minutes of flight. But this sort of advantage, too, has been eroded by shortsighted sales of com-

puter technology to the U.S.S.R.

Q. What should we do to ensure our defense?

A. Replacement of our aging B-52 fleet with the B-1 bomber will help, because it will force the Soviets to keep spending heavily on air defenses. This is one of the reasons the B-1 is the weapon the Soviets have tried hard to eliminate in SALT talks.

More important, we must develop the cruise missile, a system that is expected to be so accurate that it can destroy targets at long distances even without a nuclear warhead. It would penetrate the current Soviet air-defense system, and by modern standards be relatively cheap. (I believe the cruise missile can also perform some of the roles currently destined for the B-1 bomber. If so, we may need fewer B-1s than we think.)

Most important, we must keep our military research and development healthy and productive. The United States stands today as a first-rate power that has, through a combination of wishful thinking and inattention, allowed a second-rate power to surpass it in many aspects of military strength. We must halt this erosion of the military balance.

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OH SO SEDUCTIVE SOCIALISM

Socialist ideology now enjoys a pervasive influence among Western intellectuals. In the cultural sense, it has become one of man's most powerful "myths" by addressing a central modern concern: alienation. Here, a leading conservative examines the phenomenon.

BY PETER L. BERGER

It is widely believed that the radicalism of the late 1960s is over. Those who identified with it regret it passing (not least, one supposes, because with it seems to have passed so much of their youth); others are consoled and reassured.

Both are mistaken. The more tumultuous manifestations of that period have indeed become rare—primarily because so many of the last decade's radical impulses have now become firmly institutionalized. To be sure, the rhetorical goals of the "revolution" have not been achieved; the goals of revolutionary rhetoric are never achieved. Yet the "revolution" has succeeded beyond its wildest expectations in the social milieu that, from the beginning, provided both its place of origin and its principal audience—the milieu of the intellectuals, of the cul-

tural elite.

This success has been spectacular in Western Europe, where various forms of leftism are culturally dominant—in some countries to the point of a near monopoly. This dominance is not just a matter of intellectual climate or mood; it is exercised through job networks and career

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channels, through the control of institutions in education, publishing, the media, and the general "culture business."

The aftereffects of the late 1960s are somewhat less dramatic in the United States. Yet on America's cultural scene, there has also been a massive shift to the left, which has found a variety of institutional expressions, many of them of great political relevance. Domestic politics continues to be dominated by egalitarian, redistributionist, and liberationist ideas and programs conceived in the late 1960s. Foreign policy is undergoing a convulsive and possibly permanent change as a result of one of the major radical formulations: the proposition that American world power is immoral and ought, therefore, to be curtailed, if not dismantled.

Most important, within the intellectual milieu there has been a far-reaching delegitimation of some of the key institutions and values of American society: There is a broad, probably growing, consensus to the effect that the market economy is intrinsically evil, that the culture of the mass of the American people ("Middle America") is inferior and pathological, and most ominous of all, that the political system of liberal democracy is a corrupt sham.

Whatever else it may mean, to be "on the left" is to be antagonistic to capitalism and to bourgeois culture. Put positively, to be "on the left" is to participate, in whatever manner and to whatever degree, in one of the great myths of modern history—the myth of socialism. It will suffice to describe "intellectuals" as that social stratum whose principal activity is the production and distribution of ideas. One of the important processes of the 20th Century has been the vast increase in the population of this stratum, a development resulting from the growth of what has been called the "knowledge industry."

There have been intellectuals with no tendency toward socialism, as there have been nonintellectual socialists. The affinity between intellectuals and the socialist myth is nevertheless one of long standing, and the recent population explosion in the intellectual stratum has intensified it. Now, the simplest explanation for the affinity (and the one most congenial to those who are "on the left" themselves) would be that belief in socialism just happens to be the only rational conclusion flowing from an informed understanding of the modern world. Thus, the increased attraction of socialism could be directly attributed to the spread of information and insight in an increasingly literate and educated population.

But this explanation will not do. Even if it were true that socialism is the only rational conclusion, this would not explain its spread among specific social groups. Modern science, for example, may also be described as the only rational answer to certain questions about nature. Yet it took millennia before it was established in specific groups in a specific corner of the world.

Ideas neither triumph nor fail in history because of their intrinsic truth or falsity. Moreover, the affinity between intellectuals and socialism is clearly more than a matter of rational arguments. It is suffused with values, moral passion and, in many cases, with profoundly religious hope—in sum, with precisely those characteristics which permit us to speak of a socialist *myth*. (In this sense, "myth" is a descriptive, nonperjorative term.)

The affinity between intellectuals and the left has been noted many times, and there have been various attempts to explain it. Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist and sociologist, viewed socialism as but another rationalization of what he termed "spoliation"—the process by which one group seeks to plunder another. In his view, intellectuals identifying with socialist movements are simply trying to join what they rightly or wrongly believe to be the future elite, and their ideology is nothing

but a smokescreen for their ambition. Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian economist, sought a clue to the affinity in the material interest that intellectuals as a group have in the expansion of the modern "tax state." He held that intellectuals prefer socialism, and all steps in the direction of socialism, because they expect a socialist system to provide them with a more satisfactory subsidization than a market economy.

A Kind of Class Struggle

On the other hand, F. A. Hayek, another Austrian economist, has offered an explanation based on the intellectuals' propensity for abstract speculation. Socialism, he contends, seduces less by the riches it promises than by the neatness of its theoretical constructions, its apparent rationality.

There have been comparable analyses of the leftward shift on the intellectual scene since the late 1960s. Irving Kristol has persuasively argued that there is a kind of class struggle in America today between the intellectuals—now a bloated group numbering in the millions—and the business elite. As always, this class struggle is over privilege and power.

Clearly, intellectuals have vested interests like any other social group, and it is inconceivable that such interests should not enter into their ideological preferences. But which specific characteristics of the socialist myth account for the specific affinity between it and Western intellectuals?

The socialist myth derives much of its power from its unique capacity to synthesize modernizing and counter-modernizing themes. Modernization—its ideas, values, aspirations—continues to be the dominant theme of our time, and it is fully integrated into all the various versions of socialism. The socialist program is based on all the standard assumptions of modernity—history as progress, the perfectibility of man, scientific reason as the great liberator from illusion, and man's ability to overcome all or nearly all of his afflictions by taking rational control of his destiny.

In these assumptions, socialism—like liberalism—is the child of the Enlightenment. Unlike liberalism, however, socialism has also successfully incorporated the themes that have arisen as a result of discontents with modernity—notably the idea of renewed community. Both liberalism and socialism have upheld the threefold promise of the French Revolution—of liberty, equality, and fraternity, although they have very different definitions for these terms. But liberalism has rarely had much to say about fraternity; socialism, by contrast, has made this one of its most inspiring ambitions.

Modernity is brought about only at great costs, costs which were exacted at the time of its inception in Europe, and which continue to be exacted today. The forces of modernization bring on massive material sacrifices and dislocations, from the destruction of English village life in the past to remarkably similar cataclysms in the contemporary Third World. There are large numbers of people who suddenly lose their traditional livelihood and are plunged into acute misery, large migrations of people under conditions of great deprivation, and even mass hunger and virulent new epidemics.

But what is more, economic and social dislocations of such magnitude frequently necessitate a quantum jump in the repressive measures of the political order. This aspect of modernization is apparent from the notorious "black codes" of 18th-century England (which, among other innovations, enormously increased the number of offenses that were punishable under the death penalty) to the luxuriant growth of repressive regimes in today's Third World. There are also subtler, though by no means less important, costs of modernization. Most of these relate directly or indirectly to the loss of community.

Through most of human history, the majority of human beings have lived in small social settings marked by a plentitude of ongoing face-to-face contacts and by intense solidarity and moral consensus. It would be quite

false to idealize this condition. It was by no means characterized at all times by general happiness, and included every variety of suffering and oppression. But one kind of suffering that it almost never included was what moderns have come to know as alienation.

Modernity, by contrast, is marked by homelessness. The forces of modernization have descended like a gigantic steel hammer upon all the old communal institutions—clan, village, tribe, region—distorting or greatly weakening them, if not destroying them altogether. The capitalist market economy, the centralized bureaucratic state, the new technology let loose by industrialism, the consequent rapid population growth and urbanization, and finally the mass media of communication—these modernizing forces have brought havoc to all the social and cultural formations in which human beings used to be at home.

It is hardly surprising that this transformation caused severe discontent, giving birth to counter-modernizing impulses that consistently expressed themselves in movements that invoked the old solidarities.

In its political manifestations, counter-modernization is usually perceived as backward-looking, as "reactionary." But it can also be forward-looking, "progressive"—whenever the longed-for community is located in the future, rather than the past. There are religious prototypes—Jewish as well as Christian—for either type of anti-modern sentiment. The genius of socialism, though, is that its secularized eschatology incorporates not only counter-modern impulses, but also the central aspirations of modernity—a new rational order, the abolition of material want and social inequality, and the complete liberation of the individual.

Socialism, in other words, promises all the blessings of modernity and the liquidation of its costs, not least of all alienation. To grasp this essentially simple fact about the socialist myth and to recall at the same time that modern secularism has greatly weakened the plausibility of competing religious eschatologies is to remove the mystery of the magnetic appeal of socialism. Indeed, if any mystery remains, it is why socialism has not yet triumphed completely.

Thus the view of Marxism as an offspring of the Enlightenment is as one-sided as the contrary view of it as nothing but a quasireligion. It is both, and in this duality lies its enduring appeal. The socialist myth promises the fulfillment of both the rational dreams of the Enlightenment and the manifold aspirations of those to whom the Enlightenment has been an alienating experience.

The Middle Ages Plus Missiles

The Soviet Union, of course, has been a major disappointment to many. All the same, keeping in mind the peculiar synthesis of modernizing and counter-modernizing impulses in the socialist myth, the Soviet Union has realized its promise in instructive, if somewhat surprising, ways. It was Lenin who, in 1920, characterized Communism as "Soviet power plus electrification." Fifty years later, Russian reality could be described as "Middle Ages plus intercontinental missiles" (and it is not irrelevant that the counter-modern imagination has repeatedly invoked medieval imagery—as indeed did Marx in his few lyrical descriptions of life after the socialist revolution).

A very short list of these medievalisms will have to suffice here: the restoration of the essentially feudalistic merger of political and economic institutions (the disjunction of these two by nascent capitalism marked the beginning of the modern era); the abolition, at least in theory, of the post-medieval split between public and private life; the governing of society by the party aristocracy (in this respect, one might say that contemporary Russia is actually one up on the Middle Ages—there is now only one aristocracy, uniting within itself the elite functions of both clergy and nobility); and last, but not least, the creation of a new serfdom, which ties the peasant to the land (it was only a few months ago that residents of collective farms, who make up close to half the Soviet population, received the right to the internal passports necessary for travel).

The basic formula for coping with the various disap-

pointments is always the same (after, that is, the customarily prior denial that there is anything to be disappointed about): The disappointing country does not embody "true socialism"; therefore, it does not falsify the socialist vision; "true socialism" is either still in the future, or must be looked for elsewhere—if not in Russia then in China, if not in China then in Vietnam, and so on *ad infinitum*.

If these are some of the key features of the socialist myth, the question remains: Why do intellectuals have a particular affinity to it? As already suggested, the material interests of intellectuals as a "class" may well predispose them toward socialism. But an understanding of the mythic dimension of socialism suggests an additional explanation: *Intellectuals constitute a group particularly vulnerable to the discontents of modernity.*

To some extent this vulnerability is shared by the upper-middle class as a whole, the wider stratum within which intellectuals are found as a result either of birth or of social mobility. It is the upper-middle class that has evolved out of the old bourgeoisie, which had been the historical "carrier" of industrial capitalism and thus had been closer than any other group to the primary processes of modernization.

It was the bourgeoisie that initially and most directly experienced the impact of rapid mobility, urbanization, pluralism, and affluence. Historians are not in agreement concerning the social, psychological, and ideological consequences of these experiences. It seems plausible, however, that the earlier version of the bourgeoisie succeeded in "containing" the disruptive effects of modernization mainly with the help of two crucial institutions—the family and the church. These two were the pillars of the world of bourgeois respectability, offering shelter to the individual from the alienating forces of modernization. It is precisely these two institutions that have been the major targets of the "adversary culture" of contemporary intellectuals.

The Family and the Church

The bourgeoisie transformed the larger society in a cataclysmic manner, while at the same time it created a new form of the family, which functioned for its members as an island of tranquility. The "invention of childhood" was probably the most important institutional innovation in this respect, with far-reaching consequences for socialization and character formation. At the same time, especially in Protestant countries, the bourgeoisie was infused with a religious ethic that gave coherence and significance to the struggles in the economic, social, and political arenas.

Thus, there still exists today an upper-middle-class stratum, broadly identified with business and with scientific/technological activities. It continues to "contain" the discontents of modernity within the old bourgeois structures of respectability. This stratum is still animated by the norms of the "Protestant ethic," is antiliberationist in its family and personal values, and is still strongly attached to religion.

By contrast, there is a burgeoning "new class" of intellectuals, deeply antagonistic to virtually all the old norms of respectability. It is consumption-oriented rather than production-oriented. Its values for private life are ever more radically liberationist. It is pervasively secularized, often violently antagonistic to all the traditional forms of Christian and Jewish religiosity. And, as a result, this stratum has come to be progressively deprived of the earlier protections against the discontents of modernity.

Clearly, the old upper-middle class still manages to be "at home" in the modern world; but the intellectuals suffer increasingly from a profound sense of homelessness—and the socialist myth very directly meets their needs.

There is, therefore, no reason to expect the dominance of the "left" on the Western intellectual scene to be reversed. The intrinsic power of the socialist vision appears as strong as ever. The new position of the "knowledge industry" has accorded intellectuals more influence than ever before, giving the socialist myth an unprecedented institutional base. Indeed, the myth has achieved a sort

of cultural establishment.

Myths are not easily generated or manipulated. They have their own dynamics, their own "truth." What can be termed the mythic deprivation of Western societies in the face of the socialist vision cannot be remedied by an effort of the will. It is one thing for the historian or social scientist to diagnose the condition, quite another thing to devise plausible remedies. With socialism as the only good myth going, the political and economic elites of Western societies have become remarkably demoralized.

Calls for a revival of liberalism or of the American creed, however, well reasoned, will be ineffective unless they can be "fueled" by the power of mythic plausibility. It seems unlikely that, on its own, liberalism—least of all in its social-democratic versions—is capable of regaining such power. It remains possible that there will come a new upsurge of mythical nationalism in the West—even new forms of fascism—but even then it is likely that the essential elements of the socialist vision will be retained. In all likelihood, such an upsurge would take the form of national socialism (the terminological likeness to what emerged under this same label in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe is not at all accidental).

There is, however, one fairly effective remedy against the power of the socialist myth—the actual experience of living in a society where that myth has been politically elevated to the status of official doctrine. One of the savage ironies of the times is that ideologically Marxism is on the ascendancy everywhere—except in the countries that call themselves Marxist. One cannot lure a cat from behind a chimney with Marxist rhetoric in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe. There Marxism is ceremony, the myth has become a petrified ornament.

On the basis of that empirical evidence, one prediction is fairly certain: Western intellectuals will cease to be fascinated by the socialist myth soon after Western societies are taken over by socialist regimes. It must be added, however, that in the not improbable case that these regimes will resemble Soviet totalitarianism, this

belated conversion will have little, if any, political significance. Totalitarian regimes, it appears, can survive for a long time without plausible myths and in a cultural climate of pervasive cynicism.

A Reversal of Secularization

There is one more possibility: a reversal of the long-standing trend of secularization in the Western world generally, and particularly in its cultural elite. Throughout most of human history, the myths that guided life, including political life, sprang from the soil of religious faith. The possibility of such a revival is nowhere stronger than in America, where religion has had a unique relationship to the social realities of pluralism and political freedom. Religious faith, it need hardly be added, cannot be decided upon or engineered merely through rational insight into its importance: The spirit blows where it wills. However, those who have a stake in the future of liberal democracy would do well to ponder its relationship to the vital forces of religion still existing in American society.

None of this has an immediate bearing on the leftist extravaganza now sweeping the intellectual scene in Western countries. The reasonable expectation is that it will continue, though its ideological details may change from time to time. Those who have come under the sway of the socialist myth are not likely to be dissuaded by arguments, for they have a seemingly unending capacity to reinterpret evidence. They will not be appeased by reforms within Western societies or by protestations of humane concern by those who do not share their ultimate vision.

Nor is any of this surprising, once it is understood that they are under the sway of a myth. Myths derive their power from those realms of the mind in which the gods used to dwell, and the gods have always been relentless.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Tuesday, August 3, 1976

Halting the heroin connection

By James Nelson Goodsell
Latin American correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Mexico

Salvador Díaz makes a fairly good living off his six-acre farm in hill country north of this western Mexican town.

His chief crop: the opium poppy — the basic ingredient of heroin.

Growing the poppy is illegal in Mexico, and efforts are being made to halt its cultivation. But Salvador Díaz has found that the poppy yields a far better income than he ever earned from melons, potatoes, and groundnuts.

He began growing the poppy four years ago. Last year he earned the equivalent of \$1,000 from the crop. That is about five times what he earned from those melons and potatoes in earlier years.

He recently purchased his first automobile, a 1955 Ford, and is talking about getting a television. His wife, María, would be happier with a sewing machine, but the children side with their father.


What neither Salvador nor María comprehends is that their poppy fields are the start of a drug trafficking cycle that ends up on the streets of New York, Chicago, and other major United States cities.

Drug network

"The men" who buy his crop are part of a drug network composed of Mexicans and North Americans that is growing in size and ability to frustrate lawmen.

In the last five years Mexico has become the principal supplier of heroin to the United States. Once it was Turkey by way of France and other West European nations. The heroin is produced in clandestine laboratories here in Culiacán and other western Mexican towns.

The drug network's Mexican connection is estimated to be a \$2 billion yearly business and to involve as many as 10,000



traffickers on both sides of the 1,600-mile border.

"It has become a monster," an official of Mexico's attorney general's office commented. "We chop away at it here and there, and it springs up elsewhere. The network defies destruction."

U.S. officials estimate that no more than 10 percent of the traffic is stopped en route either in Mexico or the U.S.

"That's not a very good record," an official of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in Tucson, Arizona, admitted recently.

Antidrug operations

The two countries are cooperating in a drive to get at the source itself — farms like that of Salvador Díaz. Late last year, Mexico reorganized its own antidrug operations. In its first six months, the new campaign has tallied:

- The destruction of 18,500 acres of poppies and more than 17,000 acres of marijuana.
- The seizure of 1,480 pounds of crude opium, 473 pounds of heroin, and 330 pounds of cocaine (part of consignments flowing through Mexico from South America).
- The arrest of 2,559 persons, including 275 foreigners (some of whom were North Americans).

Mexican views

The joint U.S.-Mexican effort has used sophisticated photographic equipment to pinpoint the fields where poppies and marijuana are grown and U.S.-supplied helicopters to spray the fields with chemical defoliants. On the ground, thousands of Mexican soldiers have combed the mountainous terrain of western Mexico, setting the torch to poppy and marijuana

Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Wednesday, September 1, 1976 The Washington Star

Eliot Janeway

Russian Woes on Rise

By Eliot Janeway

Special to The Washington Star

The approach of harvest time always stirs up shock waves in a year when Russia is in visible trouble.

This year her troubles are clearly still on the rise. There are many indications of her uneasiness, but the deepening collapse in the European gold market is the most compelling.

For years the American gold debate has been distracted by the Russian red herring. One of the arguments against pegging the price of gold has pointed out that doing so would give Russia a one-way advantage as a high-cost producer needing to sell lots of gold.

I WAS AMONG the first to make this point, but advocates of a U.S. gold peg have brushed it aside. Their argument has put the abstract consideration of monetary soundness against the declared fundamental — "Kto kovo," or who beats whom.

Russia's continuing crises and her latest method of coping with it demonstrate that this is no mere academic argument.

Since 1972, the Kremlin insiders have known that the Russian economy is in a historic counter-revolutionary convulsion. Their grand strategy has reckoned on two promises from Kissinger and one bail-out at the expense of the American investing public.

Kissinger made good on the first of these promises in 1973 — before anyone was looking; it took the form of the infamous grain steal.

American opinion was appalled at the magnitude of the cost, not to mention the one-sidedness of this cynical bid for political reciprocity. Moscow, however, clutched at it as a preliminary payoff.

The second promise called for an astronomical follow-on — not merely of the grain Russia so desperately needs, but of the wherewithal for the modern gas industry that a technologically advanced farm system needs to function.

THIS TECHNOLOGY is a proprietary American asset, and Russia made no secret of her urgent need to get started installing it.

Her logic was consistent: "We're desperate for it; therefore you pay for it." To the everlasting credit of Sen. Stevenson of Illinois, Sen. Jackson of Washington, and Sen. Byrd of Virginia, they saw through this flim-flam and won a unanimous congressional veto against the promised giveaway.

Russia's reaction to this frustration was characteristically suspicious. The Kremlin's equivalent of the CIA launched an intensive investigation to determine whether Kissinger had double-crossed Brezhnev or had really lacked the power to deliver the keys to the cash box. Reluctantly it concluded that Kissinger's pretensions were greater than his power.

The defensive tactic the Kremlin then adopted called for time: Paying cash for grain and waiting to raise more cash by feeding gold into a rising market.

It counted heavily on the legalization of gold ownership for American citizens to bull the gold market. They expected the price bulge to be big enough, and public participation to be broad enough, to send gold shooting up well over \$200 an ounce despite the wholesale dumping they planned.

BUT THEY miscalculated on Main Street America. The American public said "Nyet" to gold, and the market hasn't been the same since.

Consequently, the Russians have spent the last year and a half clobbering the gold market and complaining about the lean pickings to be gleaned from it.

Last year, when they realized their selling raised a mere billion dollars for them, they increased their borrowing by a whopping five to six billion dollars.

This year they have run out of credit just as they have run out of customers for their gold.

If necessity is the mother of invention, desperation is the father of conspiracy.

The Russians are, of course, old hands at this, but they have long since abandoned the back-door route to their familiar targets. Negotiating with the power structure in any country has paid them increasingly higher returns than infiltrating the ranks.

BUT NOW THEIR frantic effort to shore up the price of gold preparatory to gulling it again has turned the clock back.

Their "apparatchicks" have been unleashed in an all-out drive to set the tinderbox in South Africa on fire.

Russia is a white man's society. Her fierce fratricidal feud with China is feeding on prejudice against the "yellows," as they are called.

In Africa, however, the Moscow-trained operatives are posing as black liberators. Their purpose is not to help South Africa — their former partner — along the difficult road to social stability, but to aggravate her torment in order to shut her gold mines down.

The threat of scarcity is the last refuge of a bankrupt producer at bay. The Kremlin's rendition of this classic scenario is not about to provide a price support for the demoralized gold market.

Western Europe

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, AUGUST 26, 1976

Who's Afraid of the Big Red Bear?

By Seyom Brown

WASHINGTON — The deepening resistance to Soviet dominance of the international Communist movement—exposed this summer in the conference of European Communist parties—challenges the anti-Communist basis of United States alliance policies. Rather than threatening to ostracize Western nations who allow Communists into their governments, we should be asking if the anti-Communist coalition also has begun to outlive its usefulness and needs to start giving way to a less aligned pattern of world politics.

The European Communists' rejection of "proletarian internationalism" and their legitimization of Titoist nationalism reflects a substantial weakening of the Kremlin's ability to exploit indigenous Marxist movements to serve Soviet imperial ambitions. But meanwhile it undercuts the Western *realpolitik* reason for opposing Communism—namely, to prevent a shift in the global balance of power that would favor the Soviet Union.

In a period of mutual superpower deterrence at the strategic level, it may yet be important to deny the Russians new forward bases for their tactical naval and air forces; and countries incapable of standing up to Soviet threats may yet want assurance of United States help. But for these purposes it may be best to reduce the anti-Communist (as distinct from anti-Soviet) content of our policy, lest we alienate certain governments whose cooperation still might be valuable for resisting Soviet expansion.

Are there nevertheless convincing moral grounds for continuing to oppose the Communists in whatever country they may appear? The public commitments by the West European Communists to basic democratic freedoms ought to at least give us pause. Skeptics, remembering events in Eastern Europe just after World War II, have grounds for suspecting that once in power the Communists would not be squeamish about renegeing on pledges to respect democratic processes.

But it also should be remembered that the postwar Communists were agents of the Kremlin. Moreover, liberalizing impulses failed in Czechoslovakia in 1968 because of the injection of Soviet military force, not because liberalization was intolerable to the Czechoslovak Communists themselves.

The risks of Leninist duplicity cannot be entirely discounted, but the problem remains of how best to influence Communists who might attain power to refrain from international alignment with the Soviet Union and from exercising the totalitarian option at home.

Our best policy might be to identify with tendencies toward non-alignment surfacing in both cold war camps — treating them as positive symptoms of a new pluralist international order. In the emerging order, coalitions would be expected to form around specific issues and in response to specific threats; and a country's coalition partner on one issue might be an adversary on other issues.

As nonalignment and international pluralism became widely accepted as norms of international relations, countries subject to Soviet pressure would have a better basis for resisting Kremlin attempts to turn them into satellites. Additionally, Communist Parties outside the Soviet Union would be encouraged to further demonstrate their independence from the Soviet party; and governments—whatever their official ideology—would find it less embarrassing to maintain cooperative relationships with the United States.

This country, given its political traditions and dominant values, can champion a pluralist structure of international relations as valid in itself, not primarily because it constricts Soviet influence, though this may well be its byproduct.

But would our support for international pluralism imply that Americans should soft-pedal their opposition to totalitarian regimes and the denial of human rights? To be sure, the norm of international pluralism, if applied to protect absolute national sover-

eignty, is at some tension with the idea that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed and that this consent is legitimately obtained only where there is civil liberty and due process of law.

In fact, however, it is precisely the synthesis of these two apparently contradictory sets of norms that has been the greatest attraction of the American experiment. And it has been Moscow's lack of credibility as champion of either that, more than anything, has soured the appeal of Soviet-style Communism.

As with international pluralism, the United States can pursue a commitment to human rights as a good in itself. Again, the fact that its furtherance would tend to lessen Soviet influence would be a byproduct. But this country will need to be considerably more consistent and energetic in applying human rights values to its foreign activities than heretofore.

At times the anti-Communist orientation of regimes has seemed to be their most important qualification for United States support, with their human rights record an incidental consideration. The low priority accorded human rights may have been justified where essential United States security interests were at stake, but it is hardly defensible elsewhere.

If the United States is to continue to help others to resist Soviet imperialism, it would be best to work through a voluntary coalition for international pluralism and human rights, open to all countries and parties—not a coalition against Communism.

The fact that Communists also find it necessary to support these values is an encouraging indication of their universal validity despite what appear to be temporary setbacks to liberal democracy. The United States can and should conduct its foreign policy in light of this new evidence.

Seyom Brown, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and adjunct professor at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, is author of "New Forces in World Politics."

Africa

WASHINGTON POST
9 AUG 1976

Rod MacLeish

The World's Worst Man

LONDON—Tyrants arrive on the platform of history by a variety of vehicles—tradition, chaos, political rivalries and sometimes even the popular will.

In ancient Greece "tyrant" meant a usurper of authority. In modern times it means a ruthless despot. Idi "Big Daddy" Amin of Uganda fulfills both definitions. He came to power by coup d'état and, since, has acted like a savage, incompetent loony.

He has butchered his subjects by the thousands (the exact numbers are matters of grisly argument), run Uganda's economy into the ground and alienated almost every other nation that has dealt with him.

On July 28 Britain broke off diplomatic relations with Uganda—the first such breach between this country and one of its former colonies. Until someone even more horrid comes along, Big Daddy Amin holds the title of World's

Worst Man.

Normally tyrants are everybody's problem, not just the dilemma of the people they oppress. There are standards of conduct that only the mightiest of nations can defy. The countries of this world have cross-pollinated each other with their interests, finances and citizens.

The problem presented by Amin is not that global power that permits a despot to break the rules. The problem is that he is African, a tyrant who came to power, in part at least, because of the chaos left in a black neighborhood after its white colonizers had gone home.

Other African leaders loathe Amin. For months he's been courting open warfare with Kenya next door. His mad caperings are an embarrassment to African governments trying to overcome that latent, racist premise that holds that blacks aren't equipped for self-gov-

ernment.

Yet however frightful an S.O.B. Amin may be, he is Africa's S.O.B. Old, anti-colonial juices will be stirred by Big Daddy's current campaign of harassment and arrest against the few hundred Britons remaining in Uganda.

Rumors are afloat here and in Africa of a joint Anglo-American venture to rid Uganda and the world of Big Daddy Amin that would be a dreadful mistake. It would re-inspire the anti-colonial passions that have helped to keep him in power thus far. It would reinforce the ugly prejudice about blacks being unable to handle their own affairs.

By a sort of ironic process of default, then, Idi Amin isn't everybody's problem. He's Africa's problem. He's most particularly Uganda's problem. Nasty though the solution would doubtless be, the only hope is that Africa and/or Uganda can do something about the world's worst man.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Wednesday, August 25, 1976

U.S. Africa Policy Seen Dependent on Aid Vote

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Foreign Service

LUSAKA — American diplomats here are increasingly concerned about the possible refusal of Congress to approve any substantial aid for Zambia and the effects this is likely to have on the United States' new stated policy in southern Africa.

The Senate Appropriations Committee approves \$22.5 million for a commodity loan to this country as part of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's proposed aid package to Zambia, Zaire and Mozambique. But the House version of the same bill provides no funds at all for Zambia, which is now in desperate need of foreign loans because of depressed copper prices.

The failure of Congress to approve the loan would be an extreme embarrassment to the U.S. embassy here, and American diplomats fear it will raise questions about the credibility of the new American posture toward the black African frontline states bearing the brunt of the nationalist guerrilla war against white-ruled Rhodesia.

"What is the new ambassador [Stephen Low] going to say when he presents his credentials to President Kaunda," remarked one embassy official. A former member of the National Security Council, Low is scheduled to arrive here shortly to take up his post

at a critical juncture in American-Zambian relations.

Zambia is regarded by U.S. policymakers as a pivotal black African state in the developing white-black confrontation in southern Africa because of its strategic location and its markedly pro-Western orientation.

It borders both Rhodesia and Namibia (Southwest Africa) where Soviet-backed nationalist guerrilla wars are under way against the white-minority governments in those two countries. But Zambia supported the pro-Western factions in the recent civil war and President Kenneth Kaunda has on several occasions spoken out against Soviet and Cuban involvement in southern Africa.

The growing importance attached to Zambia by the United States is reflected in the increasing number of high-level State Department officials making stops here. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs William Schaufele is scheduled to arrive here Wednesday for the fourth time since April 27, when he accompanied Secretary Kissinger on his African trip.

Schaufele is expected to discuss the state of Kissinger's diplomatic initiative to find a quick, peaceful solution to the Rhodesia problem and may also broach the issue of military aid for Zambia.

The Kissinger initiative is in effect a continuation of the former policy of President Kaunda, who carried out extensive talks with South African Prime Minister John Vorster last year and early this year in an abortive effort to arrange a peaceful settlement to the Rhodesian dispute.

Kaunda now has abandoned this policy, and there is general skepticism in Zambian and moderate Rhodesian black nationalist circles about Kissinger's chances of success at this late stage of the Rhodesia black-white confrontation.

Doubts about the sincerity of the United States' new stated policy toward southern Africa surfaced here recently in the Zambian press after Washington's decision to abstain from a U. N. Security Council resolution condemning South Africa for its raid on a village in southern Zambia, reportedly in pursuit of Namibian nationalist guerrillas.

"The Americans are today in a position where they can use their power to tell South Africa to stop supporting whites in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) if she (South Africa) is to count on Western support, and South Africa would respond," said the Zambian Daily Mail in a recent editorial.

But, it added, "What the Americans do not appear to understand is that any further delay in their professed efforts to work on South Africa could very well make their position irrelevant six months from now."

At the same time, President Kaunda has just said in an interview with a South African newspaper that "time is running out" for the Kissinger initiative.

alive.

A key part of the new U.S. policy in southern Africa is the promise to provide aid to African states helping the Rhodesian nationalist cause. In his speech here April 27, Kissinger said the United States stood ready to help alleviate economic hardship for countries like Zambia that have pledged to enforce sanctions against the white regime in Rhodesia.

President Kaunda recently estimated that the cost to Zambia of closing its border with Rhodesia four

years ago stood at \$450 million so far.

The proposed \$22.5 million American commodity loan would be welcome news to this country, extremely hard-hit by the collapse in the price of copper that used to account for 97 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings.

Zambia has run up a balance of trade and payments deficit totaling hundreds of millions of dollars last year and this year. A drastic cutback in imports has caused acute shortages of spare parts and even key food staples that are having a devastating

Impact on the country's economy.

Right now there is no U.S. economic assistance program to Zambia, which before the slump in copper prices was one of black Africa's wealthier nations. But the U.S. Agency for International Development is about to provide \$2 million worth of much-needed vegetable oil under its Food for Peace program and has also approved a \$10 million low-cost housing project under which it will guarantee loans from American private banks.

BALTIMORE SUN
26 Aug. 1976

Israeli ties to S. Africa burgeoning

By MICHAEL PARKS

Sun Staff Correspondent

Jerusalem—Despite warnings that it may be embroiling itself in the coming black-white confrontation in southern Africa, Israel is rapidly expanding its diplomatic, commercial and military ties with South Africa.

Diplomatic relations have grown increasingly warm since John B. Vorster, the South African prime minister, came to Israel "to pilgrimage" at Easter-time, and each has pledged the other support in international forums as part of what has been dubbed the "two outcasts policy" here.

Israel's trade with South Africa has tripled in the last four years and is set to triple again in the next two or three, according to projections here and in Johannesburg. Several large-scale projects are under discussion that would trade South African natural resources for Israeli processing skills.

Arms sales, which have included mostly submachine guns so far, are being increased dramatically with the delivery of fast Israeli missile boats, electronic warfare equipment and reportedly two squadrons of the new, high-performance Kfir jet fighter-bomber to South Africa.

The expanding ties between the two countries run even deeper than the multimillion-dollar trade deals and the semi-secret arms pacts with the establishment of a broad network of intergovernment committees, joint Israeli-South African co-operation and military consultations.

Israeli officials, conscious of criticism here and abroad of such close ties with South Africa, defend Jerusalem's decision to expand relations with consi-

derable vigor.

"The relations we have with South Africa should not be construed as approving apartheid," a top government official said, referring to South Africa's policy of racial separation.

"We have voted consistently with black Africa even at the cost of antagonizing South Africa with its strong and influential Jewish population....

"But we do not accept the proposition that one can do business with left-wing dictators but not with right-wing people."

But the morality of dealing with South Africa and thus implicitly accepting its racial policies is not the main criticism raised here of the expanded ties between Jerusalem and Johannesburg.

"When war comes to southern Africa, I am afraid we will be on the losing side," said an acknowledged dissident on the National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.

"History and international politics today are against South Africa.... We need winners, not losers, as allies."

Already, there have been charges from black African leaders that Israelis, more likely mercenaries than regular soldiers, have been fighting with South African forces in Namibia (South-West Africa) on the Angolan border. The charges have been denied, but not categorically rejected, by Israeli spokesmen here.

Israel is known to be training South Africans to handle the weapons systems Johannesburg is buying. About 50 South African naval officers and sailors are reported to be training at a base near Tel Aviv to operate the 420-ton patrol boats and their sea-to-sea Gabriel missiles, the first of which will be delivered in January with perhaps five more to follow.

In addition, senior South African staff officers have begun holding military seminars with Israelis, now that they are

effectively barred from participating in such conferences in the United States and Britain.

If South Africa buys the two squadrons of Israeli Kfirs, which fly at more than twice the speed of sound and which can be used both for air superiority fighting and ground attacks, far more extensive working relations are expected between the Israeli and South African military.

As a result, the critical Knesset member argued, Israel's new ties with South Africa go far beyond normal diplomatic and commercial relations.

"You cannot sell arms to one side in a war and remain neutral," he said. "We are close to becoming participants in whatever is going to happen down there."

Israeli government officials strongly reject this criticism, replying that France, traditionally South Africa's largest arms supplier, has not formed an alliance with Johannesburg and still has good relations with both Arab and black African countries.

But far more lies behind the new Israeli-South African ties than a search for friends in a frequently hostile world. Among the key underlying factors are:

• Israel's perilous economic situation. The importation and reprocessing of South African raw materials and the ability to pay for them with high-technology electronic equipment and war material should give the Israeli economy and its severe trade deficit a significant boost.

"Beggars can't be choosers," an official here said, noting Israel has a favorable trade balance with South Africa, primarily because of arms sales.

• A 120,000-member Jewish community in South Africa. Not only have the South African Jews, a wealthy and politically influential group, contributed tens of millions of dollars to Israel, but they now are helping organize the new commercial

ties between the two countries.

The stake of South African Jews in their country, however, now makes Jerusalem reluctant to reassert its once strong support for black African nationalism.

"After the United Nations vote equating Zionism with racism," a prominent Jewish leader from South Africa said here, "Israelis began to appreciate that Zionism and Afrikanerdom are very close as homeland philosophies."

• Israel acting as an American surrogate in arms sales. In its sales to Johannesburg of highly sophisticated weapons, Jerusalem is said by well-placed sources here to be acting for the United States, which is politically unable to do so itself.

Jerusalem has already received virtually blanket clearance, according to these sources, to sell Johannesburg whatever it requires regardless of normal U.S. restrictions prohibiting the transfer of weapons systems and parts without Washington's permission.

Beyond these factors, there is a substantial element of spite and of defiance of international opinion in Jerusalem's decision to expand relations with South Africa.

"For years we sought friends in black Africa and spent millions helping them with various projects, including building up their armies," an Israeli official said. "What was the result? In the course of less than two years, 1972 and 1973, one after another broke relations with us. Bought off with Arab money. So today we make friends where we can and however we can."

It is the "however we can" attitude that has drawn criticism here and that makes Israeli officials extremely reluctant to discuss in any detail either the arms sales to South Africa or the large-scale commercial deals. As a matter of policy no arms sales are discussed officially.

East Asia

NEW YORK TIMES
25 Aug. 1976

South Korea Disappointed At U.S. Handling of Crisis

By FOX BUTTERFIELD
Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, Aug. 24 —South Korean officials and many ordinary South Koreans indicated today that they were confused and disappointed by the Ford Administration's handling of the current crisis in Korea.

South Korean officials today anxiously asked American friends if they could explain the evident sudden switch in Washington's position yesterday when a State Department spokesman said a message received from President Kim Il Sung was a "positive step." Only a day earlier the White House and the State Department had sharply rejected the North Korean message, which described an incident last week in which two American Army officers were killed by Communist guards as "regretful."

Meanwhile, North Korea agreed today to a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom tomorrow. At that session, the United States intends to demand guarantees against repetition of such incidents.

The two officers were bludgeoned to death with axes as they escorted a work party trimming a tree in the demilitarized zone along the border between the two Koreas.

Seoul Repeats Rejection

WASHINGTON POST
2 SEP. 1976

North Korea Warned U.S. About Tree

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

North Korean guards twice warned a United Nations Command team against cutting the celebrated popular tree in the Korean demilitarized zone, Ford administration officials testified yesterday.

The first warning was 12 days before two U.S. officers were killed near the tree and the second came minutes before the fatal attack.

In a lengthy session which made public many new details of the circumstances

Reflecting Seoul's unhappiness with Washington's action, a spokesman for the South Korean Foreign Ministry said today that President Park Chung Hee's Government still found President Kim's message "unsatisfactory and therefore unacceptable."

The spokesman said that South Korea would take its "next step after reviewing the response of North Korea at the Military Armistice Commission meeting tomorrow."

The South Korean Government, like the American Embassy and the United States military command here, appeared to have been kept virtually in the dark by President Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger since the killings occurred last week.

When Marshal Kim's message was delivered Saturday, at the Panmunjom truce zone, only Americans and North Koreans were present. And President Park's Government reportedly was not informed much in advance of Washington's decision to reverse itself yesterday and accept the North Korean message as a possible starting point for talks aimed at ending the crisis.

This morning, following the State Department announcement of its changed position, the United States Ambassador, Richard L. Sneider, met with

surrounding the Aug. 18 killings, State and Defense Department officials maintained that the North Korean assault appears to have been premeditated and taken for political reasons.

They also reported for the first time to the meeting of two subcommittees of the House International Relations Committee, that the United States had been concerned in advance that the tree-trimming would cause an incident.

In the aftermath of the killings, the United States deployed nuclear-capable F-4 and F-111 jet aircraft, dispatched a naval task force to the area, began daily "practice" bombing runs with B-52 aircraft and raised the defense alert status of U.S. forces.

Several lawmakers sharply questioned President Ford's failure to report these actions officially to Congress under the War Powers Act.

Foreign Minister Park Tong Jin. Neither the United States Embassy nor the Koreans would comment on what was discussed, but one diplomat said that the meeting had been arranged on short notice.

As a further example of what seemed to be a confused situation, a group of 83 South Korean and American journalists were taken on United States military buses this afternoon to the demilitarized zone for a meeting of the armistice commission, which the United Nations Command had requested for today.

However, after an hour's drive north from Seoul to the Imjin River near the demilitarized zone, a United States military spokesman said that the North Koreans had rejected the request for talks today and that a meeting had been agreed on for tomorrow instead.

The area along the Imjin River, the scene of bloody fighting during the Korean War, was peaceful today. Rice was growing high in the emerald green fields and the low hills that dot the Korean countryside were covered with newly grown trees. A few United States and South Korean Army jeeps and trucks passed back and forth on the highway that leads to Seoul, over the

route used by North Korean invaders in 1950.

Although United States and South Korean officials have been extremely guarded in talking about the crisis, it is known that some American diplomats and some Koreans originally believed Marshal Kim's message was a sufficiently unusual gesture to represent a kind of apology. It was the first time since the end of the Korean War that the North Korean leader himself had sent such a message of regret.

Reversal Causes Surprise

These officials were reportedly surprised when Washington rejected President Kim's message so bluntly. Then they were caught off guard again today when the State Department partially reversed itself and termed the message a "positive step."

According to a senior member of President Park's administration, the South Korean Government does not want to use the incident as a pretext to start another war. But, the official asserted, "in the past the Communists have misread our intentions, because we only issued warnings and protests" at the time of other crises, such as the capture of the United States Navy spy ship Pueblo in 1968.

Rep. Dante Fascell (D-Fla.) called a State Department legal justification for non-reporting "a semantic, circuitous evasion, at first blush" and Rep. Donald M. Fraser (D-Minn.) called it "ridiculous." Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.), who first pointed out the failure to report, called it "very disturbing."

The War Powers Act passed in 1973 requires reports in writing on circumstances and justification when U.S. armed forces equipped for combat are introduced into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, or when U.S. armed might in a foreign nation is substantially enlarged.

Limited portions of a State Department legal memorandum to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger given to the House members and earlier to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee argued that it would be "an undesirable precedent" to report the Korean redeployments.

The memo argued that "we should interpret" the reporting requirement to refer to redeployment of personnel rather than equipment such as ships or warplanes.

Assistant Secretary of State Arthur W. Hummel Jr. told the House subcommittees that White House and Defense Department counsels as well as

State Department legal officers agreed that no war powers report was required in the Korean case.

Hummel and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Morton I. Abramowitz gave the following account of the conflict over the tree which raised Korean tension to a high point:

In the first few days of August a survey team went into the Joint Security Area of the DMZ to investigate the large poplar tree, whose foliage was obstructing the line of sight between two U.N. Command guardposts.

On Aug. 6 a "work party" accompanied by four security guards went to the tree "for the purpose of felling it." At that time "North Korean guards told them to leave the tree alone," according to Hummel. Abramowitz said "I guess there was too much of a show of force in the area" for them to proceed.

On Aug. 5, the day before this incident, North Korea had issued a strongly worded formal statement charging the United States and South Korea with seeking to trigger a war on the peninsula. Hummel called this statement "a major intensification" of a longstanding North Korean campaign.

By Aug. 18 it had been decided to trim the tree's foliage rather than fell it. Two U.S. officers, a South Korean officer, five Korean military laborers and a seven-man security force went into the jointly-maintained DMZ area to do so. A security reaction platoon was stationed 200 yards away in case of trouble, and three cameras were trained on the area.

"We were worried about it (the pruning operation) . . . It was a concern obviously," said Abramowitz.

Two North Korean officers and nine

men quickly arrived. Learning that the tree was only to be trimmed, a North Korean officer said, "good." However, after 10 or 15 minutes a North Korean officer ordered the tree-trimmers to stop and threatened the U.N. personnel.

A U.N. officer "indicated that work would continue" and the North Korean sent for reinforcements. When they arrived—bringing the North Korean group to about 30—the North Koreans suddenly attacked, killing the two U.S. officers and injuring four Americans and four South Koreans. Witnesses said the North Koreans used the axes intended for tree-trimming as weapons.

On Aug. 21, three days after the killings, 110 Americans and South Koreans went into the DMZ and cut down the tree while helicopter gunships and Phantom jets flew overhead as a show of force. This was done to "uphold the rights" of the U.N. Command in the area, Hummel said.

NEW YORK TIMES
24 Aug. 1976

Korean Achilles' Heel

The murder of two American officers at Panmunjom last week has provided a grim reminder of what the 41,000 United States troops still stationed in Korea are standing against in that divided country. They are there to deter another attempt at forceful reunification by a dogmatic Communist regime in the North that remains violently unpredictable.

Reinforcement of United States air and naval units in the area was a necessary precaution in the wake of last week's incident in order to impress on North Korea's leaders this country's firm commitment to deter any aggressive designs.

But the events of the past decade should have taught the United States that military deterrence alone is not enough; that in order to be successful, the deployment of American strength abroad must have positive and worthy goals. The American people know what United States forces stand against in Korea; they have a responsibility to ask what they stand for as well.

The answer in South Korea today is not reassuring. As the House International Relations Committee noted earlier this year, the regime of President Park Chung Hee in Seoul is an "authoritarian government" which has been guilty of "gross violations of human rights"—a regime that has steadily intensified a campaign of suppression and arbitrary arrest that is totally at odds with fundamental American principles and with South Korea's own long-term internal strength and stability.

The even more extreme totalitarian cruelty of the Pyongyang zealots cannot justify this increasing repression and disregard of democratic principles in the South. The challenge from the North which has impelled the United States to strengthen—at least temporarily—its military support for South Korea calls for a much more critical look at the shortcomings of the regime that this country's armed forces are helping to defend.

Its repressive acts—signs of weakness and not of strength—make the Park Government a potential liability as a United States ally and the Achilles' heel of American military power in East Asia as was the case with similar unpopular regimes in Southeast Asia. An essential firm stand against the aggressive Stalinists in the North calls for an effective underpinning by a government in the South worth standing for.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Sunday, August 29, 1976

Stiff Prison Sentences a Blow to S. Korean Opposition

By John Saar

Washington Post Foreign Service

SEOUL, Aug. 28—The nonviolent opposition to the government of South Korea suffered a severe blow today when a Seoul judge handed down stiff prison sentences for 18 Christian leaders.

One by one, priest, ministers, professors, theologians and political figures rose in a packed and hushed courtroom to receive sentences ranging from two to eight years for their roles in writing and disseminating a manifesto demanding the full restoration of democracy. They had been charged with agitating for the overthrow of South Korean dictator Park Chung Hee after the document was read at an ecumenical service in Seoul's Roman Catholic Myongdong Cathedral March 1.

The central figure in the case, Kim Dae Jong, a charismatic political leader, hobbled from the courtroom on sciatrica-crippled legs with a defiant smile and an eight-year sentence. He acknowledged shouts of "carry on your fight" with a victory sign and a wave.

A photograph in his home shows him in the same pose waving to a huge crowd during the 1971 election when he almost defeated President Park.

"It is a sad day for Korea. The law has perished," one of the seven defendants who was freed pending appeal told reporters.

Gloom and shock over the sentences more severe than expected—was ap-

rough and tumble press freedom now exists.

Under previous military regimes the corruption and maladministration was, if anything, worse; in the sixties one general had set up over a hundred minor wives in palatial homes around the capital on pilfered US military aid money. But the press attacks the Government with extraordinary

freedom, openly reporting that politician "X" or "Y" had taken money, extorted a bribe, or, as in one recent case, even raped a 14-year-old girl while on a visit to a northern constituency.

But there is no doubt that the problems are serious and some perhaps indeed insoluble. Bangkok has perhaps the worst urban environment in the

world, the roads choked with traffic and fumes and crime so rampant that there are no accurate figures. To travel just over a mile to my hotel often takes nearly an hour in endless traffic jams. So overwhelming is the lawlessness that the police themselves are heavily involved in extortion, drug-running, and theft.

A police general in Bangkok

is now awaiting trial for murdering another general during an anti-corruption investigation. Each day there are reports of arrests for murders. For all that, however, it would be wrong to write off democratic Thailand as an ungovernable mess.

In spite of the years of military rule the educated and the middle class elite have a strong commitment to democracy.

THE BALTIMORE SUN

29 August 1976

PERSPECTIVE

What the U.S. needs is one-China, two-state policy

By RAY S. CLINE

A campaign has been mounted recently in the United States in favor of establishing full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and breaking off the long-standing U.S. relationship with the Republic of China, the non-Communist state on the island of Taiwan. This proposal, which automatically would abrogate the formal Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the United States and the Republic of China, is justified by its proponents simply on grounds that Peking demands it—that is, requires that the United States give up its present links to Taiwan as the price

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for raising its liaison office in Peking to the status of an embassy.

Peking's demand, and the U.S. campaign in favor of acquiescence, raise grave problems of morality and political strategy to which Americans ought to give serious thought. To please Peking, are we entitled to discontinue our support of Nationalist China and let it become highly vulnerable to pressures that eventually will bring it into line as part of the mainland dictatorship? Especially, we must ask, can we justify this step even though Taiwan's 16 million citizens are united in wanting to keep their open society, representative government, elected leaders, internationally oriented free-trading economy, and standard of living about three times higher than that in mainland China? It bodes ill for standards of decency in international relations, as well as for stability in East Asia, if we answer "yes" to these questions.

From President Eisenhower's day in the 1950's until now, U.S. support of the development of a free Chinese society in

the Republic of China and U.S. guarantees of the defense of Taiwan have maintained strategic stability and peace in Northeast Asia. As a result, remarkable strides toward economic and political strength have been made, not only by Japan, the major country in the area allied with the United States, but also by the smaller nations of South Korea and the Republic of China. It is hard to see how the United States can gain by disrupting this stability.

The Republic of China has a modern society firmly linked with the international trading countries essential to U.S. well-being and security. It has a steadily expanding Gross National Product, now at the level of about \$15 billion annually. Its present annual foreign trade of about \$12 billion is more than that of all of mainland China. Its trade with the United States is several times that of mainland China. It also maintains well-trained and equipped armed forces, about 500,000 strong, thus making a major contribution to the security of the East Asian island chain stretching from

Japan to Indonesia, on which depend U.S. strategic defense of the West Pacific and protection of the vital shipping lanes on the periphery of all of Asia.

The United States cannot give any kind of credible security assurance to Taiwan once we have formally recognized it to be legally a province—a subordinate part—of another state. If we withdraw formal recognition of Taiwan as an independent political entity, despite the fact it is now a state in every normal meaning of the word, our solemn treaty with it will have been unilaterally abrogated and we will invite a chain of similar opportunistic capitulations to Peking.

This act of ours would make Taiwan the only country of any consequence in the world to be denied formal diplomatic ties to the main members of the international community of nations. It would surely be viewed as disgraceful and rather frightening in the eyes of other small nations for the United States to do this solely to satisfy the rival political claims of another state, however large and powerful.

Despite these facts there now appears to be a quiet but concerted move by State Department officials to redeem former President Nixon's and Henry A. Kissinger's implicit promises to Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Communist party chairman, and the recently deceased Premier Chou En-Lai. They are supported by sinologists anxious to be admitted to the ancient seats of Chinese culture on the mainland, and by journalists representing news media which are hoping to get bureaus opened in Peking. They are also urged on by anti-Soviet geopoliticians who believe, naively I am afraid, that we can manipulate the vast disordered society of mainland China against the U.S.S.R. These groups constitute the new China lobby, which is agitating to extend diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic (Peking) and to withdraw it from the Republic of China (Taiwan).

This proposal to betray a reliable ally

of many years standing is justified by some proponents as fulfilling a tacit, implicit pledge in the Shanghai communique of February, 1972, a document of no formal legal standing signed by then-Premier Chou, now dead, and Mr. Nixon, ousted from the White House 18 months after the signing. Why secret understandings reached by these two men four years ago could possibly require the United States to do something now plainly contrary to its interests in East Asia is something that cannot be explained.

The Republic of China is a political entity of some consequence, and its existence cannot be cavalierly disregarded in a rush to ingratiate ourselves with the politically troubled regime of the failing Chairman Mao. This government controls 16 million Nationalist Chinese resident on Taiwan and adjacent small islands. Fourteen million of them were born there, and they join with the Chinese who came from the mainland in 1949 in wishing to be free and independent of rule by Chairman Mao's Communist government. The legally constituted government in Taiwan claims the rightful or de jure political responsibility for ultimately ruling all of China. This is a matter which Peking disputes. Who is correct will be settled only by history. What cannot be disputed, however, is that the government of the Republic of China is in full de facto control of the territory and population of Taiwan and the Pescadores, just as much as the People's Republic is in de facto control of the mainland.

In many ways Taiwan is the Israel of the Far East, a nation outnumbered and beleaguered by intolerant enemies nearby and ultimately dependent for its security on strategic support from the United States. Like the Israelis, the Nationalist-Chinese are united politically in their determination to defend themselves and to maintain an independent status regardless of the pressures on them.

Buying goodwill from the leaders of the People's Republic just at this time is itself of dubious advantage. The political chaos in mainland China surrounding the struggle for succession to the power wielded by the senescent Chairman Mao would seem to any reasonable observer to argue that nothing can be gained by making political concessions to a nation whose leaders and policies in a few months may be entirely different from what they are now said to be. The future of the whole Mao government is uncertain, not only in Washington, but also in Peking. The very uncertainties are used as arguments for acting quickly while Chairman Mao is alive, the logic pre-

sumably being that we can get in under the wire before a greater enmity than now exists in Peking develops toward the United States.

President Ford has not so far succumbed to pressure to move on to early diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic. It makes especially little sense just now in view of the confused leadership struggle going on in mainland China. If there is any specific track in our foreign policy today where we may be walking into a disaster, it is our inclination toward sacrificing the interests of allies in making unnecessary concessions to the People's Republic.

A new and unfortunate phase in U.S. thinking about Asia began with the "shocks" administered to Japan and other Asian friends as a result of Mr. Kissinger's secret trips to Peking in 1971, and Mr. Nixon's visit of February, 1972. These U.S. contacts were eagerly sought by Chairman Mao because of fear of the Soviet Union. They were welcomed by Mr. Nixon in hopes they would frighten Moscow into closer cooperation with Washington. Basically, improving contacts with China is not a bad idea. The future of mainland China is clearly a critical element in international affairs. On the other hand, the cooperativeness of Communist China should not be exaggerated; Peking could have had better relations with the United States at any time in the past 20 years if the People's Republic had been willing to renounce the use of force to recapture Taiwan. This it has been unwilling to do. This is the reason for maintaining our long-established strategic commitment to defend the people and the territory of Taiwan from forcible conquest and subordination under the Communist dictatorship, which the people on Taiwan do not want.

The first partial betrayal of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan occurred when the White House torpedoed efforts by the State Department and other friends of the Nationalist Chinese to maintain a seat for the Republic of China when the People's Republic gained its entry into the United Nations. It was the revelation of Mr. Kissinger's presence in Peking in October, 1971, while the crucial U.N. debate was going on, that cut the ground from under the Republic of China's efforts to retain its membership.

It was no surprise, then, when the Shanghai communique in February, 1972, somewhat equivocally endorsed the "One-China" concept on which Peking based its claim to rule over Taiwan—to be made good in their view by force if necessary. While White House verbal support for "old friends" accompanied these pronouncements, there was no firm restatement by the United States of commitments concerning Taiwan; there has been instead a persistent emphasis from that time forward on the overriding necessity of improving relations with the People's Republic. Thus, for five years U.S. policy has implied with-

out openly saying so that Taiwan ought to be resubordinated to the mainland in some fashion or other.

What then is the right model for U.S. foreign policy with respect to the two states that call themselves China? It is so plain that only a fascination with Metternichean diplomatic game-playing can confuse the issue. We should return to the position adopted for a brief time in 1971 by then-Secretary of State William P. Rogers. It is basically a one-China, two-state position, proposing fair treatment for both the Republic of China and the People's Republic. This position calls for accepting the reality that the People's Republic has de facto control of the mainland territory of China and offering to extend full diplomatic recognition to it on a de facto basis without subscribing to its de jure claim to be the rightful rulers of all territory that is called Chinese.

At the same time, to be fair, we should also announce coolly but firmly, that the United States does not permit any other government to dictate our decisions on our international relations with other states. We should say flatly that the United States will maintain full diplomatic relations and honor our defense treaty with the Republic of China. Accordingly, U.S. policy should favor all nations' recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan) as, de facto, an independent state, a political entity with full sovereignty. We would not by adopting this policy be endorsing the de jure claims of any state to be the eventual rightful regime for all China, but we would be facing facts as they exist today.

This solution is similar to the German model, whereby the United States has established diplomatic relations with East Germany, a rigidly Communist state, while maintaining full diplomatic relations and defense treaty guarantees with our ally, West Germany. This is the only realistic basis compatible with American moral and political principles for dealing with the China problem for the foreseeable future.

Latin America

THE WASHINGTON POST

August 25, 1976

Saul Landau

What Future For Jamaica?

I return from a five-week stay in Jamaica with the sinking feeling that our government, or a part of it, may be intervening in Jamaican affairs as it did in Chile. Even though the State Department has officially denied all such allegations, as they did in the Chile case, I fear that once again U.S. agencies are involved in activities designed to "destabilize" (the word the CIA used for its operation in Chile) the elected government of Jamaica.

While in Jamaica I read reports in U.S. and Jamaican publications charging that Jamaica, under Prime Minister Michael Manley, had become an unstable, mismanaged mess and was about to go Communist and become a Cuban satellite.

My own conclusions were quite different. The Manley government has accomplished in five years far more than the opposition government did in 10, despite adverse world conditions. Manley has raised Jamaica's national income considerably and reduced unemployment slightly.

The physical and cultural condition of Jamaica's majority is equivalent to that of most Third World countries. Great inequities of wealth separate a small elite from the poor mass. Bauxite, sugar and tourism constitute the basic sources of revenue. As with most poor countries, Jamaica's poverty results from its inability to match the prices paid for goods produced in the advanced countries with prices received for its own raw materials. So in 1976 Jamaicans must produce double their sugar output of 1956 to buy the same number of tractors. This problem of deteriorating terms of trade was further exacerbated when oil prices rose.

Yet, unlike leaders in most developing countries faced with this predicament, almost all of the steps taken by Manley since he won office in 1972 have been designed to relieve the suffering of the poor, by democratic parliamentary actions, and without infringing on anyone's constitutional rights.

Manley and the Peoples National Party have declared a commitment to socialism—as well as to democracy and rule by law. This commitment, when taken in the context of modest land reform and tougher bauxite terms for U.S. and Canadian multinational corporations, had conjured up, in the minds of some Americans and Jamaicans, the fear of Jamaica's "going Communist." The Manley government's relations with Cuba,

Jamaica's closest neighbor, have given further impetus to the charge.

A major flap arose when James Reston of the New York Times, among others, reported that Cuba was training Jamaican security forces. This turned out to be nothing more than limited training for some of the Prime Minister's personal guards. Little was said about Canadian, English and U.S. police training programs for Jamaica's police, which to-

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gether comprise almost the whole program. Similarly, the opposition emphasizes Jamaica's commercial and cultural ties with Cuba, while ignoring ties of much greater volume with Mexico, Venezuela, England, and the United States.

This does not mean that Jamaican-Cuban relations are weak or unimportant. It does mean that those relations must be placed in a proper perspective and not viewed hysterically. The charges that Jamaica is a satellite of Cuba has no basis in fact or logic.

Even more serious was the outbreak of political violence, greatly increased in the last four months. The targets for murder, bombing and arson have not been random individuals or sites. Rather the victims have been Peoples National Party supporters, and most often youth organizers. The gunmen and bombers themselves do not appear capable of planning such devastatingly precise violence, as that which took place at Kingston's Orange Lane. Many Jamaicans suspected the CIA.

On May 19, 1976, I visited the site of that bombed out cluster of houses the morning after the devastation occurred. From on the scene witnesses I discovered that some 50 armed men drove up, blocking both street entrances with automobiles and hurled back fire bombs into the homes. Those who tried to escape were forced back into the flaming

structures, while some of the gunmen held off the fire trucks. When police arrived the gunmen opened fire at them and then orderly retreated in trained military fashion. The result of this particular act of violence was 11 dead, most of them children, and hundreds of people homeless.

The charges of economic mismanagement against Manley are often as difficult to pin down as the charges of communism. He has used the budget to benefit the poorest. Investment in education has resulted in 150,000 adult Jamaicans becoming literate since 1972. His investment in land reform has thus far freed some 50,000 acres for cultivation, and provided some irrigation, credit and machinery to small farmers.

In his approach to government Manley has emphasized popular participation and local government. He has helped create community councils and encouraged more worker participation in industry. His own work style of visiting and knowing all parts of the country show him to be a politician in the best and indeed most noble British-American democratic tradition.

But there can be no doubt that the internal attack on the Manley government—a campaign of violence and lies plus strikes—combined with the external attack from the U.S. press, plus a currency lead and what on June 20, Mr. Manley told me was a "mysterious U.S. credit squeeze," add up to a destabilization campaign, one that no small, poor, developing country can afford or should have to endure.

Mr. Manley used a state of emergency to stop the violence. It has stopped. A successful Caribbean Folk Festival, Carifesta, took place in early August to the delight of thousand of tourists, without so much as a fistfight.

If we are destabilizing Jamaica in the long run, we will have to pay in conscience. If we are not, we should then take positive steps to help this poor country develop, and back her democratic institutions with credit, assistance, and fair description in our press.